Fisheries

Somalia's coastal and offshore seas appear to have considerable potential for fisheries, as shown by studies of nutrient levels and estimates of fish populations obtained from surveys by research vessels, including a joint FAO/Norwegian survey conducted during 1975–76. Potential annual catches of pelagic (open sea) fish such as anchovies, sardines, herring, tuna, and mackerel were estimated at about 108,000 tons. Availability of demersal (bottom dwelling) fish, including flounder, groupers, porgies, and snappers, was estimated at 40,000 tons. In addition roughly 30,000 tons of sharks and rays, about 2,000 tons of spiny lobsters, and 400 tons of shrimp could be taken. Squid, cuttlefish, octopus, oysters, clams, and sea cucumbers also appeared exploitable, but insufficient data were available in 1981 to determine sustainable catches.

Commercial demersal fishing is affected by the rocky, uneven character of much of the sea bottom of the relatively narrow continental shelf (about thirty kilometers wide along parts of the Gulf of Aden, up to fifty kilometers off the northeast coast, and seldom wider than fifteen kilometers from Ras Hafun southward to the Kenyan border). As a result trawling can be conducted only in certain areas of the gulf and Indian Ocean coasts (see fig. 9). A major problem in pelagic fishing is the unpredictability of fish locations caused by the irregularity in the start of the monsoons and the subsequent changes in direction of the fish-bearing surface currents (see Climate, ch. 2). The winds during a good part of the year also cause heavy seas that make fishing by small motorized craft unsafe.

Fishing is the main source of livelihood of many of the estimated 90,000 people living in the small fishing towns and villages along the coasts. Full-time fishermen were believed to number about 4,000 in the early 1980s. Historically fishing had been of little significance to the economy as a whole, and in the 1970s it still contributed less than 1 percent of GDP. In the past the non-Somali inhabitants of the Giuba Islands off the southwest coast and the Somali fishermen of the villages to the north disposed of their catches in local markets or sold them to the traders who traveled by dhow along the coast about twice a year. Sun-dried and salted fish, tortoiseshell, sharkfins, and other marine products were taken by these dhow traders in exchange for fishing gear, dugout canoes (from India), and other supplies. There was extremely limited marketing of fish inland, which was made difficult by the lack of road communications and even more so by the widespread aversion of Somalis to eating fish (although some fresh fish were sold in the larger ports).

By about 1970 the dhow trade had declined greatly, affecting the prosperity of the fishing communities, and some fishermen moved inland seeking other opportunities. The government be-

Bananas are Somalia's principal commercial crop.
Courtesy United Nations



Figure 9. Fishing Towns, Villages, Settlements, and Potential Trawl Fishing Areas

gan encouraging the formation of fishing cooperatives under the provisions of the Law on Cooperative Development of 1974, and a total of eighteen were reported in existence in 1979. The basic principles of the cooperatives included joint handling, marketing,

and the purchase of boats, gear, and other fishing needs. Cooperatives at Berbera, Mogadishu, Marka, and Kismaayo were able to sell most or all of their fish fresh, and several cooperatives on the north coast were able to dispose of part of their catches to the fish canneries there (see Manufacturing, this ch.). Fish not used fresh locally had to be salted and sold to the government monopoly corporation SOMALFISH. The cooperatives reportedly have not had a marked effect on raising production. Management staffs have consisted largely of untrained local personnel, and individual incentives have apparently been weakened by the absence of direct responsibility for the use and maintenance of the several hundred motorized fishing boats, gear, and equipment furnished by the government to the cooperatives for communal use without financial obligation. Particularly damaging to production has been the deterioration of the motorboats, use of which had been expected to increase the catch materially. As many as three-quarters of the total boats provided had become unserviceable within three years largely because of the lack of individual accountability for proper care and use, although the government's failure to train mechanics and shortages of parts was also responsible.

Four new fishery settlements were established along the coast in the mid–1970s, populated by a total of about 15,000 nomads made destitute by the 1974–75 drought. They were organized along the lines of collectives under the administration of the Coastal Development Project, an autonomous government agency, and efforts were made (at first with Soviet aid) to train them as fishermen and in skills associated with fisheries. Fishing operations and conditions, including unusability of motorized boats, appeared generally similar to those in the cooperatives. Two of the settlements (at Eyl and Cadale) were isolated from inland markets by lack of road communications, and all fish were sun-dried, salted, and sold to SOMALFISH. Those at El Hamed and Baraawe were close to the Mogadishu-Kismaayo main road and were able to sell some of their catch fresh. About 9 to 10 percent of the refugees were reported to have left the settlements by some time in 1979.

Modern commercial fishing dates from late 1974 after the establishment of the joint Somali-Soviet company SOMALFISH. Subsequently ten Soviet trawlers equipped to freeze catches operated until late 1977, when the Soviet Union withdrew from the venture after the expulsion of its advisers from Somalia. The total catch during the period of operation was 9,670 tons of fish, and 3,730 tons of spiny lobsters. Training of Somalis was to have been carried out, but little actually occurred. The Soviet vessels, moreover, did not provide the government the detailed operational information that could have been useful for planning and execut-

ing future fishing ventures. In 1977 Somalia entered into a joint venture with Iraq under which Iraqis were to operate trawlers in Somali waters. Fishing began that year, but information on later operations was unavailable in late 1981. Somalia also licensed several Italian freezer trawlers, three of which fished in 1978 and at least to mid–1979. Additionally SOMALFISH acquired fishing vessels of its own, including two prawn trawlers constructed in Australia that were launched in 1979; these have been operated under contract by an Australian company. In 1980 three freezer trawlers were also ordered from Italy (financed by the Italian government), which were to be delivered about mid–1981. Another nine smaller trawlers were secured from Yugoslavia, but did not appear to be in use because of unsuitability for Somalia's rough-water coastal conditions. According to foreign observers the number of vessels operating or expected to be operating in offshore waters in about 1981 did not appear to offer any immediate threat to either pelagic or demersal fish stocks, but concern has been expressed about overfishing of spiny lobsters.

During the early 1970s the overall annual catch averaged possibly 4,000 to 5,000 tons, mostly taken in inshore coastal waters. The provision of motorized fishing boats to the cooperatives and fishing settlements in the mid–1970s resulted in substantial increases in catches, which reached an estimated high of 7,900 tons in 1975. They declined thereafter, however, as more and more motorboats became inoperable and in 1978, the latest year for which statistics were available, the catch had dropped to about 3,550 tons. The Soviet fishing fleet reported 1,370 tons of fish and 680 tons of lobsters taken in 1974, in its first period of operations. The 1977 total had reached 4,550 tons at the time the fleet was withdrawn late in the year. The catch in 1978 by licensed Italian operators was reported at only 255 tons. Offshore operations were continued in 1979 by Italian vessels, which through June (latest data) had taken close to 460 tons of fish and lobsters.

Forestry

The country's forests—broadly defined as areas of vegetation dominated by trees of any size—cover about 8.6 million hectares, or 13.7 percent of the land area. They consist almost entirely of savanna woodlands, of which about 2.5 million hectares have dense tree stands and about 6 million hectares only scattered tree covering. In addition there are about 100,000 hectares of largely degraded high forests located partly in the mountain ranges of the north and partly in the far southwest (see Terrain, Vegetation, and Drainage, ch. 2). The forestry sector was estimated roughly to have contributed an average of somewhat over 8 percent of GDP at factor cost annually during the 1970s. Frankincense and myrrh

President Mohamed Siad Barre opening a fishing cooperative project
Courtesy Somali Embassy, Washington

obtained from forests in the northeast were important earners of foreign exchange, but little timber was produced. The principal economic value of the forests was as the main source of fuel (either used directly as firewood or converted into charcoal) and as a supplementary supplier of forage.

Excessive cutting and overgrazing have led to steady deterioration of the forests. One of the most serious consequences has been expanding desertification, which follows deforestation almost immediately in many areas because of climatic conditions. Government efforts to protect and restore the forests were included in the First Five Year Plan (1963–1967) and each subsequent development plan through the Three Year Plan (1979–1981). Only minor progress appeared to have been made until the mid–1970s when aid was received from the World Food Program and FAO, and under the Five Year Development Programme (1974–1978), a tree planting program averaging about 150 hectares a year was carried out. Two main nurseries were also expanded, twelve

small regional ones were established, and trial plantings of teak, gmelina (an Australisian hardwood), mahogany, and eucalyptus were completed. Some planting of tree stands near towns to provide future fuel was also initiated. In the coastal area of southern Somalia, where sand dune drifting (caused primarily by overgrazing) poses a serious threat to agricultural areas and human installations, experimental stabilization planting was carried out.

The Three Year Plan (1979–1981) had as one of its main projects an increase in the size of the forestry staff and improvement of its quality—factors that were considered vital for adequate implementation of future forest policies. Among other projects, forestry reserves were to be established, including reserves protected from grazing and others where controlled production of charcoal was to be instituted. Additional forestry plantations, some to provide firewood to nearby towns, were also planned. The program to stabilize dunes along the coast was being continued. Implementation of many of the projects was dependent, however, on international assistance. Preparation of a ten-year forestry development program, which would include use of expatriate forestry consultants to carry out investigative studies, was planned, but this effort was also dependent on funding by external donors.

Mining

Mineral resources believed to have considerable potential value have been found in various parts of Somalia. Through late 1981, however, development of the mining sector had been minimal, and mining's contribution to GDP was relatively small. Although production data were negligible, government sources estimated that during the 1970s the sector's annual contribution to total GDP had, at most, been only slightly over 1 percent and in the late 1970s had been even lower. During the colonial period the British administration in the north established a geological department that discovered tin ores in present-day Boosaaso District that were mined commercially until World War II. Significant deposits of gypsum and anhydrite were found near Berbera, and occurrences of columbite, lead-zinc, tantalite, and several other metalic minerals were also located. In the south exploration was left to private interests by the Italian administration, and little systematic information on mineral potentials was developed. After independence a major program of exploration was undertaken from the early 1960s by the UNDP. Among significant finds were a sizable deposit of low-grade iron ore and deposits of uranium, thorium, and several rare earth minerals. UNDP activities in the direct investigation of mineral potentials continued to the mid–1970s; further exploration has been carried on by the Somali Geological Survey with UNDP help. Exploration for petroleum and natural gas (the possible existence of which is indicated by geologi-

cal conditions) began after World War II. It was continuing in 1981 under cooperative ventures between the government and private oil companies, but commercial deposits had not been located through mid–1981 (see Petroleum Supply and Domestic Resources, this ch.).

Actual mineral exploitation had been limited through late 1981 and principally involved materials quarried for construction. Salt was obtained through solar evaporation, and some sepiolite (meerschaum), of which large high-grade deposits are located in Galguduud Region, was apparently also mined for local consumption. The principal nonhydrocarbon potentials for development in 1981 included limestone suitable for making cement, large quantities of which were situated in the area of Berbera, where a cement plant was under construction in 1981, and near Baardheere in Gedo Region (see Manufacturing, this ch.). Other nonmetallic minerals of importance were the gypsum-anhydrite deposits near Berbera—reportedly among the world's largest—quartz sands suitable for the domestic manufacture of glass, kaolin, and high-grade piezoquartz (used in electronics and optical instruments) found in pegamite dikes throughout an extensive area in the northwest.

At least two large uranium deposits—estimates of sizes varied—had been identified: one in Galguduud Region and the other in Buur Hakaba District of Bay Region. The latter deposit also contained thorium. Several foreign firms secured prospecting concessions in Bay Region in the 1960s, but by about the mid–1970s all had relinquished their holdings. In the early 1980s the Somali Arab Mining Company, a joint venture between the governmental Somali Mining Company (two-thirds interest) and the Jordanian Arab Mining Company (one-third interest), held an exclusive license for exploration and mining in an area covering 57,000 square kilometers. The area encompassed the deposit in Galguduud Region and other deposits in adjacent Madug Region. Iron ore deposits, estimated at about 200 million tons and having an average content of about 35 percent iron, were found in Dhiinsoor District of Bay Region, and other deposits had been reported from several parts of the country. In 1981 development both of the uranium and iron deposits remained in the exploratory and evaluation stage.

Manufacturing

At independence the country's modern manufacturing establishments (defined as enterprises having five or more workers) consisted of one large operation—the Italian-owned sugar refinery at Jowhar—a few medium-sized, and roughly 100 small-sized manufacturing operations. In the 1960s about a dozen new large and medium-sized enterprises were built. Most were state-owned

plants for which financing had been provided from abroad. The state enterprises included five large plants: a meat processing factory at Kismaayo, a dairy plant at Mogadishu, and a fish cannery at Laas Qoray on the northern coast, all constructed with Soviet assistance; the SOMALTEX cotton textile plant at Balcad north of Mogadishu, largely funded by West Germany; and a fish factory in Caluula District on the northern coast, financed by the United States. Public sector involvement was further extended during the decade by the government's acquisition of a 50 percent interest in the Jowhar sugar plant in 1963.

In the 1970s the funds for manufacturing expansion were again overwhelmingly from foreign sources for government projects and, although private sector involvement occurred, the major additions to manufacturing facilities were state operations. They included a cigarette and match factory, a packaging plant making cardboard boxes and polyethylene bags, a fruit and vegetable canning plant, a wheat flour and pasta factory, several grain mills, an iron foundry, and a petroleum refinery. Extensive rehabilitation of the Jowhar sugar plant (nationalized in 1970) also was carried out. New machinery was installed at a long inoperative brick and tile factory near Afgooye, and SOMALTEX facilities were greatly expanded. (In 1981 SOMALTEX reportedly was among the best equipped textile plants in Africa.) At the end of the decade work was under way on a second sugar factory, situated near Jilib in Jubbada Hoose Region—this plant commenced operations in September 1980—and a cement plant at Berbera that was still under construction in late 1981. Foreign grant and loan assistance again played a major role and included Chinese aid for the cigarette and match factory; Saudi Arabian, United Arab Emirates, and Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) development fund assistance toward construction of the second sugar factory; and IDA funds and Yugoslav technical assistance for setting up the iron foundry. Iraq furnished the funds for the oil refinery.

According to a government industrial survey, there were fifty-three modern state-owned manufacturing enterprises in 1978, of which about a dozen were in the large-size category. They employed 9,735 workers, who constituted 78 percent of the modern manufacturing labor force, and their combined production accounted for more than three-quarters of manufacturing gross output. The underlying reason for state ownership of the large plants constructed in the 1960s appears to have been the size of the required investments, which were beyond the capability of the private sector. Although this same factor remained equally important in the 1970s, the belief that all major productive facilities should be publicly owned so that profits would accrue to the gov-

ernment for use in other socially desirable undertakings has been preeminent since the military takeover in 1969 and the subsequent adoption of a socialist program.

In the late 1970s the state industries (except the wheat flour and pasta factory) showed little or no profit or suffered losses. Production was stagnant or, at the end of the decade, below earlier highs (see table 10, Appendix). Among contributory factors were the lack of managerial staff and skilled workers, and declining productivity attributed largely to inadequate financial incentives for employees. Other major factors were production capacities in excess of domestic demand, insufficient domestic and import supplies and, in the case of the fish canneries and meat packing plant, the lack of export markets. Examples were the cardboard box and plastic bag company's output, which was taken mainly by the banana trade and to a lesser extent by the fish and meat canneries. Its capacity was far beyond requirements at the beginning of the 1980s. The canneries, whose production was aimed at the export market, were plagued by inadequate supplies, a shortage of spare parts, and after the departure of Soviet personnel in 1977, by loss of the Soviet Union as a main market. Facilities of the fruit processing plant were regularly underutilized because of shortage of domestic raw materials, and the cigarette and match factory suffered similarly from a scarcity of imported raw materials. Shortages of supply at the milk plant appeared to be caused mainly by payment to producers of prices that were well below those in the open market. The output of neither the fruit nor milk plant satisfied domestic demand. Epitomizing the problems of the state sector in general was SOMALTEX. After a sharp rise in output resulting from earlier installation of new machinery, the plant registered a major production decline in 1979 caused by a shortage of skilled workers to operate effectively its sophisticated equipment, its management's inability to coordinate production flows, inadequate raw material supplies, and production interruptions because of fuel and energy shortages.

In 1978 there were in operation 224 private enterprises having five or more employees. Total employment was almost 2,750, or 22 percent of the modern manufacturing sector work force. Almost half of the plants were engaged in the processing or production of food, beverages, clothing, and footwear. Among the larger private establishments in production in the late 1970s were a plant that manufactured chemicals, detergents, shampoos, and insecticides; two soft drink plants; and two tanneries. Between 70 and 75 percent of the raw materials used by the chemical plant were imported, as were most of the main ingredients of the beverage plants. The tanneries—one at Mogadishu, the other at Baraawe—processed domestic raw materials and produced shoes, sandals,

and boots. A meat cannery had been in operation at Mogadishu until 1977 when it closed because of supply problems and financial difficulties; it remained closed through 1980, the latest date for which information was available. Two private fish canneries were also closed in 1979 (1980 and 1981 status unknown) because of a lack of fish, a shortage of spare parts, and the need for new machinery.

Outside the modern sector, according to a survey taken in the mid–1970s, there were more than 6,000 manufacturing units belonging to what has frequently been called the informal sector. These establishments having fewer than five workers were mainly single proprietor and family operations. They produced a wide range of goods that included handloomed cloth, clothing, footwear, furniture, baskets, pottery, various other ceramic products, hand tools, rope, vegetable oils, and baked goods. These small industries were a major provider of employment and livelihood, especially for the urban population.

Energy Supply and Potentials

In 1981 Somalia's basic sources of energy were domestic wood and charcoal and imported petroleum. Oil shale deposits had been discovered in the north, but their potential had not yet been assessed. Drilling for hydrocarbon fuels carried out in several parts of the country had resulted only in trace finds of natural gas. There were no reports of coal or lignite. The known deposits of uranium had no direct bearing on the domestic energy situation. The most significant unexploited domestic energy source was the large hydroelectric generating potential present in the flow of the Juba River, but its development was in a preliminary stage in 1981.

Electric Power

All public electric-power generating facilities have been state-owned since 1970, when the country's largest power plant and distribution system (an Italian-owned enterprise at Mogadishu) was nationalized. In 1981 public facilities consisted of about eighty widely separated oil-fired thermal and diesel plants that were completely dependent on imported oil for operation. Because of the great distances between most plants, interconnections were uneconomical, and individual towns and localities were served only by local grids. This situation had led various industrial and public sector operations to install their own generating units. However, the remoteness of some plants from fuel sources and poor access road conditions reportedly resulted in fuel shortages from time to time and reduction or interruption of power supply.

In late 1981 information on generating capacity and use of electric power was available only for Mogadishu. At the time of its nationalization in 1970 the Mogadishu plant (an oil-fired installation) had an installed capacity of 7,100 kilowatts. Increased de-

mand resulting from the rapid growth of the city and its environs and the establishment of new industries in the area led to installation of additional generating units that more than doubled the installed capacity to 17,980 kilowatts in 1978. Capacity was again almost doubled in 1979 to 34,480 kilowatts when a power plant newly constructed at Gesira, a suburb of Mogadishu, went into service. This plant had been equipped with diesel generators in order to use residual fuel from the nearby oil refinery that opened in 1978. Electric power production by the Mogadishu facilities rose from 21 million kilowatt hours in 1970 to 47.9 million in 1979. In 1970 lighting needs accounted for almost four-fifths of total consumption. Slightly over one-fifth was consumed in the operation of industrial and other equipment. This proportion remained relatively constant through 1979.

The National Electric Energy Authority, the government corporation responsible for public power generation and supply, planned to expand and modernize the generating facilities in the three northern towns of Berbera, Burco, and Hargeysa and at Kismaayo and Baydhabo in the south. Feasibility studies were reportedly completed in mid-1981, but further action was dependent on securing the foreign financing needed to carry out the projects. The major program for increasing the country's power supply during the 1980s was the development of hydroelectric generating facilities at the proposed multipurpose dam near Baardheere on the Juba River. An installed capacity of about 100,000 kilowatts was planned. The estimated overall cost of the project was relatively enormous for Somalia (US$640 million in early 1981, mostly in foreign exchange). Foreign funding, which had not yet been assured in late 1981, was the absolute requisite for proceeding with the undertaking.

Petroleum Supply and Domestic Resources

Somaia was entirely dependent on imports to meet its petroleum needs in 1981. Until their nationalization in 1970, three foreign-owned firms imported and distributed all petroleum products. Thereafter, until the rift between Somalia and the Soviet Union in 1977, the latter was the sole supplier to the state-owned successor distributing operations. Saudi Arabia subsequently became the chief oil source until late 1978 when Iraq began providing crude oil for a newly opened refinery at Gesira built under a joint Somali-Iraqi government project. The new plant had a design capacity of 10,000 barrels a day, or 500,000 tons a year, and was equipped to produce gasoline, kerosine, and various other fuel oils. During 1979 it operated at about 40 percent of capacity, producing 223,259 tons of refined products. Output was expected to expand; but after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980, Iraq suspended deliveries, and Somalia was again forced

for the time being to import refined products. The refinery was reportedly back in operation, according to information available in mid–1981, although the source of its crude petroleum was unknown.

The possibility of finding petroleum and/or natural gas deposits in Somalia is sufficiently promising that foreign oil companies have engaged from time to time since the end of World War II in exploratory drilling. The principal active operations in 1981 were by a subsidiary of Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) of the United States; Deutsche Texaco, the West German subsidiary of the American Texas Corporation (Texaco); and a joint venture by Cities Service Company of the United States and AGIP (Afrique), owned by the Italian government. ARCO received a two-year exploratory rights concession covering 124,230 square kilometers in Galguduud and Mudug regions in October 1979. Through mid–1981 one well had been drilled and had proved to be dry. Deutsche Texaco signed a similar agreement in December 1979 for a concession in Jubbada Hoose Region covering 34,965 square kilometers; drilling had not yet started in mid–1981. At the latter date only preliminary work was under way on the Cities Service-AGIP 42,406 square kilometer concession in northeast Somalia.

Transportation

At independence Somalia inherited a poorly developed transportation infrastructure consisting of a few reasonably good local roads in the more populated areas in the south and northwest and four undeveloped ports having only lighterage facilities. During the next two decades considerable improvement was made with the help of substantial foreign aid in the form of loans, grants, and technical assistance. By 1981 all-weather roads connected some of the more important towns and the northern and southern parts of the country, and modern facilities had been installed at three principal ports. Regular domestic air service was also in operation (see fig.10). But the country still lacked much of the road infrastructure essential to open up still largely undeveloped areas and to tie together isolated economies in various administrative regions.

Roads

According to Somali government statistics the country's road system in 1978 totaled 19,380 kilometers. About 11 percent (2,153 kilometers) were hard-surfaced, 36 percent (7,247 kilometers) had gravel or earth surfaces, and the remaining 53 percent (10,280 kilometers) were essentially rudimentary dirt tracks. At the start of the First Five Year Plan 1963–1967 there were only about 600 kilometers of asphalt-surfaced roads (of which over half consisted of a road from Mogadishu to the Ethiopian border built during the Italo-Ethiopian War of the 1930s). The rest served



Figure 10. Transportation System

mainly the banana plantations along the Juba and Shabeelle rivers. At that time the gravel-earth roads of the north were mostly impassable during the rainy season.

By 1971 paved roads had increased to over 1,000 kilometers. Except for minor local sections all were in the south, and it was not

until 1975 that the first major paved road was completed in the north between Hargeysa and Berbera. Practically all of these new main roads were financed through multilateral assistance from IDA and the European Development Fund (EDF). The most significant road built during the 1970s, however, was the 1,045-kilometer hard-surfaced road constructed with Chinese financing and work crew participation from Beled Weyne (about 300 kilometers north of Mogadishu on the earlier Italian road) to Burco in the north. Begun in 1973 and completed in 1978, this road tied together for the first time the northern and southern parts of the country. Additional road construction was reportedly carried out in the late 1970s and in 1980, but information on completions was unavailable. In a statement made in early 1981 the government implied that further improvement of the main road system would be largely contingent on additional external aid.

In the late 1970s about 10,500 vehicles were reported in operation throughout the country. Motor transport was predominantly in the private sector, although about 20 percent of the trucks belonged to government agencies. Lack of spare parts and adequate facilities for repair and maintenance were major problems. A considerable but unknown amount of cargo was actually transported by camels and donkeys, the former primarily in the country's vast arid regions, the latter mainly in the towns and cities and between adjacent communities.

Civil Aviation

In 1981 Somalia had about twenty widely scattered civilian airfields and usable landing strips. Only three, the international airports at Mogadishu and Hargeysa and the airport at Kismaayo, had hard-surface runways. Scheduled domestic service, centered on Mogadishu, was furnished by the national air carrier, Somali Airlines (SOMALAIR), to nine regional centers. SOMALAIR provided international services to Djibouti, Nairobi, points in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states, Cairo, and Rome. The airline also had landing rights at Frankfurt where, under agreement with Lufthansa, all SOMALAIR planes were serviced. There was an agreement with Pakistan to operate flights to that country, although service had not started as of late 1981. Other international service was provided by Alitalia, Aeroflot (services had continued despite the cooling of Soviet-Somali relations during 1977), and a number of other international and regional airlines (see Relations with Communist States, ch. 4). International cargo flights on a regular basis were made between London and Mogadishu by Tradewind Airways.

SOMALAIR has been operating since 1964, when it was founded as a joint stock company in which equal shares were held by the Somali government and Italy's Alitalia. Services were lim-

ited to domestic operations until 1968, when regional flights began. Overall management was by Alitalia under contract until 1970, when the government holding was increased to fifty-one percent, and active Somali participation in running the airline began. Full control of operations was assumed in 1978 without any further increase in the government equity. In 1978 SOMALAIR entered into a cooperative arrangement with Lufthansa for the training in West Germany of new pilots, mechanics, and other categories of airline personnel.

In mid-1981 SOMALAIR's aircraft consisted of two Boeing 720Bs, two Boeing 707s, two DC-3s, two Fokker F-27s, and four Cessnas. Revenue passengers and cargo both increased in the late 1970s, reaching a total of 125,528 passengers and 845 tons of cargo in 1979, the latest figures available. Until at least the early 1970s the airline operated at a loss that was covered by subsidies from the Somali government. It was said to have been profitable in the late 1970s, but the airline's accounts were unavailable for checking.

Ports and Shipping

Four main ports handled virtually all of the country's foreign trade in 1981. Three were deepwater ports, including Berbera, a natural harbor on the Gulf of Aden, and Mogadishu and Kismaayo on the Indian Ocean, both of which are protected by breakwaters. The fourth port—Marka, also on the Indian Ocean—continued in 1981 to be a lighterage facility that required ships to anchor offshore in open roadsteads while unloading and loading. Mogadishu also had been a lighterage port until 1976 when the first of five deepwater berths was completed under a project financed mainly by IDA and a grant from EDF. At the official opening in late 1977, Mogadishu's facilities included three general cargo berths, a banana berth, and a specialized livestock berth. In 1978 IDA furnished additional funds to construct a conventional tanker berth for ships of up to 50,000 deadweight tons to discharge crude oil for the Gesira oil refinery and for outward shipment of refined products. In early 1981 a contract was awarded to add two additional banana berths to the facility.

Port facilities at Berbera included in 1981 two deepwater berths, one specifically for handling cattle. These facilities, built with Soviet aid, have been in operation since 1969; two cranes installed in 1968, however, had never been used because of the lack of adequate electric power. The construction of two to three new general cargo-handling berths has been under consideration by the government since the late 1970s, but implementation was dependent on external financing, which had not yet been assured in late 1981. Since 1969 Kismaayo has had four deepwater berths (provided by United States aid) in operation. A bulk export ter-

minal for molasses was reportedly under construction in 1981 to handle production at the new sugar mill at Jilib that went into operation in 1980. Cargo handling equipment was limited at all three deepwater ports; ship's tackle was used in loading and unloading general cargo.

Information on individual port capacities was unavailable, and annual data on cargo passing through the ports showed substantial fluctuations. In 1976 total exports and imports were reportedly under 750,000 tons; in 1978 the total was close to 2.2 million tons. Mogadishu has been the principal entry point for most general cargo. Through the mid–1970s exports handled at the port were under 10 percent of the country's total, but the quantity may have increased since the opening of the port's new facilities. Berbera received general cargo for the northern part of the country and was the main export port for livestock, although an increased amount of the traffic may pass through Mogadishu since construction of the livestock berth there. Kismaayo's main function has been in the export of bananas and of meat from a processing and packing plant at the port. Marka has served principally as an export point for bananas.

International trade was carried chiefly by foreign shipping lines. In 1974 the government (51 percent holding), in conjunction with the government of Libya (49 percent), established the Somali National Shipping Line, which in 1980 operated five oceangoing vessels (refrigerator ships of 4,700 and 4,000 deadweight tons, general cargo ships of 2,000 and 1,500 deadweight tons, and a livestock carrier of 2,500 deadweight tons). During 1980 the Jiddah-based Islamic Development Bank granted Somalia funds for another livestock carrier, but whether the purchase had been made was not known in late 1981. Through 1975 Somalia had provided flag-of-convenience registry for foreign ships (numbering about 250 vessels in that year). Late in 1975, however, the government abolished the practice to "safeguard its integrity."

Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments

Foreign Trade

Somalia's merchandise exports have consisted of a relatively small number of items, of which two—live animals (plus livestock products) and bananas—regularly accounted for 90 percent or more of visible export earnings. Receipts from live animals increased during the 1970s from well over 50 percent of total export earnings in the early part of the decade to more than 70 percent in 1979. Over 1 million head of goats, sheep, cattle, and camels were exported annually (except in 1976 and 1977 when a large drop in sheep and goat exports occurred reportedly mainly because of a shortage of shipping facilities). Earnings increased dur-

Port activity at Mogadishu
Courtesy Andrew Dobson

ing the decade, but this was largely attributable to rising prices rather than to the number of animals (see table 11, Appendix). Almost all live animals went to the Middle East, mostly to Saudi Arabia whose purchases during the 1970s accounted for between 87 and 96 percent of Somalia's total live animal exports. (In view of the extreme importance of livestock in export earnings, any significant change in Saudi Arabian buying patterns would have an important impact on the economy and would seriously affect Somalia's balance of payments position.) Bananas were the source of at least 25 percent of export receipts in the early 1970s, but export volume gradually declined thereafter, in part because of drought, disease, and other growing problems, in part because of export market situations. Improving unit prices as the decade progressed offset the decline only relatively, and in 1979 earnings from banana exports had declined to about 11 percent of total merchandise earnings (see table 12, Appendix).

Livestock products (meat, meat preparations, hides, and skins) have been important secondary export items. The combined export receipts from those commodities increased from 9.6 percent of total receipts in 1970 to about 18.6 percent in 1976, when they surpassed banana export earnings. The expulsion of Soviet advisers in 1977, however, was followed by the loss of the export market for meat processed by the government cannery. Largely as a result the cannery remained closed in 1978 and operated at only a

reduced level in 1979 when production was mainly exported to Italy. (Market information and production for 1980 were unavailable.) The private meat cannery closed in 1977 for financial reasons, owing in part to an inadequate foreign market, and remained closed in 1980. The export of fish and fish preparations, which had risen in the mid–1970s, also dropped after 1977, chiefly because of the loss of the Soviet market, although shortage of supplies and other factors played a part. In 1979 fuel oil exports from Somalia's new refinery became an important new source of export earnings, accounting for 4 percent of total receipts. Data for 1980 were unavailable, and it would be difficult to estimate the future potential in view of possible crude oil supply problems and unknown domestic demand growth factors.

Exports were made to about fifty countries. However, approximately two-thirds to almost three-quarters of all exports went to Arab countries, and in 1978 the proportion had risen to 90 percent (see table 13, Appendix). Saudi Arabia was the largest single customer. Kuwait and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen [Yemen (Aden)] were also important through the mid–1970s, but their purchases had declined in the late 1970s for unreported reasons. Exports to the larger Arab buyers were almost entirely live animals and fruit (bananas). The only non-Arab state in Africa to which any significant exports were made was Kenya, which took mostly fish, fish products, and live animals.

Among the thirty-five to forty other countries that were destinations for Somali goods, Italy was the most important, although exports to that country, chiefly fruits, vegetables, and hides and skins, generally stagnated during the decade, resulting in a downward trend in Italy's share of Somali exports. The Soviet Union became a significant destination for canned fish and meat from the early 1970s as Somalia's new canneries, built with Soviet aid, went into operation, but this trade stopped abruptly in 1977. Export trade with Western Europe (other than Italy) and the United States was negligible; Somalia did not produce—or produce at competitive prices—commodities desired by traders in those countries.

In 1970 about half of Somalia's imports consisted of consumer goods. Intermediate goods constituted another quarter, capital goods made up 17 percent, petroleum and petroleum products 6 percent, and miscellaneous imports the remaining 2 percent. The share of consumer goods in reported imports began declining in the early 1970s and from the middle of the decade constituted under two-fifths of the total (see table 14, Appendix). At the same time the share of capital goods in imports increased to over 30 percent as the country's transportation facilites were expanded and machinery was brought in to equip new industrial operations

and reequip several major existing plants. Intermediate goods continued to make up about a quarter of imports by value through 1978. Detailed data were not available on imports during 1979 and 1980, but the influx of refugees from the Ogaden was believed to have forced considerably increased food imports. Higher oil prices in 1979 and greater volume of imports to meet the requirements of the refinery presumably altered also the share of mineral fuels in the overall import total.

Imports have come from about seventy countries. There has been substantially less concentration of trade than in the case of exports. Western European countries ranging from Greece and Austria to Spain, members of the European Economic Community (EEC—also known as the Common Market), and the Scandinavian states have accounted for about half of all merchandise imports. Italy has remained the largest supplier, furnishing close to 30 percent of the total and serving as a major source of chemicals, chemical products, manufactures, intermediate goods, machinery, and transport equipment (see table 15, Appendix). Until 1977 the Soviet Union was the second largest supplier—chiefly of petroleum products and project supplies. Arab states of the Middle East individually played relatively small roles as sources of imports. Saudi Arabia, destination of most Somali exports, has furnished principally consumer goods. Iraq became the source of crude petroleum for the new Gesira refinery in 1978, but suspended deliveries in late 1980 (see Petroleum Supply and Domestic Resources, this ch.).

Balance of Payments

Somalia entered the 1970s with a chronic adverse trade balance; published official statistics showed negative balances annually thereafter through 1979. During the decade exports declined in volume. At the same time, export receipts increased about threefold, owing largely to higher unit prices (the result of inflationary forces set in motion by oil price rises from 1973). In the case of imports both costs and volume rose; import values in 1979 were almost eight times greater than in 1970. The unfavorable trade position depicted by official figures was real, even though the accuracy of the published data was questionable because of the possible underdeclaration of export values and the partial (or lack of) inclusion of imports purchased with foreign exchange in the *franco valuta* (literally free foreign exchange) market (see table 16, Appendix). This market, which functioned legally alongside the official exchange market, consisted of foreign currency obtained abroad, mostly by private importers. An unknown but presumably substantial amount of this currency came from earnings of Somali workers employed in foreign countries, whose relatives in Somalia were compensated in turn in local currency, at usually

better exchange rates than the official one. The *franco valuta* rate was believed to have been about two and one-half times the official rate until July 1981, when the government introduced a two-tier official exchange system. Under the latter the shilling was devalued to Sh12.46 to US$1 (for value of the Somali shilling—see Glossary) for most goods imported through official channels. Certain commodities, however, have continued to be imported at a rate of Sh6.35 to US$1 (only slightly changed from the earlier official rate) in a measure intended to hold down consumer prices. *Franco valuta* imports, which have consisted mostly of food and other consumer items, have varied greatly from year to year; for instance they were estimated to have constituted 7 percent of actual imports in 1977, 28 percent in 1978, and about 9 percent in 1979.

The net services item in the balance of payments has been consistently negative. Major factors in this have been travel, which has included pilgrimages to Mecca, and payments to foreign contractors and consultants. Unrequited transfers (transfers from Somali workers abroad, foreign official and voluntary agency grant aid, and the like) have contributed substantially to total receipts. Grant aid from foreign governments and international agencies has been on an increased scale since 1974, reflecting larger gifts to help victims of the 1974–75 drought and later for aid to refugees from the Ogaden. Beginning in 1978 an estimated value for shipments in kind from Somalis abroad (through the *franco valuta* market) has been included in private unrequited transfers.

The current account as reported was in deficit in the 1970s except for a small surplus in 1971 and was in balance in 1975. The validity of the balances again was questionable because of the unknown amount of trade through the *franco valuta* system and the possible underrecording of exports and grant aid received by the government. Reported capital inflows in the early 1970s were sufficient to maintain favorable balances of payments, but deficits were registered officially in 1973 and 1974. From 1975 through 1978 the inflow again produced favorable balances, and foreign exchange reserves increased, reaching the equivalent of US$158 million at the end of March 1978, an amount sufficient to cover about six months of imports in current values. Imports rose dramatically in 1978, and only a moderate surplus was reported in the published balance of payments data. In 1979 imports continued their rapid rise. Some increase in official capital inflow occurred, and the current account was helped by inclusion of estimated *franco valuta* imports (as it had been in 1978). But these failed to offset the great growth in imports, and a major drawdown on foreign reserves was necessary. This continued

into 1980, and reserves had declined reportedly to the equivalent of about US$41 million in mid–1980, equal to less than one and one-half months' imports.

Prices, Wages, and Employment

The primary source of information on inflationary trends in Somalia in late 1981 was the consumer price index for Mogadishu prepared by the Central Statistical Department. Until 1973 inflation in the Mogadishu area was moderate. The revolutionary government's efforts to hold down consumer food prices after the military coup were quite successful during this period. The general index, which had stood at 111 (base year, 1966) in September 1969, actually declined to 108 in March 1973. During 1973 the first effects of rising oil prices and worldwide inflation were felt. The country was not then—and in 1981 still was not—self-sufficient in food production, and in an effort to contain the prices of basic foodstuffs the government introduced subsidies for essential foods including wheat flour, rice, sugar, and edible oils. Rent controls were also introduced. The impact of imported inflation was heightened in 1974 and 1975 by the effects of the major drought that afflicted the country. Despite the subsidies the food index rose substantially, as did those for clothing and miscellaneous items, and the average annual inflation rate was over 18 percent.

In 1975 inflation ran at an average annual rate of over 19 percent. The rise was attributed in some degree to shortages of clothing, other textiles, and household appliances that reportedly developed after nationalization of import operations. The prices of foods and miscellaneous goods rose less rapidly in 1976, but pressure on the general consumer price index was exerted by higher prices for clothing that resulted from large imports through the *franco valuta* market—goods that were sold in the open market in Somalia at uncontrolled prices. The overall rate of inflation declined, however, to 14 percent for the year. The decline continued in 1977 to 10.6 percent and to 9.9 percent in 1978, as supplies of food were reasonably adequate, and the market became flooded with clothing; the war in the Ogaden appeared to have had only a moderate impact on the Mogadishu area. The situation was drastically reversed in 1979, however, when the inflation rate hit almost 24 percent. Food production was down during the year, and prices for imported foods not under controlled prices were higher. Clothing prices also rose substantially, apparently the result of shortages as *franco valuta* imports declined in reaction to the previous year's oversupply. Also important in the upward push on prices was the inadequate supply of imported tobacco in 1979 that caused an acute shortage of cigarettes and a sharp rise in price. Of major significance was the budgetary

deficit financing to which the government was forced by inadequate capital inflows, which greatly increased the money supply (see Government Finance, this ch.).

In late 1981 the most recent published data on paid employment were from a manpower survey conducted in 1971. At that time, nonagricultural paid employees (but including employees in public sector agriculture) were estimated at about 108,400; of these some 67,200 workers (62 percent) were private sector employment, and 41,200 (38 percent) had public sector jobs. Three sectors accounted for about 70 percent of all wage employment—commerce, 35 percent; transportation, 19 percent; and public administration and community services, 16 percent. Manufacturing had about 10 percent of total paid employment and public sector agriculture another 10 percent. It was then anticipated that a substantially larger growth in paid employment would occur in the public than in the private sector because of the implementation of governmental economic development projects and increases in government services; by 1976 paid employment was expected to be divided roughly equally between the public and private sectors. Expansion of private sector wage employment, especially in small-scale operations, was found to have been considerably greater than expected. Of the 167,000 individuals estimated to have had paid employment in 1976, about 95,000 (57 percent) were private sector employees, and 72,000 (43 percent) held public sector positions. In 1978 a survey of employment and manpower requirements generally comparable to that of 1971 was carried out, but except for limited, selected statistics, the results had not been issued by late 1981. It should be noted that a large number of Somalis were employed abroad, mostly in the Arab states of the Middle East. Estimates of their number ranged generally from 50,000 to 120,000, although one estimate placed the total as high as 250,000.

Wage and employment information was meager in late 1981. The government has assumed, based on comparisons with other countries having similar socioeconomic patterns, that the labor force at the time of the 1975 census constituted about 40 percent of the total population. Revised figures for the census have established a population in 1975 of about 3.7 million, in line with which roughly 1.5 million individuals would have been in the work force at the time. It was further assumed that the labor force would increase in the near future at about the same rate as the population. Accordingly the total in 1981 would be between about 1.6 and 1.7 million (see Population and Settlement Patterns, ch. 2). (It should be noted that these assumptions and estimates are no more than that and that their basic purpose is to provide only a rough scale of magnitude.) Estimates of the sectoral distribution of the labor force in the mid-1970s made by the JASPA mission placed

about 80 percent in agriculture and livestock, 7 percent in industry, and 13 percent in services.

The government has followed a policy of attempting to provide some work for everyone employable in the modern sector, at low pay levels if necessary, rather than supplying work for some at higher scales and none for others. As part of that effort, jobs have been guaranteed in the public sector to all graduates of the national university, secondary schools, and postintermediate technical institutes. From the early 1970s all public sector employees—both those in government services and in the public enterprises—were unified by law, and grades, pay, and conditions of service were made the same for equivalent positions. Few increases in wages were given during the 1970s, and it has been estimated that in real terms wages and salaries in 1978 were worth about half of their 1970 value. Productivity has suffered as a result, and an unknown number of trained and experienced personnel have left government service and the government enterprises for positions in the private sector or in the Middle East oil-producing states. Many of those who remain apparently have to work at a second job in order to support themselves and their families.

One state-owned enterprise introduced a productivity bonus system in 1975 but was forced by the government to discontinue it, apparently because of the possible effect on existing general wage levels. The public enterprises, however, were subsequently directed to set aside a small proportion of their profits for their employees that was usually distributed equally. Since the early 1970s, by law a share of the profits was also to be used to furnish housing and social amenities for employees. Many of the state enterprises have made little or no profit, and the benefits (where received) were mostly small. In October 1980 President Mohamed Siad Barre decreed a salary increase for all permanent government employees—in consideration of their financial hardship, the result of the worldwide inflation—that was to be effective beginning in January 1981. The details of this increase remained unavailable in late 1981.

Government Finance

During the 1960s the government had derived a very high proportion of its domestic revenue from indirect taxes on international and domestic transactions. Tax receipts on income and property averaged only about 7 percent of total domestic revenue annually in the decade. An attempt had been made by the Italian trusteeship administration to establish a broad direct tax base by assessing taxes on huts and small farms in the agricultural south. This had met strong opposition, including armed resistance, and the total tax obtained never amounted to more than a small fraction of government revenue. After independence the new gov-

ernment imposed a land tax, but the hostile reaction and lack of registered land titles led to discontinuance of its collection. No tax was collected on livestock. As a result direct taxes were actually assessed only against a small segment of the population, consisting of the civil service and individuals and businesses in the modern sector. Tax evasion was widespread—a situation that an inadequate tax enforcement apparatus was unable to overcome—and income taxes were generally collected only from civil servants.

Throughout the 1960s the budget was in deficit annually, although the gap had been greatly reduced in size by 1969. The military government in its first year also found itself faced by a sizable budget shortfall. The new dominant role set for the public sector in development and the emphasis placed on self-reliance gave added importance to the fiscal performance of the government, and in late 1970 major steps were taken to generate domestic savings for development purposes through the current budget. An austerity program was announced that included raising the duties and taxes on luxuries and a reduction in civil service pay. Private firms also were ordered to cut pay scales and to contribute the proceeds, which came to be known as the development levy, to a government development fund. This extraordinary tax, which was equivalent to an extra income tax on nongovernment employees, was still collected at the beginning of the 1980s.

From 1970 an upsurge in tax receipts occurred, and tax revenue had doubled by 1975, continuing to grow between 1975 and 1979 at an average annual rate close to 25 percent. But international transactions remained the main source of revenue, especially import duties, which accounted for over half of total revenue in 1978 compared with about one-third in the mid–1960s. Income and property taxes still constituted a very small part of total revenue (see table 17, Appendix).

Ordinary expenditures on social and economic services rose gradually during the 1970s and in 1977 accounted, respectively, for about 26 and 18 percent of total expenditures. General services—the presidency, foreign affairs, interior (including the police), justice, planning, and finance—expended close to a third of the total during this time, a proportion maintained in the late 1970s. Defense spending accounted regularly for roughly 25 to 26 percent until 1978 when the expenditure pattern changed markedly as defense expenditures rose sharply to over 37 percent, affected by the war with Ethiopia. The increase came largely at the expense of the social and economic services sectors, which continued to bear the brunt of still growing defense spending in the 1979 budget (see table 18, Appendix).

Since the mid–1960s there has been no regular development budget, only a separate development component that comprises domestically financed expenditures on projects. Foreign fi-

nanced development expenditures, a significant part of which the government does not control, are not included. The result has been an incomplete picture of the fiscal situation. Domestic development expenditure has gradually increased and since 1973 has exceeded the surplus registered annually in the current budget through 1978. The resultant overall budgetary deficit has mounted, and in the late 1970s was increased by growing domestic budgetary funding of the item defined as "extraordinary expenditures" that covered outlays for projects not included in the regular development plans, e.g., the refugee resettlement program, and other spending of an unstated nature by certain ministries, including the Ministry of Defense. The deficit rose to large proportions in 1978 and 1979, and external aid, which had generally filled the gap in previous years, was considerably short. The government had to resort to substantial financing through the Central Bank of Somalia, and the resultant large increase in the money supply contributed to a sharply rising rate of inflation.

Foreign budgetary grants have been received since independence when Italy and Britain agreed to provide support to the new government. After 1963 British aid was rejected following a break in relations that resulted from a dispute over the frontier with Kenya. In 1964 China helped to meet the budgetary deficit. Subsequently grant aid was received generally on an annual basis from the EEC, West Germany, China, the United States (to 1971—substantial grant aid was resumed in 1978), and various UN agencies. Although the Italian agreement on budget support was to have ended in 1970, some grants were made thereafter. Egypt also furnished grants at various times, and the Soviet Union provided budgetary support through 1969. Soviet aid was extensive during the 1969–77 period, but it was not known whether any of this was in the form of budget grants. From the mid–1970s substantial budget assistance was also extended by Arab states. The refugee aid problem that emerged from the drought and the war with Ethiopia evoked large grants from a wide range of donors. For 1977 the total reached some Sh535 million, or 39 percent of total government revenue including grants; the amount was almost two-thirds as large as all government revenue for the year. In 1978 grants dropped to about half the amount of the previous year but still were equivalent to a fifth of current revenue and provided over 16 percent of total revenue. Details for 1979 and 1980 were not available, but grant totals reportedly remained large overall.

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In 1981 generally available background and analytical information on Somalia's economy was extremely limited. A partial view

and some data are presented in the government's series of development plans during the period 1963–81 and in its *Country Programme for the 1980s*, prepared for a mid–1981 UN conference on the least developed nations. *Economic Transformation in a Socialist Framework*, a special report to the government by an International Labour Organisation employment advisory mission, provides an excellent employment-oriented survey of the economy. Statistical data and some analyses are available in the Central Bank of Somalia's *Annual Report and Statement of Accounts*. The Central Statistical Department of the State Planning Commission has published annually various statistical reports, including the *Statistical Abstract, Industrial Production Survey*, and *Foreign Trade Returns*. Various government ministries and agencies have produced other reports. It should be noted, however, that while governmental efforts were being made to expand and improve the collection and organization of statistics, there were wide deficiencies in the statistical data and in the reliability of the published figures available in 1981. (For further information see Bibliography.)

Chapter 4. Government and Politics



Somalia's official state seal

THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT that prevailed in Somalia for nearly a decade after independence in 1960 degenerated in its final years, culminating in the assassination of the president. The military government that followed has provided the country with stability and has brought economic and social progress, but its authoritarian features had been little modified by late 1981. Assuming power by a coup d'etat in 1969, the military junta declared its intention of wiping out the excesses of corruption and tribal nepotism that had brought discredit on the politicians of the civilian era. On the first anniversary of the coup, a doctrine of scientific socialism was proclaimed by the military government. Under this label numerous achievements were realized in the early years of military rule, augmented by a determined effort to replace clan loyalty with a sense of national cooperation and unity.

Political association had been prohibited at the time of the coup, but this was amended seven years later when the government sponsored a political party of its socialist elite. The original controlling military council was phased out in favor of the new party's central committee, composed of both military and civilian members, whose role was to chart the ideological course. A second phase in civilianizing the regime was the introduction of a new constitution and the convoking of an elected legislature early in 1980. Somalia's first elections in over a decade had been staged in 1979 to demonstrate mass approval of the Constitution and the single-party slate of candidates.

The grip on political authority by the president and armed forces commander in chief, Mohamed Siad Barre, continued to tighten behind the facade of civilian government. Economic and foreign policy failures and the blunting of ideological direction sapped the earlier revolutionary vigor of the military leadership. But because internal dissidence was muffled by the state security apparatus and exiled opposition groups lacked credibility, no satisfying alternative to Siad Barre was on the horizon in 1981.

As a result of bad management, drought, a great refugee influx, and the drain of recent war, Somalia's survival has become dependent on financial support from the Western and Arab countries. Lacking a reliable arms supplier after the rift with the Soviet Union in 1977, its ambition of ending the international partition of the Somali people has been checked by economic and military realities. Projecting into the Indian Ocean and within range of the Persian Gulf, however, Somalia has gained added strategic importance as the West has moved to protect its oil supply lines. The republic hopes, through its 1980 agreement with the United States covering use of the Soviet-built naval base and airfield at Berbera, to forge a new military and political relationship that will reduce its exposure to the threat from its historic adversary, Soviet-supported Ethiopia.

The Governmental System

Until 1969 Somalia was governed under a multiparty parliamentary system based on a constitution written at independence in 1960 and ratified in 1961. In spite of the natural inclination of the Somali people to democratic expression and political organization, this Western parliamentary system gradually broke down under the temptations of personal gain and the demands of competing lineage interests.

On October 21, 1969, a group of army officers seized control of the government and established the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), which arrogated to itself the power to promulgate laws, administer justice, and govern the republic. The SRC consisted orginally of twenty-five officers under the leadership of Major General Siad Barre, until then commander of the army.

The SRC's announcement of its takeover, known as the First Charter of the Revolution, set forth the objectives of the new military rule as liquidating corruption and tribal nepotism, introducing a standard written Somali language, ending illiteracy, and bringing about rapid social, economic and cultural development. This document constituted the ideological basis for governing. Law Number 1, also effective as of October 21, 1969, amplified the First Charter, vesting in the SRC the functions previously performed by the president of the republic, the ministers, the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers, and the Supreme Court. All existing legislation was to be enforced until revoked or amended by the SRC or found incompatible with the spirit of the revolution.

Steps toward replacing military rule with civilian institutions of government were spaced over the following decade. Local government reorganization was begun in 1972. A single political party, the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP), was created in 1976. Its standing body, the Central Committee, was to supersede the SRC as the guiding political instrument in the country. Real executive power remained, however, in the hands of Siad Barre and other senior military leaders, in particular the four officers who, with the president, functioned as the party's political bureau.

In 1979, three years after formation of the SRSP, a nationwide referendum was held to approve a new constitution that led in turn to the first general election of delegates to a national legislature and to local district councils. The new document embodied certain features of the 1961 independence constitution, including guarantees of personal rights, while tempering the nation's strong commitment to socialist ideology and to a Greater Somalia. Like the original constitution, many details of government machinery, such as those concerning the size of the legislature, were left to be

President Mohamed Siad Barre Courtesy United States International Communication Agency

defined by subsequent legislation, thereby avoiding acknowledgment of the permanence of alien jurisidiction over Somali-populated territories.

The new civilian structure added some democratic elements to what had been an unabashed military dictatorship. By providing for Siad Barre's election as president of the republic by the legislature, it furthered the legitimacy of his rule. Yet by virtue of his continued control over the SRSP, elections, and candidates (as well as members and leadership of the legislature), and by provisions in the Constitution authorizing him to bypass normal legislative processes, Siad Barre effected a transformation in the external characteristics of the system while preserving his personal domination over the Somali government.

Structure of the Civilian Government, 1960–69

The protectorate of British Somaliland received its independence on June 26, 1960, and five days later united with the Trust Territory of Somalia under Italian Administration to form the

Somali Republic. A formal constitution was not ratified until June 20, 1961. The newly created government was parliamentary, having a president as titular head of state who was elected by the members of the unicameral National Assembly. The president selected the prime minister, who then had to obtain a vote of confidence from the assembly. The prime minister and his Council of Ministers, who were usually chosen from among members of the assembly, were vested with executive powers.

The popularly elected National Assembly was the real center of political power under this system. Its 123 members were chosen in forty-seven electoral districts. Within each district, seats were assigned on a complex proportional representation basis that encouraged the proliferation of small, primarily local parties. In spite of new laws designed to reduce the multiplicity of parties before the 1969 election, sixty-four parties having a total of 1,000 candidates contested the election; only three of these parties operated nationwide. The disintegration of the party system became evident when nearly every member of the assembly immediately deserted to the winning party in an effort to reap the advantages of victory (see The Egal Government, ch. 1).

Military Government Institutions

After the bloodless coup that brought the military and police to power in 1969, the country's executive and legislative functions were absorbed by the twenty-five leading military and police officers who composed the SRC. The constitution was repealed, the National Assembly and the Supreme Court were abolished, and political parties were outlawed. Regional governors, and district commissioners were replaced by army or police officers acting as chairmen of local revolutionary councils. In addition to exercising authority as head of state and senior member of the armed forces, Siad Barre acted as chairman of the Council of Secretaries of State (CSS), a cabinet without policymaking functions, composed mostly of civil servants who served as operating heads of the government ministries.

The SRC exercised its supervisory role primarily through four committees having oversight of broad policy areas: social and political affairs, economic affairs, judicial affairs, and security affairs. SRC members also served on or chaired interministerial bodies charged with the conduct of major programs, such as efforts to ease the impact of the disastrous 1974–75 drought and to resettle nomadic families in new farming projects. The SRC members conducted inspections of national and local government agencies to ensure compliance with SRC policies and encourage efficiency. The SRC and CSS often met jointly to discuss major issues. By law both bodies had to meet to approve the national budget. The composition of the SRC remained fairly constant; twenty-one of

the twenty-five officers who were members of the coucil in 1969 were members at its dissolution in 1976, and no new members were added.

Return to Civilian Political Institutions

Under Somalia's post–1969 military rule the civilian component of government was restricted to administrative rather than policy responsibilities. At the highest level were the secretaries of state, in effect senior functionaries with the necessary education and experience to superintend day-to-day government operations. As a first step in restoring the civilian political framework, Siad Barre adopted the pattern of other Leninist-inspired socialist states by creating the SRSP as a vanguard party of committed supporters, including both civilian and military members.

The new party's Central Committee replaced the SRC while the CSS was upgraded to full cabinet status, its members holding ministerial rank as heads of the administrative departments. Military influence within this Council of Ministers was stronger than in the former CSS; the addition of five SRC members plus the president and three vice presidents brought the total of military figures to twelve among the twenty-three posts on the council (see fig. 11; see table 19, Appendix).

The Constitution introduced in 1979 after debate in SRSP channels reaffirmed the official and exclusive standing of the party as the "supreme authority of political and socio-economic leadership." The Constitution, made effective when the favorable results of a national referendum were announced on August 20, 1979, completed the civilianizing process, introducing a bill of rights and an elected legislative body, the People's Assembly. Election procedures were, however, carefully controlled to ensure that all delegates would be dedicated supporters of the revolutionary government. The assembly itself appeared to have been entrusted with little authority beyond ratifying decisions of the leadership group.

Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party

Although the SRC had disbanded the Somali Youth League and abolished political parties after the military coup, Siad Barre announced in 1971 that a national political party would be formed. Preparations for the new institution got under way only in 1974 when the National Political Office of the SRC was given the task of opening branch offices in all districts to educate and suitably indoctrinate cadres in the principles of scientific socialism. Workers' committees had been formed beginning in late 1972 in factories, farms, cooperatives, government ministries, and the armed forces. From these committees, delegations were to be elected to village councils, which in turn elected representatives to district and regional congresses as preliminary steps to the founding congress of the SRSP on June 26, 1976. Chosen by the regional military gover-



Figure 11. Organization of the Somali Government, May 1981

nors for their reliability, the 3,000 delegates to the congress elected the seventy-three members of the Central Committee, which was designated to direct party affairs between party congresses that were to be held every five years. The Central Committee, of which Siad Barre became chairman, superseded the governing body of the revolution—the SRC—although SRC officers were absorbed into the Central Committee along with members of the CSS and other civilian activists. The Central Committee was to meet quarterly while bureaus constituting the party executive were to meet weekly.

The actual locus of authority was the political bureau comprising the five leading members of the SRC: Siad Barre, who was elected secretary general of the party; the three vice-presidents—Lieutenant General Mohamed Ali Samantar, Major General Hussein Kulmie Afrah, and Colonel (later Brigadier General) Ismail Ali Abokar—and the head of the National Security Service, Colonel (later Brigadier General) Ahmed Suleiman Abdulle.

In proceeding at a cautious pace with the formation of a political party to supplant the SRC, Siad Barre was said to have acted only after constant prompting from his Soviet advisers who regarded it as an indispensable step in the institutionalization of the socialist regime that had emerged from the 1969 coup. The party structure would also comprise a reliable body of politically indoctrinated supporters through all levels of society and in all parts of the country. Formation of the party was seen as a precursor to normalization and full legitimization of the regime, leading to a new constitution and the transformation of Siad Barre from a military strongman to an elected head of state. By placing himself at the head of the party, Siad Barre might also have sought to fortify his personal authority, which until then had been based solely on his leadership of the military junta.

As the accredited source of political action in a revolutionary socialist state, the SRSP was the sponsor of all candidates running for office. Its leading role was not restricted to the political sphere but was to be pervasive in all forms of association. Other national organizations were brought into linkage with the SRSP, and their leaders were subject to endorsement by the Central Committee after nomination by the political bureau. The most prominent of these were the General Federation of Somali Trade Unions, the Somali Revolutionary Youth Organization, and the Somali Democratic Women's Organization.

The party was committed to the rules of democratic centralism; views and policy proposals were, in theory, to be gathered through lower party echelons and then, after decisions had been reached by the elite leadership, the SRSP was to be employed as an instrument for diffusing doctrine and plans, which were to be unhesitatingly obeyed at regional and local levels. Membership was made

conditional on a probationary period of six to twelve months after indoctrination in the principles of scientific socialism. The party's size has remained small, most estimates placing it at about 20,000 members and suggesting either that it has been deliberately maintained as a compact body of activists or that slack recruitment at local levels has hindered membership growth. A historian of Somali orgin, Abdi Sheik-Abdi, has classified SRSP membership into three groups: civil servants and small businessmen who are not dedicated socialists but who have learned to live with the party's rhetoric; centrists, epitomized by Siad Barre; and the Marxist left, composed in part by Somalia's intelligentsia.

The party bureaus originally numbered seventeen but have been subjected to frequent organizational shifts and mergers. After a Central Committee meeting in May 1981, new chairmen and vice chairmen of the bureaus (reduced to eleven) were announced. Among these were bureaus of ideology, foreign affairs, economics, social affairs, cooperatives, organization and mass mobilization, and personnel. These changes evidently constituted the reorganization of the SRSP insisted upon by Siad Barre when he declared a state of emergency in October 1980. It was not immediately clear whether the important role mandated for the SRSP to direct policy and to oversee the operations of the government departments and agencies had been fundamentally altered by Siad Barre's decree, but the parallel existence of the SRSP and the restored SRC seemed to create severe overlapping in an already complex structure (see Revival of the Supreme Revolutionary Council, this ch.). No changes were announced in the party's five-member political bureau of military officers, but only one of the eleven new bureau chairmen had military rank. Previously five of seventeen SRSP heads had been military officers.

Constitution of 1979

During the inaugural party congress in 1976, a committee was appointed to draft a new constitution for the republic to replace the independence constitution that was suspended in 1969. The draft constitution of 114 articles adopted at the extraordinary congress of the SRSP in January 1979 was submitted to the people for approval in a referendum in August, and elections followed at the end of the year. The results as reported by the government showed that 3,597,692 voters supported the new Constitution while only 7,898 opposed it.

Adoption of the new Constitution was viewed as a promising step toward the democratization of the government and a possible indication of the leadership's willingness to moderate the authoritarian measures that had prevailed since 1969. Nevertheless Siad Barre's political preeminence was not diffused in any material degree, and the exclusive role of the SRSP guaranteed in the

Opening ceremony at the founding congress of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party
Courtesy Somali Embassy, Washington



Regional representatives listen to a speaker during a congress of women in Mogadishu.
Courtesy Somali Embassy, Washington

Constitution virtually ensured that the new legislature would not be the breeding ground for a legalized opposition.

The Constitution vests legislative authority in the People's Assembly, members of which are to be popularly elected for five-year terms. The assembly can be dissolved, however, by a two-thirds vote of its own membership or by action of the president. The assembly is to meet in two regular sessions each year, although this requirement was not observed during the first year. The assembly is authorized to elect its own chairman and vice chairman and a Standing Committee, which has responsibility for directing the flow of assembly business and for discharging its function during periods of recess. Under the Constitution the Standing Committee is to consist of the chairman, vice chairman, and secretary of the assembly, plus ten ordinary members. It was subsequently announced that the committee would consist of the chairman, secretary, two vice chairmen, the chairmen of five subordinate committees, and five ordinary members.

Under the 1979 Constitution the president is elected to a six-year, renewable term by a two-thirds vote of the People's Assembly. If a candidate fails to receive the necessary support on the first two ballots, a simple majority suffices on the third ballot. The president is invested with far-reaching authority. He is empowered to conduct foreign affairs, to declare war, and to appoint one or more vice-presidents, the president of the Supreme Court, and members of the Council of Ministers, of which he is chairman. The president chairs joint party and state meetings, acts as commander in chief of the armed forces, and serves as chairman of the National Defense Council. The president may veto laws passed by the People's Assembly by failing to promulgate them within forty-five days, but his veto can be overridden by a two-thirds vote in the assembly.

The 1979 Constitution has adopted a number of provisions that closely correspond to the independence constitution of 1961, although the two documents differ in several essential features. Both constitutions have provided for a unicameral legislature elected for five years but subject to earlier dissolution. While the earlier government was parliamentary in form, having a prime minister and Council of Ministers who were members of the legislature, both constitutions reserved broad powers for the president. Both documents included clauses enabling the president to invoke emergency rule or to be delegated temporary lawmaking power by the assembly. The 1979 Constitution, which critics have contended is designed mainly to give a cloak of legitimacy to the authoritarian rule of Siad Barre, gives the president more sweeping emergency powers. As defined in article 83 of the 1979 Constitution, the president can take all appropriate measures throughout the country or in any part of it subject only to consultation with the National Defense Council.

In certain other features the 1979 Constitution appears to reflect the less doctrinaire approach of the Somali leadership as it has shifted closer to the West. Articles 15 and 16 declare that, while supporting national liberation movements, the Somali Democratic Republic will adopt peaceful and legal means in securing the liberation of Somali territories "under colonial occupation." This provision is in conformity with the more supple diplomatic posture of Siad Barre since the Ogaden conflict. While the Constitution reaffirms that the economy is to be founded on socialist state planning and that priority is assigned to the state sector, Article 41 explicitly recognizes a role for the private sector and for mixed ownership between the Somali state and others.

The People's Assembly

The popular elections mandated by the Constitution for the 171 seats in the People's Assembly were held on December 30, 1979. Few details were revealed by the government on the procedures followed. Voting totals were announced for each district of the sixteen regions, but these showed only votes in favor, votes opposed, and invalid ballots. Voters were reportedly permitted only to vote "yes" or "no" to the entire list of 171 candidates. Apparently no effort was made to appoint candidates representing groups or geographic areas. The government explained that members of the People's Assembly would be selected at the national level to eliminate the danger that they might campaign on the basis of individual or tribal interests. The government later announced that among the members of the assembly, twenty were military personnel, six were women, and fourteen were not party members. Under his authority in the 1979 Constitution, the president named six deputies who were "dedicated to science, arts, and culture or [who were] highly esteemed patriots," bringing membership to a total of 177.

The officially announced voting total indicated that nearly 4 million people went to the polls—even more than the 3.6 million claimed to have voted in the constitutional referendum in August 1979. These results exceeded most estimates of the entire population (exclusive of refugees) notwithstanding that large numbers of nomads would have been unable to reach polling places on the single day set aside. The results were claimed to be 99.91 percent favorable to the government, with only 1,826 negative and 1,480 invalid ballots. Many districts did not report a single negative or invalid vote, while two entire regions—Gedo with 293,500 voters and Bakool with 230,800—reported no negative votes. The government responded to criticisms by asserting that the election was more popular and democratic than those of the past. It noted that less than 1 million votes had been cast in prerevolutionary elec-

tions, that the new elections had been conducted in a peaceful atmosphere, and that the candidates were of a higher caliber, free of tribalism and corruption.

The People's Assembly was convened for the first time on January 24, 1980. In an opening address Siad Barre announced that he would be forming a new government; the names of its members were made known after a SRSP Central Committee meeting on February 7. (No provision is contained in the Constitution for assembly approval of cabinet members.) Siad Barre promised that the action program of the new government would be submitted to the assembly; but if the program was debated by the legislature, no public report of this was made. On January 27 Siad Barre was sworn in for a six-year term after unanimous election as president by the assembly.

The first chairman of the People's Assembly, Brigadier General Ismail Ali Abokar, had previously been vice-president of the republic and assistant secretary general of the SRSP. On April 28, 1981, Ali Abokar was restored to his position as third vice-president, relinquishing the chairmanship of the assembly to Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmad, a former minister of commerce. In apparent disregard for the Constitution, new first and second vice chairmen and committee chairmen were also elected during a joint extraordinary meeting of the SRSP Central Committee and the People's Assembly. In all likelihood, the personnel changes were decreed by Siad Barre, and approval by the party and legislature was simply a formality.

Little has been made public about the deliberations of the People's Assembly. The government-controlled press announced that the assembly had held its ordinary session for six days beginning in late December 1980. It reportedly approved the 1981 budget, new sugar prices, changes in passport, license, and ticket fees and other draft laws, and ratified several international agreements. Apparently doing little more than endorsing actions of the executive dominated by Siad Barre, the assembly has not yet lived up to its promise as a move away from authoritarianism.

Local Government

The independence constitution of 1961 had stated expressly that administrative functions were to be decentralized wherever possible. Provision was made for elected units in the towns and some representative features at the district level. One of the SRC's earliest acts was the abolition of the existing structure of local government. In the new order no municipal units existed. Instead the SRC increased the number of regions from eight to sixteen (see fig. 1). The number of districts was correspondingly

People's Hall in Mogadishu, headquarters of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party
Courtesy United States International Communication Agency

increased from forty-eight to eighty. Each region contained from three to six districts except the capital region (Banaadir), which was subdivided into thirteen districts. A hierarchical structure of regions, districts, and village councils was created following a pattern established by the local government reform law of August 1972. At the regional and district levels these councils had both national and local representation. The chairman was the regional or district secretary. All chairmen were army officers until 1973 or 1974, when a few civilian officials were appointed. A list of new regional secretaries appointed in February 1981 showed renewed prominence of military officials, only four civilian secretaries being named to the fifteen regions outside Mogadishu.

Under the 1972 reforms, heads of regional units of the central government ministries comprised the membership of regional councils, along with chairmen of the subordinate district councils and a citizen from each district chosen by the regional council to represent community views. District councils were similarly organized using community representatives selected from among local people who actively supported the government. Only vil-

lage councils, each with seven members, were chosen by local residents and thus were the sole elective bodies in the country. The government claimed that by 1973 a clear process of local self-rule had begun to emerge, entailing a network of local committees from the level of regional and district councils downward to town and village sectors, subsectors, and even smaller units of the settled population. Orientation centers, originally only outdoor gathering places but later buildings constructed with local labor and government-supplied materials, assumed both social and political functions. Through these new political units and meetings in the orientation centers, according to the government, the popular will could find its expression and local communities could influence national policy. After the mass rural literacy campaign of 1974–75, the government sought to draw nomads into the local political process by having them elect representatives for political training at regional centers. The graduates were then to return to their own communities to act as motivators and teachers.

Direct elections of 1,074 candidates to the eighty district councils of the country were combined with the national election of December 30, 1979. A single list of candidates nominated by the SRSP was presented, but it was not clear that names of the candidates were actually inscribed on the ballots enabling voters to endorse or reject specific individuals.

The size of district councils was linked to both economic importance and population of the districts. In forty-six districts each council was composed of thirteen members; in twenty-one districts each council had twenty-one members; the city of Mogadishu, with thirteen districts, had a single council of thirty-five members. Districts with the larger twenty-one member councils included, at one extreme, the urbanized area of Hargeysa with 225,000 voters and, at the other extreme, Ceerigaabo with 40,000 voters. Districts with the smaller councils of thirteen members usually listed 20,000–40,000 voters but in a few cases more than 70,000 voters. In 1981 it was not clear whether the introduction of elections at the district level had been accompanied by any change in the procedure for selecting regional council members or the status of Mogadishu. Previously the Mogadishu city council had been nominated to represent interest groups (youth, women, workers, and the revolutionary elite) in each quarter. The quarters were supervised by district council-level units called quarter committees.

Authority over the local government structure was exercised by the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, headed by a senior army officer. Regional council chairmen were responsible both to the ministry and to their councils in carrying out their administrative functions. After the declaration of emergency in October 1980, it was announced that revolutionary com-

mittees would be reconstituted at the district and regional levels. It was not clear what effect these committees would have on normal local government operations, but the reemergence of these bodies—heavily weighted with army, police, and security personnel—was a step backward from the measure of local self-government that had been introduced by the military leaders.

The operating staffs of local government units were personnel of the national civil service assigned by the central authorities. Planning for local projects was done by the local councils, which had the right to be consulted on national government projects operating in their areas. The councils were permitted to impose local taxes and were empowered, with prior ministerial approval, to borrow funds for development projects of a productive nature. Regional and district councils were required by statute to form six committees: economic development, social affairs, public security, finance, political orientation, and mediation and consultation. The total revenues of local councils in 1978, amounting to Sh105.6 million (for value of the Somali shilling—see Glossary), were only 7 percent of central government revenues. Main sources of income were sales of goods and services, taxes on consumption and expenditures, and taxes on income and property. The capital budget of local councils totaled only Sh28 million, of which Sh20 million was derived from a surplus on current account and Sh8 million received as grants from the central government. On the evidence of the small share of Somali government finances handled through local channels, it appeared that the local government network was not yet an important factor in supplying government services and in development.

The Legal System

At the time of independence Somalia was faced with the problem of absorbing four disparate legal traditions: English law, Italian law, the sharia (Islamic law), and Somali customary law. Italian Somaliland and the British Somaliland Protectorate had their distinctive colonial judicial systems. In addition Italian Somaliland had a well-developed court system of qadis (traditional Islamic law specialists) for the settlement of civil and minor penal matters, while in British Somaliland the qadi courts were recognized as having competence to decide questions of native law and custom. Traditional courts were replaced in 1950 by subordinate courts having competence to deal with minor criminal offenses. After independence the earlier court divisions were rejected in favor of a modern, unified system.

The military junta suspended the constitution when it came to power in 1969, but other sources of law were retained. Customary law was heavily modified, and a unified civil code was introduced. A major new feature of the court system was the

introduction of the National Security Court to try a broad range of offenses judged to affect security and public order. Presided over by military officers, the system lacked the usual rights of appeal.

The Constitution of 1979 reintroduced most of the guarantees of individual liberty that had been prominently featured in the independence constitution. In practice, however, the rights of free speech and publication and protection against arbitrary arrest were not respected, and many long-term political prisoners continued to be held without trial.

Sources of Law

The judicial organization and procedures introduced after independence were drawn primarily from the system of the Italian trust territory, which consisted of Italian metropolitan law and enactments of the local authorities in Italian Somaliland. Judicial decisions under the Italian system were based on the application and interpretation of a legal code. However courts were enjoined to apply English common law and doctrines of equity in matters not governed by legislation. Provisions of the sharia relating to marriage, divorce, family disputes, and wills were adjudicated during the colonial period by qadis in the northern regions. In Italian Somaliland the sharia was more widely applicable, but a Muslim plaintiff had the choice of appearing before a regional judge instead of a qadi. After independence the differences between the two regions were settled by compromise, making the sharia applicable in all civil matters if the dispute arose under that law. Customary law could also be applied in such matters as land tenure, marriage, child custody, intestate succession, and payment of *dia* (blood compensation—see Glossary).

During the 1960s a unified penal code and a code of criminal court procedures were introduced, and a unified civil code relating to inheritance, personal contracts, and house rents was completed in 1973. Customary law was sharply curtailed by the military regime's efforts to eradicate tribalism. Clan or lineage rights over land and water resources and grazing were abolished. Payment of *dia* as compensation for death or injury was limited to the victim or close relatives rather than to an entire *dia*-paying group (see Glossary). Later, payment of *dia* was entirely prohibited.

The Courts

The 1961 constitution provided for a unified judiciary independent of the executive and legislative authorities with a Supreme Court as the highest judicial organ. By a law passed in 1962 the courts of northern and southern Somalia were integrated into a four-tiered judicial system: the Supreme Court, courts of appeal, regional courts, and district courts. All members of the

Supreme Court, supplemented by four additional members, comprised the Constitutional Court, which had the power to review the constitutionality of legislative action. The full Supreme Court supplemented by six additional members, constituted the High Court of Justice, which was empowered to hear impeachment proceedings against the president or ministers of the government. No provision was made for the sharia courts in the 1962 law on the grounds that judges versed in both the sharia and civil law were better qualified to hear cases than qadis, who knew only the sharia.

When the military government came to power, it abolished the Constitutional Court and High Court of Justice, neither of which had ever been formally convoked. Some jurisdictions of other courts were assumed by the National Security Court, which was outside the ordinary legal system and under the direct control of the SRC. This court, regarded as a political instrument, had competence over serious offenses affecting the security of the state including offenses against public order and tranquility and crimes by public officials and members of the government. The court heard a broad range of cases, passing sentences for embezzlement by public officials, murder, tribalism, political activities against scientific socialism, and stealing government food stocks. The court was composed of three members: an officer of the SRC, who acted as president of the body, and two other judges, generally military officers. Similar courts were also organized into regional and district sections. A special military attorney general served as prosecutor. No other court could review its sentences; appeals from its decisions could be taken only by the SRC. It was widely believed that Siad Barre determined which cases would be brought before the National Security Court and that he personally cleared sentences imposed by it.

In 1974 a new law on the organization of the judiciary was promulgated, which appeared to make only minor changes in the system. Four levels of courts continued to be provided. District courts were as before divided into civil and criminal sections. Regional tribunals now had three divisions: an ordinary section dealing with penal and civil matters more serious than those allowed to be heard by the district courts; an assize section, which only considered major criminal cases (those punishable by more than ten years' imprisonment); and a labor law section. At the district and regional tribunals, cases were heard by a single magistrate assisted by two laymen, who with the judge decided questions of fact and voted on the guilt or innocence of the accused.

At the next level were the regional courts of appeal, comprising two sections. The ordinary section heard appeals from decisions of the district tribunals and from the ordinary sections of the regional tribunals. The second heard only appeals from the regional assize sections. In both sections a single judge presided, assisted in the ordinary section by two laymen and in the other by

four. The senior judges (or presidents) of the courts of appeal served as the administrators of the courts in their regions.

At the pinnacle of the judicial system was the Supreme Court. The court was composed of a chief justice (whose title was president), a vice president, nine surrogate justices, and four laymen. In plenary sessions the court panel consisted of the president, two other judges, and four laymen. In ordinary sessions it had a presiding judge, two other judges, and two laymen. Whether the case was to be handled in plenary or ordinary session was decided by the court's president on the basis of the importance of the matter being considered. The Supreme Court was charged with uniform interpretation of the law; it heard appeals against decisions and judgments of the lower courts and against measures taken by public attorneys and settled questions of court jurisdiction.

The 1979 Constitution appeared to confirm most of the existing court hierarchy, although the composition of the various courts and their functions were left for determination by specific laws. Provision was included for military courts, thereby apparently entrenching the National Security Court system in the Constitution. The Constitutional Court, composed of the Supreme Court and delegates to the People's Assembly nominated by the president of the republic, was restored to decide on the constitutionality of laws.

Observance of the law and prosecution of criminal matters was made the responsibility of the state attorney general. This official was assisted by ten deputies in Mogadishu and by other deputies who served at the courts of appeal and the regional or district courts.

Before the 1969 revolution the Higher Judicial Council had responsibility for the selection, promotion, and discipline of members of the judiciary. The council was chaired by the president of the Supreme Court and included justices of the court, the attorney general, and three members elected by the National Assembly. In 1970 all positions on the council were taken over by SRC members. The 1979 Constitution included provision for the Higher Judicial Council, adding amnesty matters to its jurisdiction. Its structure was not defined except to designate the president of the republic as its chairman. By making this change any pretense of the independence of the judiciary seemed to have been abandoned.

Human Rights

The constitution in force until the October 1969 revolution strongly protected the civil rights specified in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. The country's record of honoring these rights was impressive not only by the standards of developing states but even by those of developed Western democracies. They included the presumption of innocence before the courts;

the right of habeas corpus; the freedoms of political association, public expression, and personal liberty and movement; and the rights to form labor unions and to strike. The ownership of all land was vested in the state (outright ownership of land conflicts with Somali traditions), but developed property and improved land could only be expropriated on the basis of equitable compensation.

The revolution of 1969 brought to power a socialist-military government that attached considerably less importance to most of these rights. The right of habeas corpus was abolished in October 1970, although the presumption of innocence and free legal assistance for indigent defendants in serious cases continued to be provided. Equal rights were extended to women in several areas, including inheritance (see Social Change, ch. 2).

The 1979 Constitution has restored, at least in principle, many of the civil rights extinguished by the military regime. It guarantees the freedoms of speech, religion, and publication and the right to participate in an assembly, demonstration, or organization. The inviolability of the home and the privacy of correspondence are protected. These safeguards, however, are subject to important qualifications—in the case of freedom of expression and association by the condition that exercise of these rights "shall not contravene the Constitution, the laws of the land, general morality, and public order." The United States Department of State's Human Rights Report for 1981 noted that the press is government controlled, foreign publications are subject to censorship, and freedom of assembly is severely circumscribed. The report further stated that, while the Constitution provides that the state religion is Islam, adherents of other religions are allowed to worship freely but cannot proselytize.

The Constitution stipulates that anyone deprived of his personal liberty shall forthwith be informed of the offense of which he is accused, and anyone detained on security grounds must be brought before a competent judicial authority without delay. In spite of these provisions, the *Amnesty International Report 1980* estimated that at least 100 people were being held on political grounds without charge or trial, among them former Prime Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, detained except for a brief period ever since the overthrow of the civilian government in 1969. The Mogadishu National Security Court tried seventy-four men after the failed coup attempt of April 1978, resulting in the execution of seventeen individuals. The defendants did have access to legal representation, and close relatives could attend the trials. In spring 1980 as many as several dozen military personnel, members of the Majerteyn clan, were executed secretly for allegedly having supported the Somali Salvation Front (SSF) guerrilla move-

ment. It could not be ascertained whether the victims had been executed without trial.

Politics And Ideology

The egalitarian traditions of the Somali social system under which all were free to speak out on political issues and to be equally heard were breached by the military men who came to power in 1969. Important decisions were henceforth made by the military-dominated leadership at the center, supported by the largely military structure at the regional and local levels. Political disagreements that did occur were apparently ironed out within the ranks of the SRC. Major issues concerned the speed and degree of socializing the country, the continuing intrusion of clan rivalry, foreign alignments, and Somalia's irredentist claims.

The later addition of new bodies like the SRSP and the People's Assembly have produced a complex amalgam of government but have not materially affected the underlying concentration of power in the hands of Siad Barre and his closest military collaborators. The introduction of the civilian party structure might have been expected to reinvigorate the ideological spirit of the government; but it was in fact followed by reduced stridency of official rhetoric and more pragmatic policies as Siad Barre has moved closer to the West. The proclaimed socialist course of the economy has been maintained while private economic activity has been sanctioned among the peasants, nomads, and small businessmen.

Insofar as policy debates have occurred in recent years, they have been permissible only within the upper reaches of the SRSP, the political arm of the military junta. But by 1981, in spite of stern deterrents to the expression of dissenting views, discouragement over the drift and loss of vitality of the Siad Barre regime had been increasingly voiced. This discontent did not appear to have crystallized into a coherent opposition element; while new dissident groups had been formed abroad, most appeared to be based on clan ties and rivalries without offering a distinctive national program.

The Ideological Base

On the first anniversary of the SRC coup, Siad Barre declared that Somalia was to be a "socialist state dedicated to scientific method." In subsequent speeches and pronouncements Siad Barre and other government officials elaborated on what had been designated scientific socialism, which they equated with Marxism-Leninism rather than African or other forms of socialism. Siad Barre described scientific socialism as a system in which all means of production and natural resources belong to the entire society and one that distributes the national products in accor-

dance with contributions of each individual. Although Siad Barre associated Somalia's ideology with that of the Soviet Union and other "advanced socialist countries," he emphasized that it must be applied in accordance with the conditions found in each country. Thus in Somalia the country's poverty of natural resources dictated that growth be centered on the traditional sectors of agriculture and livestock. Distinctive features of Somali socialism were the great campaigns for a standard Somali script and mass literacy and programs of self-help and collective labor. Siad Barre also insisted that Somalia's socialism was in harmony with Muslim doctrine, which he noted is a religion of social well-being and human equality (see Siad Barre and Scientific Socialism, ch. 1).

Somalia is one of several African states (including Guinea, Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia) that have chosen a political doctrine they have defined as scientific socialism. Political scientist Kenneth Jowitt has drawn attention to the disparity between the terminology used in these countries and their real ideological commitment and development strategies. Jowitt postulates several possible explanations for this phenomenon: that African scientific socialist regimes are designed to secure military or economic aid from communist countries, that overwhelming resource shortcomings prevent the achievement of economic aspirations along conventional Marxist lines, that the choice of an ideological format reflects the arbitrary decision of a personal dictator or ruling clique, or that some African scientific socialist states have for particular reasons formally adopted Leninist facades while retaining a non-Leninist character. Consideration of these factors helps to explain Somali adherence to scientific socialism. In spite of its heavy reliance (until late 1977) on the Soviet Union for arms, military training, and economic aid and its exposure to the influence of several thousand Soviet advisers, Siad Barre's government never relinquished the prerogative of carrying out its socialist revolution in its own chosen fashion.

David Laitin, a specialist on Somalia, has found that during the military regime's first seven years, achievements in terms of traditional socialist doctrine were mixed at best. While banks, insurance companies, and leading industrial enterprises were nationalized, the process was based on pragmatism. The private retail sector was largely unaffected, and the most important export earners—livestock and bananas—remained in private hands. Self-help projects like sand dune stabilization were carried out in the name of scientific socialism, as were the determined efforts to bring about greater social equality through language reform and the moves to root out the prevailing kinship system. In its foreign relations the regime pursued a consciously socialist policy, becoming a leading voice for "progressive" causes and developing close

ties with the Soviet Union, China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the more radical Arab states like Syria, Libya, and Iraq. In Laitin's view, however, even before the break with the Soviet Union in 1977, scientific socialism was becoming more meaningless with every speech by Siad Barre. In retrospect another government confronting the same developmental problems might have acted in much the same way without claiming so assertively to be following the course of scientific socialism.

Since the eviction of Soviet personnel in late 1977 and the subsequent traumas of defeat in the Ogaden war and the influx of refugees, the rhetoric of scientific socialism has become muted, and the term itself has faded from official utterances. The 1979 Constitution does not employ the expression, stating simply that the republic is a socialist state led by the working class. Foreign policy is declared to be nonaligned. The Constitution affirms that the economy, while founded on socialist state planning, is composed of a state sector ("the vanguard of economic development"), a cooperative sector, a private sector, and a mixed sector consisting of joint ownership between the Somali state and others. In an address to military officers in May 1981 Siad Barre reiterated that Somalia maintains a straightforward political policy of socialism but does not insist on the universal superiority of socialist doctrine. He noted that capitalism is practiced by major Western countries having advanced agriculture, industry, and transport infrastructures, and that economic units were owned by the people through share capital. Somalia, he pointed out, is obliged to follow a socialist path because it does not have a solid infrastructure, a wealthy population, training, experience, and basic resources.

Since 1976 seemingly contradictory trends have emerged—while the fervor of socialist ideology has abated, the institutional forms of state socialism have been extended. A government-party structure has been imposed in a form resembling those of such African nations as Angola and Mozambique and more distantly related to the systems of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In all these countries the national governments are based on a blurred division of responsibility between a single vanguard party and the state. Although party congresses are held only at lengthy intervals—usually five years—a central committee concerns itself with the ideological direction, and an administrative apparatus of bureaus or committees deals with day-to-day policy questions. True executive power in each country is concentrated in the political bureau, which in Somalia has consisted only of Siad Barre and four others regarded as his most loyal supporters.

As in other socialist states like Angola and Guinea, a national legislature has been introduced, but it has been relegated to a position subordinate to the military oligarchy and the party. Al-

though ostensibly holding broad powers under the new Constitution to legislate, approve budgets and development plans, ratify treaties, and elect the president, the Somali People's Assembly seems to have been accorded little more than symbolic status, meeting in brief sessions to endorse government decisions already made and to hear inspirational messages from government leaders. The constitutional referendum and assembly elections of 1979 can be explained best not as opportunities for genuine expression of opinion but as furnishing public manifestations of the legitimacy of the regime. The predictably favorable response in the voting results was heralded as an affirmation of the nation's unity and support for Siad Barre's leadership.

In accordance with its socialist commitment to egalitarian economic policies, the government exercises control over wages and prices, conducts foreign trade through import and export agencies, and monopolizes large-scale economic activity through public corporations. As of 1981 the less doctrinaire attitude toward the private sector reflected in Siad Barre's public declarations—and formalized in the Constitution—had not been matched by a strong revival of private economic activity. Approximately fifty public enterprises continued to dominate the modern sector of the economy, including banks, insurance, wholesale trade, business services, exporting, and manufacturing. In 1978 it was estimated that 77 percent of gross output in manufacturing arose from publicly owned establishments. Major projects in cement, sugar, petroleum refining, and textiles in the 1974–78 development plan period and others included in 1979–81 intensified the government's preeminence in the economy. Although the government recognized the role of the private sector in small-scale manufacture and in retail trade, few tangible forms of encouragement were offered to private entrepreneurs and foreign investors.

The government has not interfered with private agriculture by livestock- and crop-producing families, who constitute the largest part of the Somali population. Government pricing policies for the country's main export—livestock—have acted as an incentive to private producers in recent years. Government development policies, however, have tended to encourage large-scale irrigated state farming over individual crop raisers and small cooperatives, and some of the best rangelands have been reserved for grazing associations and cooperatives (see Crop Production, ch. 3).

The Somali labor force is organized within the General Federation of Somali Trade Unions, formed by the government in 1977. Seven unions claiming a membership of 200,000 are affiliated with the federation: the Industry and Minerals Union; the Agricultural and Livestock Workers Union; the Construction and Electrical Workers Union; the Transport, Telecommunications, and Infor-

mation Workers Union; the Commerce and Finance Workers Union; the Administrative and Social Affairs Workers Union; and the Local Government, Tourism, and Hotel Workers Union. The unions appear to serve chiefly as rallying points for support of the government as adjuncts to the SRSP, rather than independently representing the interests of the workers and conducting collective bargaining.

Decisionmaking

Until 1976 the policies of the military government were determined by the SRC, which was composed exclusively of senior military and police officers. When the SRC dissolved itself in July 1976, direction of the country's political course was formally vested in the newly created SRSP. Through its central committee the new party incorporated the ideological, policy formulating, and supervisory functions of the erstwhile SRC. A measure of civilian participation in the essentially military power structure had already been introduced in 1970 with the creation of a cabinet (Council of the Secretaries of State) composed largely of civilian technocrats. The secretaries of state administered the government departments, and the authority of the council, of which Siad Barre was chairman, gradually expanded. Some of its members were co-opted as advisers to the SRC in 1974.

The real reins of power, both before and after the emergence of the SRSP in 1976, continued to be held by Siad Barre in collaboration with a small group of military counselors. Those most readily identified, in addition to the president, were the three vice-presidents appointed in 1971—Ali Samantar, Kulmie Afrah, and Ali Abokar. This inner circle was augmented by a fifth member, Suleiman Abdulle, head of the National Security Service (NSS), when it was more formally constituted as the political bureau of the SRSP in 1976. Notwithstanding their long association with Siad Barre, the extent of their influence was uncertain. Some Somali critics asserted that Siad Barre had no intimate advisers and that his actions, especially since about 1974, were guided largely by his own political shrewdness.

In spite of Siad Barre's energetic campaign aimed at eliminating tribalism and clan rivalry in Somali society, tribalism remained a persistent factor that could not be ignored even by the president. Major lineage blocs were represented in the SRC, and political rewards were dealt out with an eye to avoiding discontent. This balancing of ethnic interests long maintained by Siad Barre was reported to be reverting to greater reliance on traditional clan ties as pressures mounted against the regime in 1980 and 1981.

Siad Barre is of the Marehan clan of the predominant Darod clan-family. The Marehan homeland is near the junction of the borders of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia. His position is strengthened by linkage through his mother to the Ogaden clan (also of the

Darod clan-family) originating across the border in Ethiopia. Another strategically important alliance is with a northern clan of the Darod, the Dolbahante, through his son-in-law, Suleiman Abdulle. The Dolbahante connection forms a bridge to the clans of former British Somaliland. A Somali dissident writing in the *Horn of Africa* in 1981 listed more than fifty officials allegedly related to Siad Barre. They included the ministers of foreign affairs, defense, finance, and information and national guidance; the governor of the central bank; and the president of Somali Airlines.

The opacity of the political process among Somali governing elites defies reliable assessment of the personal standing and political orientation of the high officials surrounding Siad Barre. Widespread changes have occurred in policy-level positions beginning in 1980. New SRSP bureau heads named in February of that year were superseded by an almost entirely new list of bureau chairmen in the spring of 1981. When the SRC was reconstituted in October 1980, a new list of SRC committee members was published, but the further changes in the SRC in April 1981 hinted at the eclipse of the political careers of a number of longtime military leaders not linked to Siad Barre by clan ties.

Revival of the Supreme Revolutionary Council

Beginning with the substitution in 1976 of a civilian political party for the original SRC, the introduction of the new Constitution in 1979, and the convoking of the elected People's Assembly in early 1980, Siad Barre had sought to endow his rule with greater legitimacy through token forms and institutions of civilian government. As head of the party apparatus and president after election by the People's Assembly, Siad Barre appeared in fact to have solidified his dominance over the power structure. It was thus wholly unexpected that only eight months after the introduction of civilianizing measures he felt constrained to declare a state of emergency and to reconstitute his military council, the SRC, on October 21, 1980, the eleventh anniversary of the revolution. In explaining his actions the president cited the "continued acts of aggression" by Ethiopia and its allies; the large number of refugees from the Ogaden; distortion of the objectives of the revolution through tribal, i.e. clan or lineage, favoritism, nepotism and inequality; and bribery, corruption, and malpractice in the government and the party.

In a directive a few days later, he relieved five of the military members of his cabinet and two military men acting as directors general of state agencies in order to free them to serve on SRC committees. Five of these committees were identified: defense and security; economic, commerce and finance; political; social; and public auditing. The committees (all headed by prominent military figures, including Ali Samantar and Kulmie Afrah) were

given a broad mandate aimed at correcting deviations of the revolution; revitalizing government programs; protecting defense and security; and eradicating tribalism, rumormongering, embezzlement, sabotage, favoritism, and mismanagement.

The reintroduction of the SRC was subject to several possible interpretations. One was that Siad Barre wished to blur his personal discredit for reversals in the Ogaden by forcing the military leadership to share responsibility for withdrawal of remaining Somali units. The repeated references to tribalism and nepotism caused other foreign observers to conclude that the emergency decree was part of Siad Barre's efforts to counteract dissension in the army and elsewhere by rival clan groups.

Among other steps taken during the state of emergency was the formation of revolutionary committees at the regional and district levels under the chairmanship of party secretaries; the committees included local members of the armed forces, police, and the National Security Service (NSS). These organizations were instructed to combat at the local level all evidence of tribalism, regionalism, corruption, and nepotism as well as to ensure the provision of aid for refugees in their regions and districts. The committees were empowered to detain or place under house arrest for ninety days anyone suspected of engaging in the practices that had necessitated the declaration of the state of emergency.

In the early months of 1981 the government announced several major economic changes arising from the state of emergency and the restoration of the SRC. In response to recommendations by the SRSP central committee and the SRC, government leaders had decided to dissolve the Livestock Development Agency, the Textile and Equipment Agency, and the Building Materials Agency as unproductive and incapable of carrying out their work. The Agricultural Development Corporation was reorganized to raise producer prices and further encourage small-scale farmers by providing equipment and capital. Among measures to stem the loss of reserves, more favorable exchange rates were announced, and special accounts were offered enabling Somali workers abroad to retain their earnings in hard currency form.

While these measures seemed to follow reasonably from the revived SRC's mandate to ferret out inefficiency and corruption in the economy, rapid changes in government leadership that followed a month later could not be so easily explained. It was announced on April 28, 1981, that ten leading members of the SRC had been relieved of their party, parliamentary, and government functions in order to leave them ample time to carry out their duties on the SRC committees to end the deviations from revolutionary objectives. Among these officials were Defense Minister Ali Samantar, the NSS Director Suleiman Abdulle, Peo-

ple's Assembly Chairman Ali Abokar, and Vice-President Kulmie Afrah. These four, along with Siad Barre, had constituted the political bureau of the SRSP and had been considered the president's most trusted confidants since the early years of the revolution. Other SRC leaders removed from their posts were the chairmen of the bureaus of ideology and foreign affairs, economy and finance, scientific research, and organization and mass mobilization.

Observers were baffled by what at first appeared to be a sweeping purge of the most prominent members of the SRC. One interpretation was that the president, increasingly isolated by his internal and external policies, wished to surround himself with dependable members of his own Marehan clan and that he was particularly concerned over the threat posed by the popular armed forces commander, Defense Minister Ali Samantar. His son-in-law, Suleiman Abdulle (sometimes looked upon as the president's heir apparent), was relieved of the sensitive NSS post but remained in the inner circle as presidential adviser on security affairs. A further unexplained aspect to the changes was that Ali Samantar and Kulmie Afrah were not removed from their positions as first and second vice-presidents, while Ali Abokar was simultaneously raised to the restored post of third vice-president, which he had held earlier, in spite of relinquishing his positions in the SRC and the People's Assembly.

Public Opinion

The degree to which the Somali government and its leaders are influenced by currents of popular opinion is problematic in spite of the existence of new instrumentalities—the SRSP and the People's Assembly—that might serve as forums for the expression of political views. During the first years of military rule, the government energetically sought to monitor and control public opinion. Under direction of the National Political Office, the regime's orientation centers became the focal points of government information activities at the local level. Instruction was given in the aims of the revolution and scientific socialism. Political officers were charged with gathering and disseminating information and with reporting to upper echelons on political, economic, social, and security affairs in their areas. Registers were maintained on people who were active supporters of the regime and those who appeared to resist the official ideology. Strenuous attempts were made to suppress political gossip and insinuation that had been features of Somali public life. Surveillance by the uniformed "People's Militia," also known as Gulwadayal (Victory Pioneers), who reported to the National Political Office, was pervasive; individuals who went beyond the narrow but ill-defined boundaries of acceptable criticism faced prosecution and jail sentences.

Siad Barre has supported in principle the filtering upward of ideas and preoccupations of the people through his local political representatives, but the oppressive atmosphere has not been conducive to incautious expression. To some extent the party apparatus may have provided a means for more effective dialogue, at least between lower and upper level supporters of the regime, but tangible evidence of this is scarce. The revival of revolutionary committees of police, army, and party officials under the 1980 emergency decree could not have encouraged outspokenness at the local level.

In spite of the regime's control over the instruments of government and the information media, the leadership is not insensitive to fundamental Somali concerns and aspirations. Foremost among these is the national preoccupation with the Greater Somalia issue and the enduring bitterness toward Ethiopia over the Ogaden. Siad Barre's more moderate diplomatic posture has probably been accepted as a necessity owing to military weakness and economic stress, but any action seen as relinquishing Somalia's inherent interests in the Ogaden could undermine his authority. Ejection of the Soviet personnel in 1977 resulted in part from strong public feeling against Moscow's rearming of Ethiopia and dislike of the Soviet presence in Somalia. SSF's clandestine Radio Kulmis has harshly attacked the military facilities agreement with the United States, appealing to Somali chauvinism and distrust of foreign influence from any quarter. But Siad Barre's collaboration with the United States has not been an unpopular move.

Clan attachments and Muslim identity are constants in Somali society that would be perilous for the government to ignore, however complete its grip on public expression. Although the issue of the compatibility of Islam with scientific socialism produced a sharp clash over women's rights in 1975, Siad Barre has since managed to avoid open dispute with religious leaders (see Islam in the Colonial Era and After, ch. 2). As the government sought to create a modern state, its deliberate weakening of kinship-based associations—particularly in the urban centers—created an obligation to meet social needs that were no longer available through descent groups. Although the military regime undertook to fill this gap, e.g., by providing funeral expenses for those who died without relatives at hand, its success was limited and, as economic strains have mounted, its failure to ensure the security that the descent group system once provided has become more acute. Siad Barre's growing reliance on his own clan ties to assure his continuance in power has contributed to public cynicism over his attempts to reduce clan loyalty as a preeminent factor in Somali society.

Since 1978 several observers have commented that criticism of the government has become more open, probably resulting from

both slack administration of controls and a relaxation of security measures. Dissatisfaction has been widely expressed over the shortages of food staples and consumer goods that became severe in 1980 and 1981. The feeling appeared to be widespread that the government no longer had the capacity to deal with the country's problems and was mainly occupied with perpetuating itself. If any organized internal opposition existed, it was necessarily clandestine owing to the strict prohibition against unauthorized political activity and vigilance of the security forces against potential sedition. A number of political exiles had formed themselves into opposition groups headquartered in foreign countries, but in 1981 it could not be established whether support was building for any identifiable internal or external faction or for a return to genuine representative government (see Sources of Opposition, ch. 5).

Politics and the Media

In 1981 all modern information media were in the hands of the government, and news carried in radiobroadcasts or in the few domestic publications was subject to editorial control by the Ministry of Information and National Guidance. A limited number of uncensored foreign publications such as American news magazines were available to the educated elite. Foreign radio programs could also be heard by anyone possessing a shortwave radio receiver.

Radio was the most important medium of communication. Nearly all urbanized Somalis had access to a receiver, and nomads commonly owned portable transistor models. Radiobroadcasts could also be heard in village orientation centers, which were designed as places for social activities but had as their principal purpose the political indoctrination of the people. In an interview in 1979 the director of the Somali Broadcasting Department, an agency of the Ministry of Information and National Guidance, mentioned the following as among the objectives of government broadcasting: strengthening national cooperation; spreading the spirit of solidarity; dealing with social problems; advocating adherence to spiritual and moral values; evaluating, filtering, and disseminating ideas and aspirations of the national leaders; giving listeners a ready understanding of the aims of the socialist revolution; and explaining how the people fit into the overall system.

Newscasts on the Somali radio were largely repetitions of slanted and uninformative government releases. There is evidence that educated Somalis gave the official news little credence, depending instead on the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), which in early 1981 carried ninety minutes of transmission in Somali each day. The Soviet Union, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Italy also had programs in Somali, and the Voice of America's English-language broadcasts to Africa could be heard in Somalia. Transmission of information by word-of-mouth has long been tra-

ditional among Somalis as a natural consequence of their deep interest in political and social events and the virtual lack of other channels of communication until well after the end of World War II. It is believed that dissemination of uncensored information in this way continues to be important in spite of government efforts to discourage "rumor-mongering."

Radiobroadcasting was operated by the Somali Broadcasting Department of the Ministry of Information and National Guidance, and transmissions originated from Radio Mogadishu and Radio Hargeysa. Programming of the two stations differed only in their treatment of area news. Radio Mogadishu conducted broadcasts fourteen hours daily in Somali, releasing forty-two programs each week in the form of light entertainment, information, education, and political orientation. Programs in Arabic were broadcast one hour daily on both mediumwave and shortwave frequencies. Fifteen-minute shortwave broadcasts were transmitted each day from Mogadishu in Amharic, French, Italian, Swahili, English, Oromo, and Afar.

During the nine years of civilian government after independence, the literate segment of the population had access to daily, weekly, and monthly periodicals that presented relatively freely the views of all significant elements in Somali politics. In 1968 some fifteen such publications appeared fairly regularly, but only four had circulations of more than 1,000 copies; three of these were owned by the government, and the fourth belonged to the then-dominant party, the Somali Youth League.

All independent periodicals ceased publication after the military takeover in 1969, and journals appearing thereafter were under government aegis. The only daily newspaper was *October Star*; editions in Italian, English, and Arabic were published by the Ministry of Information and National Guidance. When the new Somali script was introduced in 1973, a new Somali-language newspaper, *Xiddigta Oktoobar* (October Star), replaced the earlier English and Italian editions. An Arabic version also appeared as *Najmat Oktobar*. Combined circulation of the two editions of the newspaper was believed to be about 12,000.*Horseed* (Vanguard), a weekly published in Italian and Arabic, was described as independent but was believed to be controlled by the Ministry of Information and National Guidance; it had a circulation of about 4,000. In 1978 a six-page English-language weekly *Heegan* (Vigilance) began to be published by the Ministry of Information and National Guidance, replacing a monthly called *New Era*. Circulation figures were not available.

Foreign Relations

Somalia's vision of world affairs has been dominated by the dedication of the country's political leaders and its people to the Greater Somalia cause. In its foreign policy, described in the new



A ground station near Mogadishu provides a Somali link to transmissions via international communication satellites.
Courtesy Somali Embassy, Washington

Constitution as based on peaceful coexistence and positive neutrality, Somalia has been an active partisan of both African and Arab causes. It has committed itself, along with other states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), to the eradication of the remnants of white rule in Africa and is aligned with the Arab League (League of Arab States) in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Somalia's leaders have also carried on an energetic bilateral diplomacy with the countries of Africa, Asia, and Europe. In the principles and conduct of its foreign relations, however, the issue of pan-Somalism takes precedence over all other considerations.

Somalia has common borders with Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, all of which include ethnic Somalis in their populations. Successive Somali governments have continued to regard this fragmentation as a result of the unjust division of the Horn of

Africa by European colonial powers. During the early years of Somali independence until 1967, Somalia was involved in almost constant strife with neighboring states, leading them to regard Somali irredentism as the paramount cause of instability in the area. During the final years of the civilian government and early phase of the military regime, some progress was made toward the peaceful conciliation of differences with Kenya and Ethiopia, but the enlargement of Soviet influence under the leftward-oriented military regime injected a dangerous new element into the situation. An augmented flow of Soviet military advisers and modern equipment nourished Somalia's irredentist claims. Somalia's allocation of bases for Soviet use as a quid pro quo contributed to a sharp adjustment in military balance among the great powers in the volatile Middle East by facilitating an increased Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf areas.

His alliance with Moscow formalized by a treaty of friendship in 1974, Siad Barre simultaneously adopted a more expansive international posture, ranging Somalia with the militant African states on the issues of Portuguese colonialism and white minority regimes. Reasserting historical and religious ties with the Arab world and coveting financial support from Saudi Arabia and other countries of the Persian Gulf, Somalia became a member of the Arab League in 1974. In spite of Somalia's active presence in the OAU and its intensive courting of individual African countries, the OAU has treated the Greater Somalia issue in terms of its resolute attachment to the status quo on African territorial disputes, thereby tacitly siding with Ethiopia over the Ogaden. Even the Arab League, while attentive to Somalia's economic vulnerability, has stayed aloof on pan-Somalism.

Somalia's overt intervention in the Ogaden fighting in 1977, apparently triggered by the turmoil in Ethiopia after the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie and fears of Ethiopia's military buildup under Soviet patronage, was disastrous in both military and diplomatic terms. It made Ethiopia appear as the victim of aggression, helped legitimize Soviet and Cuban involvement, and deterred Western support for Somalia. Somalia's dramatic foreign policy realignment, precipitated by the Soviet shift of client states in the Horn, obliged Somalia to address urgent appeals for military support in Western capitals. Met with initial rebuff because no Western power wanted to encourage Somali adventures or defy the OAU, Somalia nevertheless continued its border encroachments and supplied the guerrilla forces of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF).

Unable to counter Ethiopian military ascendancy in the Ogaden and stymied by the Western arms embargo, the government in Mogadishu swung around to a policy of détente in 1980, curbing direct military activity in the Ogaden, reducing its support for the WSLF, and calling for direct talks with Ethiopia. Siad Barre has

argued that he has not staked out territorial claims but has only sought self-determination for Ogaden Somalis. Such statements have not been taken seriously by Ethiopia, which has regarded the Ogaden claims as deeply rooted in Somali nationalism and has not been willing to negotiate over the territory. While deep suspicions have persisted in Kenya and Djibouti over Mogadishu's true aims, the Somali clans in those countries have not been as closely linked politically, culturally, or economically to Somalia, and the Somali government has been less demanding because it has acknowledged that the political and legal conditions are dissimilar.

The flood of refugees driven into Somalia by Ethiopian oppression, border warfare, and drought combined with Somalia' own deteriorating economic situation have engendered growing sympathy and have brought massive development and relief aid from Western and Arab sources. A new chapter in Somalia's external relations opened in August 1980 after the conclusion of an agreement with the United States covering military facilities at Berbera. While the United States has undertaken to provide only limited amounts of defensive military equipment, the Somalis see in the emerging relationship the outlines of a long-term commitment to their country's security (balancing the Soviet presence in Ethiopia) and the prospect of a reliable source of equipment for the depleted Somali armed forces.

Greater Somalia

The issue transcending all other considerations of Somalia's foreign relations has been the status of fellow Somalis in adjacent countries: the Ogaden and Haud regions of Ethiopia, generally called simply Ogaden; the Northern Frontier District of Kenya (NFD), which since the 1970s has been part of Kenya's North Eastern Province; and the southern half of the Republic of Djibouti around the port of Djibouti. The inclusion of the contested areas as parts of Somalia would roughly double its size and increase its population by up to 50 percent; this addition, however, would not necessarily increase the national wealth because, with the exception of the built-up areas of Djibouti and the prospect of oil and gas discoveries in the Ogaden, the contested areas are at best dry pastureland and at worst simply desert without natural resources.

Although the constitution of 1961 stated that "the Somali Republic promotes by legal and peaceful means the union of the Somali territories," the Constitution of 1979, adopted when the country was seeking to divert censure arising from its intervention in Ogaden, is more circumspect: "The Somali Republic adopting peaceful and legal means shall support the liberation of Somali territories under colonial occupation and shall encourage the unity of the Somali people through their free will."

Siad Barre's military government, like its civilian predecessor, did not insist directly on the territorial unification of all Somali-occupied areas but on the right of Somali people in the three contested areas to a free referendum, citing Article 1 of the United Nations Charter on the principle of the self-determination of peoples. The conviction by Somalia's neighbors that Mogadishu harbored territorial ambitions seemed substantiated when Somalia's regular forces joined the WSLF in its campaign against Ethiopia in 1977. But Somalia has respected the sovereignty of Djibouti since that country became independent in June 1977, acknowledging that the independence referendum there represented the freely expressed will of the people.

The Northern Frontier District of Kenya

During the time of European colonization at the turn of the twentieth century, the Somalis were still on the move in the south, expanding their presence in the area then called the Trans-Juba, which extended from the Juba River southwestward to the northern shore of the Tana River in present-day Kenya. The entire area was at first claimed by Britain as part of Kenya. In 1916, however, the British agreed to cede about half of the Somali-occupied territory to Italy as part of Britain's settlement in exchange for Italy's entry into World War I on the side of the Allies.

By the time colonial control in the NFD was solidified after 1925, Somalis dominated most of the area north of the Tana River, having driven all the weaker ethnic groups southward or westward. To prevent further interethnic warfare the British authorities set up a line—virtually an internal frontier—beyond which the Somalis were not permitted to travel. Other distinctions that remained in effect at the time of Kenya's independence in 1963, such as taxation of Somalis at a higher rate than other African groups, reinforced alienation of the Somalis and induced them to look to their politically and economically advanced brethren across the border for leadership.

In connection with Kenya's independence negotiations in 1961, a British survey found that the Somalis and the Oromos, who together formed a majority in the NFD, overwhelmingly preferred separation from Kenya. The leaders of Kenya's two major parties were, however, determined not to give away any part of the country that was shortly to be theirs; as a result the British, reluctant to oppose the Kenyans, failed to act on demands of the Somalis in the NFD for separation. The North Eastern Region, composed of the Somali district of the NFD, was established as a federal unit but was absorbed when Kenya adopted a highly centralized system in late 1964.

Soon after Kenya's independence an uprising by Somali guerrillas in the NFD kept the small Kenyan security forces busy.

Remembering that experience, Kenya feared that a Somali victory in the 1977–78 Ogaden war against Ethiopia would lead to a renewed campaign for the return of the NFD. Its suspicions were heightened by claims of defecting Somali officers after the coup attempt against Siad Barre in 1978 that plans had been laid for the invasion of Kenya. Mutual antipathy toward Somalia induced Kenya and Ethiopia to join in a ten-year treaty of friendship and cooperation in January 1979, although their political systems had little in common. The government in Nairobi refrained from directly blaming Somalia for a resurgence of *shifta* (bandit) activity in 1980, but Kenya's President Daniel arap Moi joined Ethiopia's Chairman Mengistu Haile Mariam in a harsh condemnation of Somali goals and activities during their meeting of December 1980. The two leaders demanded that Somalia renounce all territorial claims to Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti, and pay reparations for damage caused during the Ogaden war. Kenya also objected to delivery of military equipment by the United States, remaining unmollified by the defensive nature of the arms and the stringent restrictions over their use.

The goverment in Mogadishu has sought to appease Kenya, asserting that it has no territorial claims and that it does not lend support to Somali insurgents in the NFD because, unlike Ethiopia, it does not regard Kenya as a predatory colonial power. The Somali dissidents were reported in May 1981 to have formed a Northern Frontier District Liberation Front, based on independence of the North Eastern Province, to be followed by a referendum to decide whether to join Somalia. They were denounced by the Kenyan vice-president as a group of "con men"; he urged Arab countries to reject their fundraising efforts in the Middle East.

Although Kenya has remained distrustful of Somali intentions, a thaw appeared to be developing by mid–1981 when, after an OAU summit conference in Nairobi, Moi and Siad Barre met to commit themselves to promotion of better understanding and collaboration and to hold regular meetings in the future. Lower level talks followed on trade and on curbing *shifta* activity through the use of joint border patrols.

Conflict in the Ogaden

The Ogaden area between the highlands of Ethiopia and the sea has been the scene of intermittent conflict for hundreds of years. The roots of modern Somali irredentism can be traced to the recognition of Ethiopian jurisdiction by Britain and Italy in separate treaties in 1897, confirmed by the British when control over Ethiopia was restored to Emperor Haile Selassie during World War II (see Division of Somali-Occupied Territory, ch. 1). The unification and concurrent independence of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland in 1960 was followed by open frontier hos-

tilities, although under the Egal government (1967–69) and during the early years of the SRC a policy of détente was maintained. The guerrilla movement among Ogadeni nomads that later became the WSLF continued to operate with increasing support from the military government until the fateful decision of Somalia to become directly involved in mid–1977 (see Pan-Somalism, ch. 1; War in the Ogaden, ch. 1; Performance in the Ogaden Conflict, ch. 5).

Somalia's humiliating military defeat in early 1978 did not result in its total disengagement from the Ogaden. Incursions of regular Somali forces of up to battalion size were reported until a series of Ethiopian victories in 1980, based on superior armaments and control of the air, forced Somalia to curtail the use of regular units in Ethiopian territory. Ethiopian oppression in the Ogaden, combined with renewed drought, brought destruction of farms and herds and resulted in a flight into Somalia of refugees numbering in the hundreds of thousands, intensifying the strains on Somalia's economy (see Refugees, ch. 2).

Ethiopian military superiority and Somali war weariness added to crushing economic burdens, and Siad Barre was induced to adopt an increasingly conciliatory attitude. He declared that his country was no longer giving direct military support to the WSLF and was prepared to negotiate its differences with the Ethiopians. In a tour of West African countries before the OAU summit meeting in June 1981 and during the conference, Siad Barre underscored his goal of a peaceful solution of differences in the Horn. While his new posture apparently impressed Kenya's president enough to agree to a fresh start, the Ethiopian leadership again rejected any talks centering on the status of the Ogaden.

The OAU has been occupied with the dispute over the Ogaden since its formation in 1963. It has repeatedly confirmed a resolution passed at the Cairo summit in 1964 pledging all members "to respect the borders existing on their achievement of independence." Somalia regards this resolution as irrelevant because Ethiopia did not achieve independence in the modern era and has always been, in the Somali view, a colonial power. Somalia's lack of diplomatic success in the OAU forum stems from the fears of other African states that any readjustment of frontiers in the Horn would unloose pressures from their own tribal groups fragmented by boundaries imposed during the colonial period.

In May 1973 the OAU created a Good Offices Committee of eight states (Nigeria, Liberia, Senegal, Sudan, Cameroon, Tanzania, Mauritania, and Lesotho) under the chairmanship of the Nigerian foreign minister to mediate differences over the Ogaden. The committee has reflected the predisposition of the OAU itself, condemning Somalia's aid to the WSLF as meddling in Ethiopia's internal affairs, reaffirming the inviolability of frontiers, and in

effect recognizing the Ogaden as an integral part of Ethiopia. Siad Barre rejected the committee's report at the OAU summit in June 1981 as an obstacle to meaningful attempts at solving the problem and a misreading of the struggle between the WSLF and the "Abyssinian colonizers."

Skepticism over Somalia's calls for peaceful settlement in the Ogaden has been accentuated by the Siad Barre regime's continued support for the WSLF, supplying most of its arms and permitting WSLF guerrillas to use Somali territory as a refuge. Although by no means a pawn of the Somali government, as is often alleged, the WSLF under its former secretary general, Abdullah Hassan Mohamed, lent its weight to the goal of a Greater Somalia. At a congress in January 1981, the older WSLF leadership was replaced by a group headed by Mohamed Diriyeh Urdoh, which adopted a new policy stressing self-determination and the creation of a free state of Western Somalia rather than incorporation into Somalia proper.

The WSLF originally included within its ranks both Ogaden Somalis and the Oromos, the largest single ethnic group in Ethiopia, found mainly in three provinces to the south and west of the Ogaden. The two factions divided during the WSLF congress in 1976, the Oromos becoming organized as the Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF) in 1978. Following the example of the WSLF, the SALF installed a new leadership group in 1981 under Secretary General Mohamed Haji Dobane and called for self-determination for the main Oromo areas of Ethiopia without necessarily leading to union with Somalia. Neither the WSLF nor the SALF appeared to have a well-formulated political doctrine, although both were inclined to Islamic nationalism and rejection of major power blocs.

The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), active in the southern Oromo areas of Ethiopia, is looked upon as a rival group to the SALF. Although less closely linked with Somalia than the SALF, the OLF was officially recognized by Siad Barre in 1980, and it established an office in Mogadishu for contact with the WSLF, which maintained its headquarters there.

The Djibouti Question

The ultimate disposition of the small area around the port of Djibouti had been a prime source of contention in the Horn of Africa. Attainment of Djibouti's independence from France on June 27, 1977, deflected Somali irredentist pressures and brought at least transitory political stabilization to the territory.

Originally called French Somaliland, the area of some 20,000 square kilometers was officially known as the French Territory of Afars and Issas after 1966. This smallest fragment of the Horn contains the important modern port of Djibouti, which is the ter-

minus of the only railroad line linking Addis Ababa with the Gulf of Aden. Although the area is not of great economic importance to Somalia, roughly half the population of the country is composed of Somalis, mostly the Issa section of the Dir clan-family. The urbanized Somalis who form a majority in the city of Djibouti, while active in the political affairs of the territory, have maintained strong ties with the SRC. Although the Somalis were few in number in relation to those in the Ogaden and Kenya, Djibouti's orientation after the French administration ended was a matter of intense concern to Somalia.

In a referendum in 1966 roughly 60 percent of those voting favored the territory's continued association with France. Ten years later, after revision of the citizenship law, which had hitherto favored the Afar minority, 99 percent voted for independence in a second referendum. The leading parties of the Afars, who represent about 35 percent of the population and are part of an ethnic group more heavily represented in Ethiopia, boycotted the referendum, but 77 percent of the registered voters cast their ballots. The first president, Hassan Gouled, was an Issa, but the independence government was a coalition with nine ministerial posts held by Issas and six by Afars.

The referendum results were hailed by the SRC as a victory over French colonialism, although the Somalis of Djibouti manifested little interest in rejoining their brethren in a Greater Somalia. Heading a delicate coalition of Afars and Somalis, Gouled pursued an evenhanded course between his neighbors, entering into friendship treaties with both Ethiopia and Somalia and urging a negotiated peace in the Horn. Somalia became the first country to recognize the new state and has refrained from interference, acknowledging the right of the people of Djibouti to opt for independence in a free referendum. The Addis Ababa-Djibouti rail link, dynamited in 1977 by Somali guerrillas, was restored to service a year later, but the line and port of Djibouti have suffered because Ethiopia transferred much of its commerce to the Eritrean port of Mitsiwa.

Djibouti has receded as one of East Africa's danger spots, but its situation has remained uneasy because of its strategic position and the possibility that its ethnic and factional divisions or the influx of refugees from the Ogaden could lead to a breakdown of coalition government. French support for the new country and the presence of some 4,000 French troops have acted as restraints against Somali or Ethiopian intervention.

Arab Ties

After independence Somalia looked to the Arab world for diplomatic and economic support. In addition to its cultural and religious affinities with the Arab states, pan-Arabism was regarded by militant irredentists as the counterweight to pan-Africanist poli-

cies that imposed on Somalia moderate policies for settling its differences with Kenya and Ethiopia. The post–1969 military government found that its scientific socialism and receptivity to Soviet aid and influence brought Somalia into conflict with the conservatism of many Arab states, especially the wealthier ones. When the world oil crisis began to develop and Arab oil producers raised their prices in late 1973, Somalia chose to accept the offer of membership in the Arab League extended years earlier. It thus became the first non-Arab member of the organization.

After joining the league, Somalia sent economic delegations to a number of Arab states and entered into aid agreements, notably for a power station in Mogadishu financed by Kuwait and a refinery built by Iraq, which also agreed to supply crude oil. Saudi Arabia remained cool toward Somalia, especially after the treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union was announced in 1974. Orthodox Arab opinion was also shocked by Siad Barre's execution of ten religious figures in 1975. Somalia had no reservations with the Arab League's strong pro-Palestinian anti-Israeli stand and sought to win Arab sympathy by claiming an analogy between the Palestinians' conflict with Zionism and the Ogadenis' subjugation by Ethiopia.

Until 1977 Mogadishu was closer to the radical Arab states that were friendly to the Soviet Union. But Somalia's rift with the Soviet Union and the realignments occasioned by the Ogaden war led Libya and Algeria to support Ethiopia while troops of Yemen (Aden) were engaged on Ethiopia's side in the war. Although Somali actions in the Ogaden did not enjoy unanimous Arab support, as hostilities widened Saudi Arabia and Egypt saw an opportunity to reduce Soviet influence and strike a blow at the leftist Mengistu regime in Ethiopia. Both countries remained supportive after Somalia's debacle, Saudi Arabia increasing its financial aid and Egypt providing replacement military equipment and spare parts from its own stockpile.

Somalia has remained on good terms with Egypt, in appreciation of its military aid and its adamant opposition to Soviet influence in Africa. This has presented Somalia with a delicate problem of balancing its affinity with Egypt against the benefits it has sought as an anti-Israeli, pro-Palestinian member of the Arab League. Siad Barre has tried to meet this dilemma by remaining nonpolemical when faced with issues dividing the Arab world. Although he felt constrained to join the Arab consensus in condemning the Egyptian peace treaty with Israel at the Arab League summit of November 1979, he did not follow the other Arab nations in breaking diplomatic relations with Egypt. In this respect Somalia and Sudan stood alone among Arab League members in showing tolerance for Egypt's settlement with Israel. Somalia's

hitherto good relations with Sudan suffered a damaging blow in November 1980 when, in a meeting with Ethiopia's Mengistu in Addis Ababa, President Jaafar al Nimeiri brought Sudan to Ethiopia's side by rejecting Somalia's claims in the Ogaden.

The signing of a treaty of friendship and cooperation at Aden in August 1981 by Libya, Yemen (Aden), and Ethiopia led to fears of a new axis of radical forces in the Horn and of Libyan mischief-making in the area. Accusing Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhaafi of offering Ethiopia money and weapons to suppress Ogadenis, Somalia announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Libya.

Relations with Communist States

Somalia's dramatic break with Moscow in November 1977 brought to an abrupt end a relationship that had transformed Somalia into a valued client state of the Soviet Union. In return for supplying modern weaponry and training to Somalia, Moscow secured facilities at Berbera permitting the permanent stationing of naval forces in the Indian Ocean adjacent to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Soviet involvement in Somalia's economic development further entrenched Moscow's influence in a country that had adopted a course of scientific socialism under Marxist-Leninist banners and slogans. Somalia's expulsion of Soviet advisers had a positive effect on its already good relations with China, whose presence in Somalia was less conspicuous yet productive in economic terms. China was, however, unprepared to step in as a large-scale source of military aid in substitution for the severed supply lines from the Soviet Union. After the breach with Moscow, only Romania among East European countries has remained on close terms with Somalia, providing technical aid in agriculture, fisheries, and livestock raising.

The Soviet Alliance

Although Somalia's civilian leaders during the period 1960–69 regarded communism as incompatible with their strong Islamic convictions, the Soviet Union was approached as early as 1963 after the Western nations showed little willingness to meet Somalia's arms needs. The Soviets responded by lending Somalia the equivalent of US$32 million for equipping its expanding army at a time when a modern military force was the most important national issue. Thus, even under the civilian government, Moscow had become the leading military patron of Somalia and was making ideological inroads on the Somali army leadership through the training, by 1969, of more than 800 Somali officers in the Soviet Union.

The Soviets reacted generously when the military government of Siad Barre turned to them for augmented military aid, although the new government's appeal was inspired more by the desire for arms from whatever source than by ideological affinities. The

presence of Soviet advisers had little effect on the doctrine or practice of Somalia's socialists program with its nationalist and Islamic overtones. In 1976 the substitution of a civilian political party (the SRSP) for the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) and the accompanying effort to develop party structures and institutions at local levels were carried out under Moscow's influence, although these actions brought no real change in the authoritarian power structure. A Soviet-sponsored solution to tensions in the Horn—a "progressive" federation embracing Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, and Yemen (Aden) proposed in a speech by Cuban President Fidel Castro in March 1977—was summarily rejected by Somalia.

Moscow supplied armor, MiG–21 aircraft, air defense missile systems, and other arms for a Somali military establishment that was doubled in size by the new regime (see Foreign Military Assistance, Ch. 5). This militarization magnified the threat posed by Somalia's irredentist claims and introduced a fresh source of tension in the Horn.

In February 1972 during a visit to Somalia by Soviet Defense Minister Andrey Grechko, agreement was reached on access to military facilities to be constructed by Moscow, including oil storage depots and missile loading equipment for the Soviet navy, communications sites, and new airfields for long-range reconnaissance flights. A Soviet contingent of 1,500 advisers was detailed to all levels of the armed forces, and 60 percent of the Somali officer corps had received training in the Soviet Union by the time of the rupture in 1977. Until Moscow shifted its support to Ethiopia in 1976, Somalia was the largest client in Black Africa for arms from the Soviet Union and the first to enter into a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviets.

Soviet economic aid was somewhat less generous, amounting to the equivalent of US$154 million over a fifteen-year period, of which only 60 percent had been used when the breach occurred. The loss of Soviet economic aid was of far less consequence than the cutoff of support for the Somali army, which had been entirely dependent on Soviet equipment. Somalia had, moreover, been promised more than the equivalent of US$675 million in Arab loans to cushion the economic consequences of the Soviet withdrawal.

Strains in Soviet-Somali relations had arisen from Somali dissatisfaction over the repayment terms of the military debt, the disappointing economic aid level, and friction resulting from the insensitive and arrogant behavior of Soviet advisers. The collapse of the alliance stemmed, however, from the Soviet decision to exploit the power vacuum in Ethiopia resulting from the American withdrawal. After the initial Somali successes in the Ogaden

in 1977, Moscow branded Siad Barre's government an aggressive military dictatorship and cut off military shipments. Siad Barre's pilgrimage to Moscow in August 1977 to salvage his arms link ended in failure. Formal termination of the Soviet presence came only on November 13, 1977, when the Mogadishu government renounced the 1974 friendship treaty, ordered immediate evacuation of the Soviet advisers, and withdrew Soviet access to military facilities at Berbera and elsewhere. Soviet equipment was quickly removed, and 600 Somali officer trainees were repatriated from the Soviet Union.

Notwithstanding the sweeping nature of the Somali action, the rift was not absolute. Diplomatic relations were not severed, although a reduction was ordered in the Soviet embassy staff, and all Cuban diplomats were ejected. In opening the SRSP congress in January 1979, Siad Barre said that it was not inconceivable that cooperation might resume. Somali restraint, in spite of Moscow's all-out support of Ethiopia, was attributed variously to a lingering hope that the Soviet Union might yet release equipment for the Somali army, to the influence of a pro-Soviet faction the leadership that had looked upon the expulsion as precipitate, and to a tactic to bring pressure on the West to be more forthcoming. In January 1980, however, Somalia voted in favor of a United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement calling the Soviet action a grave threat to peace and a gross violation of international law. By 1981 Somalia's heavy economic dependence on the West and the moderate Arab states and its base facilities agreement with the United States made reconciliation with the Soviet Union seem increasingly remote.

Relations with China

In contrast to the Soviet Union, China has maintained cordial relations with Somalia since diplomatic ties were established in 1961. Most of China's economic assistance projects have been built under credits equivalent to US$130 million extended between 1963 and 1971. In April 1978, in the aftermath of the rift with Moscow and defeat in the Ogaden war, Siad Barre visited Beijing to seek emergency military and economic help. China responded with a token shipment of light arms and spare parts (although military aircraft were supplied in 1981) and agreed to provide the equivalent of US$18 million to finish abandoned Soviet economic projects. A conspicuous Chinese achievement was the construction of a section of hard-surfaced road linking northern and southern Somalia. About 1,000 Chinese technicians remained in Somalia to carry out economic projects.

Somalia has increasingly aligned itself with the Chinese position on issues dividing the communist countries. During a visit to Beijing by Somali Foreign Minister Abdurahman Jama Barre in

1979, the Chinese hosts condemned Cuba and the Soviet Union for creating tension in Africa. Jama Barre praised China for restraint in its border warfare with Vietnam and condemned the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia).

North Korea has also remained on good terms with Somalia, providing a cement plant, an iron foundry, a vegetable oil factory, and a technical college. During a visit to Somalia in March 1981, the head of a North Korean delegation noted that both countries had been "unscrupulously partitioned by colonialists" and were struggling for unification.

Western Relations

After the withdrawal of Soviet personnel from Somalia in 1977, the country sought to rebuild its former close ties with the countries of Western Europe. The refugee situation and Somalia's deepening economic crisis attracted a mounting flow of aid, not only in bilateral form but also through the European Economic Community (EEC) and UN agencies. But Somalia's urgent efforts to find help in refurbishing its army after the Ogaden war were less successful. Although the United States, Britain, and France had been initially disposed to approve the export of arms for the defense of Somalia's borders and to alleviate the effects of the Soviet cutoff, the three Western countries reinstated their embargo policies when it became apparent by August 1977 that Somalia was embarked on a large-scale offensive in the Ogaden.

The success of the Ethiopian counteroffensive in January 1978 with Soviet and Cuban assistance presented the Western powers with the problem that Somalia's belligerency had left it virtually defenseless against a possible Soviet-directed invasion. The United States, joined by the other Western countries, called for a negotiated settlement and extracted assurances from the Soviet Union that the advancing Ethiopian forces would not cross the Somali border in return for agreement by Somalia to withdraw its remaining military units from the Ogaden.

While Western military aid was withheld pending Somalia's complete cessation of activity in the Ogaden, economic aid from Western Europe and the United States increased measurably. The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), which had been a moderate donor, phased out its assistance in 1970 when Somalia recognized the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). Aid was resumed in 1978, initiated by an unconditional loan of the equivalent of US$12 million that was regarded as a token of gratitude form Somalia's cooperation in the overpowering of hijackers of a Lufthansa airliner at Mogadishu airport.

Italy has sought to maintain working relations with the parties in the Ogaden dispute, regarding its historic role in the Horn as qualifying it to assist in finding a settlement. Although Italy had cut back its substantial aid program in Somalia after 1970, it was

resumed in 1977. Subsequently Somalia has become the single most important beneficiary of Italy, accounting for 20 percent of Italian aid worldwide. During a visit to Mogadishu in mid–1981, the Italian foreign minister signed a three-year agreement promising the equivalent of nearly US$200 million for projects in agriculture, irrigation, and energy development. By virtue of its former ties with Italy, Somalia was entitled to associate status with the EEC. EEC aid allocated through the European Development Fund (1980–85) will be equivalent to US$75–85 million, over half of which is intended for the Baardheere dam hydroelectric and irrigation project. The EEC had also provided food aid equal to US$53 million as of mid–1980.

French-Somali relations had long been rancorous, Somalia charging France with "colonialism" for its continued presence in Djibouti, and the French suspecting that Somalia, intent on annexation, would subvert that territory's course toward independence. The successful transition of Djibouti to independent statehood brought an end to Somalia's agitation against France and a measure of reconciliation. A number of French firms have been engaged in development-oriented projects, including a large cement works at Berbera financed with Arab credits, and mining and hydrology surveys have been carried out by France.

Somalia's relations with the United States have followed an erratic course, negatively affected by Somalia's use of force, directly or indirectly, in pursuit of its Greater Somalia goal and by its earlier military alignment with the Soviet Union. A decisive turn in relations appeared to have been reached when a military access agreement was signed on August 22, 1980, although abundant possibilities remained for future differences and misunderstandings.

During the 1960s the United States was the largest source of nonmilitary aid to Somalia after Italy. Political relations were nonetheless distant owing to Somalia's encouragement of insurrection by ethnic Somalis against Kenya and Ethiopia, countries friendly the United States. United States military aid to Ethiopia, significant by African standards, was in turn an irritant to Somalia. The diplomatic climate became more positive after the shift to a policy of accommodation with Kenya and Ethiopia by the Shermarke-Egal government in 1967.

The military coup in 1969 was followed by a long period of strained American-Somali relations. As leader of the capitalist world, as Israel's protector in the Middle East, and as a primary benefactor to Kenya and Ethiopia, the United States seemed antagonistic to the SRC's purposes. Peace Corps volunteers, mostly working as teachers, were expelled on trumped-up espionage charges, as were several officials from the United States embassy

and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). United States retaliation took the form of closing its USAID mission and terminating its assistance programs, although two projects already under way—a water supply system for Mogadishu and port improvement at Kismaayo—were completed. The justification for the aid cutoff was a United States legal prohibition against assistance to countries lending their flags to vessels engaged in trade with Cuba and Vietnam.

While American aid continued to reach Somalia in the form of contributions to multilateral aid programs and disaster relief grain shipments, official contacts remained at a low ebb until Somalia's differences with the Soviet Union in the spring of 1977 resulted in the visit of an economic aid team to Mogadishu. United States officials, seeking to present Somalia an alternative to its military dependence on Moscow, also responded to Somali government appeals by indicating that the United States was prepared "in principle" to supply a limited amount of defensive weaponry. One possibility was that such aid would be financed by friendly Arab states. While this offer was revoked at the outbreak of open conflict in the Ogaden, other factors were by then also working against the arrangement. Congressional reluctance to become more deeply involved in the Horn, Somalia's anti-Israeli posture, and Mogadishu's unwillingness to break conclusively with Moscow until Western aid was firmly pledged were among the constraints acting on the United States.

Somalia later asserted that it had been encouraged by the United States through unofficial channels in committing regular units in the Ogaden and that Washington had agreed to replace the Soviet Union as a major arms supplier because the United States wanted to punish Ethiopia for its defection to the Soviet side. American officials rejected this account, pointing out that the arms transaction had been suspended as soon as the presence of the Somali troops in the Ogaden had been verified.

As the Soviet and Cuban role in the Ogaden expanded in early 1978 and the Somali situation became more critical, Siad Barre's appeals for arms continued to be rebuffed by the Western powers. The United States objected strongly to the harmful actions of Moscow in supplying excessive arms to both sides and dispatching Cuban troops to Ethiopia. A warning was issued against invasion of Somalia. The OAU was also urged to bring its weight to bear in securing an end to the fighting in the Ogaden. On March 9, 1978, President Jimmy Carter announced that in a telephone conversation Siad Barre had promised to withdraw his remaining troops from the Ogaden. Carter called upon Somalia for a renewed commitment not to dishonor the boundaries of Kenya or Ethiopia before the United State would be willing to discuss economic aid

or defense supplies. Later that month a delegation headed by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard Moose visited Somalia for detailed talks. Pledges were sought that the Somali government would not use force against any country and would not use American arms except for internal security or to defend the internationally recognized territory of Somalia. Satisfactory assurances were obtained from Siad Barre, but continued Somali operations in the Ogaden deterred the United States from consummating the agreement.

In 1979 increased tension in the Persian Gulf and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan impelled the United States to reinforce its presence in the Indian Ocean area and to seek access to military facilities in Oman, Kenya, and Somalia. Negotiations were reopened with the regime in Mogadishu in early 1980 but were stalled when the Somalis, in an apparent miscalculation of the importance attached by the United States to the military facilities at Berbera, submitted an initial list of its military needs, the cost was estimated at US$2 billion. Agreement was reached, however, in August 1980 covering the use of the naval installations at Berbera and the adjacent airfield. Refurbishing of the port was expected to be completed by 1983. The United States agreed to provide Somalia US$53 million in economic aid and US$40 million in military credits over two years for the purchase of air defense equipment. Somalia was required to reaffirm the written assurances given in 1978, and the United States Congress added a restriction insisting on verification that all Somali regular forces were out of the Ogaden. Such verification was not made by the United States Department of State until January 1981.

The military aid package, although falling short of Siad Barre's expectations, assumed considerable symbolic importance to Somalia because it was regarded as representing a political commitment to the country's safety and territorial integrity. The visible presence of United States forces in Somalia would accordingly have been welcomed, although it was expected that only a small number of American troops would be assigned as support personnel. While the new military superiority of Ethiopia in the Ogaden and Somalia's diminished military effectiveness were in 1981 the main factors discouraging Somali incursions, preservation of the new relationship with the United States acted as a further restraint. It appeared, however, that the Somalis would be greatly disappointed if the small initial commitment by the United States were not followed by future military assistance to alleviate equipment deficiencies within the Somali armed forces.

United States economic aid resumed after the USAID mission was reopened in 1977. Development assistance has since averaged about US$12 million annually, and food aid from US$35 to US$45 million annually. For fiscal year 1982, US$78.5 million was requested from Congress, of which US$58.5 million was for eco-

nomic aid and US$20 million for military credits. In addition the United States had been providing about 75 percent of all food relief to the Somali refugees. Contributions to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees totaled US$53 million while direct food grants were US$32 million in fiscal year 1980.

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An indispensable introduction to Somalia's political situation is contained in the review of domestic policies of the military government and the circumstances surrounding the Ogaden war of 1977–78 in the final two chapters of I.M. Lewis' *A Modern History of Somalia* (1980 edition). A comprehensive analysis of the "civilianizing" process of the Somali government since 1976 was not available in 1981, but an interesting interpretation of this period could be found in Abdi Sheik-Abdi's article, "Ideology and Leadership in Somalia" in *The Journal of Modern African Studies.* Sheik-Abdi, who acknowledges the earlier achievements of Siad Barre's rule, describes the growing demoralization among the elites of the country and the revival of clan politics by the leadership. Scientific socialism in Africa and the extent to which Somalia has conformed to its determinants are examined by Kenneth Jowitt and David Laitin, respectively, in successive articles in *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa.*

The important turning point in the politics of the Horn represented by the Ogaden war and Somalia's realignment of its diplomacy is treated by Mohammed Ayoob in *Conflict and Intervention in the Third World.* Former American Ambassador to Somalia Raymond L. Thurston gives an authoritative recapitulation of United States-Somali relations in "The United States, Somalia, and the Crisis in the Horn" in *Horn of Africa.* Scanty treatment of Somalia in the world media makes it advisable to consult the annual *Africa Contemporary Record* and the monthly *Africa Research Bulletin* for accounts of the republic's domestic politics and international relations. The periodicals *Africa* and *New African* also contain periodic reports on Somali developments. (For further information see Bibliography.)

Chapter 5. National Security

Detail from bronze relief on monument in Mogadishu depicting deeds of Somali patriot Mohamed ibn Abdullah Hassan, the legendary "Mad Mullah"

SOMALIA HAS EXISTED in an inhospitable international environment since being defeated decisively in the 1977–78 war to determine political control over the people of the arid, Somali-populated areas of eastern Ethiopia. Although in proportion to the nation's population of 4.3 million the 50,000–man Somali army was the largest in Africa, in 1981 it was dwarfed by its 225,000–man Ethiopian counterpart. Somali military equipment that survived the war has been increasingly inoperative since the 1977 expulsion of Soviet advisers.

In order to rebuild the armed forces, the government in Mogadishu has sought arms from Arab countries, China, and the West. Military aid has not been forthcoming in the amounts the Somalis desire, however, and no arms patron to replace the Soviet Union has been found. Foreign nations have been reluctant to provide assistance because of their past dealings with Somalia, its former association with the Soviet Union, its continued involvement in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, and its inability to pay for military purchases. By 1981 the withdrawal of Somali regular forces from the Ogaden and decreased support for anti-Ethiopian guerrillas had removed one obstacle to increased aid. But the prospects for substantial arms deliveries could not be determined, partly because of the unknown willingness of donors to risk provoking an Ethiopian response.

The government of Mohamed Siad Barre built an effective internal security apparatus after coming to power in a military coup that overthrew a faltering parliamentary regime. In the 1960s the Somali Police Force had received extensive United States and West German aid, but the 8,000–man force declined in importance after the 1969 military coup. Following Soviet advice, the new regime sought to control opponents through the widespread use of arrest and imprisonment for broadly defined crimes against the state, including rumormongering and unreported association with foreigners. A "People's Militia" of young vigilantes—also known as the Gulwadayal, or Victory Pioneers—and the Soviet-trained National Security Service became prominent. Although there were indications that the government had become somewhat more tolerant of domestic opposition, these organizations remained powerful after Somalia's rift with the Soviet Union. In the early 1980s domestic intelligence was also provided by a number of official and informal organizations controlled by relatives of Siad Barre.

As a result of strains caused by the Ogaden war, the government's internal difficulties increased, and its political basis of support apparently diminished. The difficulties in raising (or maintaining) the standard of living in a country long plagued by drought and flood—the world's eighth poorest nation according to

figures from the World Bank—apparently combined with criticism over President Siad Barre's handling of the Ogaden war to exacerbate political opposition. As the regime's popularity apparently waned in the late 1970s, the government became increasingly dominated by Siad Barre and trusted members of his Marehan clan.

Although the governing regime (which appears to have been held in high esteem among Somalis for several years after coming to power) may have declined in popular favor, in 1981 there was no sign of a broad-based, coherent opposition. Numerous government officials have defected or have been removed from power, but antagonism has remained generally clan-based. Because of the pervasiveness of the Somali security forces, opposition to the government has been forced to organize outside the country and has been limited to conducting a propaganda compaign and occasional guerrilla forays into Somalia. Given Somalia's continuing political and economic difficulties, however, it appeared that Siad Barre's political skills and security apparatus would be increasingly tested.

International Security Concerns

Somali national security perceptions in 1981 were largely dominated by neighboring Ethiopia and by the Soviet Union which, with its Cuban and East European allies, had supplied the training, military equipment, troops, and advisers to place Ethiopia in an overwhelmingly powerful position in the Horn of Africa. Since the 1977–78 war, Somali-supported guerrillas have operated in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia while the Ethiopians have supported a Somali insurgency and conducted air raids and border probes into Somalia. In that effort to "liberate" Somalis living in Ethiopian territory, Somalia had lost much of its military equipment and personnel, its Soviet ally, and the international support necessary to replace its losses.

Irredentism and the Changing Balance of Power

Somalia's military weakness since the Ogaden conflict, Ethiopian hostility, the continuing Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa, and international isolation have resulted largely from the republic's claims against its neighbors that have shaped its foreign policy since independence. Somalia has been unwilling to recognize political boundaries drawn by British, French, and Italian colonialists in conjunction with Ethiopia, which divided the Somali people among five jurisdictions. Since the republic's independence in 1960, successive governments have pursued policies to bring under one flag Somalis living in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. (see Pan- Somalism, ch. 1; Greater Somali, ch. 4).

For fifteen years a balance of power limited conflict in the Horn. In 1960–64 guerrillas supported by the Somali government battled with local security forces in Kenya and Ethiopia, and in 1964 Ethiopian and Somali regular forces clashed. By late 1964 it had

become obvious that the initial campaign to unify all Somalis was a failure. Ethiopian forces had overmatched Somalis in the Ogaden, conducting air raids in Somali territory and, with assistance from British counterinsurgency experts, Kenya controlled Somali guerrillas in its Northern Frontier District. In late 1964 Kenya's President Jomo Kenyatta and Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie signed a mutual defense agreement aimed against Somali aggression. These factors, combined with complete opposition to Somali aims by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and burdensome defense costs that amounted to 30 percent of the national budget in the mid–1960s, forced Somali circumspection.

The last civilian government under Mohamed Ibrahim Egal openly initiated—and the military regime of Siad Barre continued—a policy of détente with Somalia's neighbors to win at the conference table what could not be won on the battlefield. In the 1970s, however, Somali military strength gradually increased with substantial Soviet support. The Soviet Union, which had been Somalia's most important military patron since 1963, supplied the Somali National Army with the largest tank force in sub-Saharan Africa, transport vehicles (including armored personnel carriers) for a largely mechanized infantry, and aircraft that included supersonic MiG–21 fighter-bombers. The close ties between the Siad Barre regime, which by the early 1970s was espousing scientific socialism, and the Soviet Union were formalized by the treaty of friendship and cooperation signed by the two countries in 1974. The Ethiopian army at this time remained twice as large as Somalia's 23,000–man force, but because of reduced military aid from the United States, the Ethiopians were not as well equipped. More importantly, the Ethiopian government collapsed in stages during this period: Haile Selassie was overthrown, violent conflict ensued among those responsible for his deposition, and several groups sought to secede from the empire.

The result of the Somali army buildup, when combined with Ethiopian weakness, was the complete breakdown of the balance of power that had limited tensions in the region. It has remained unclear to what degree the government in Mogadishu orchestrated the 1976–77 guerrilla campaigns by the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) to seize the Ogaden region from Ethiopia and to what degree the regular Somali army was involved at the start (see War in the Ogaden, ch. 1). By the late summer of 1977, however, Somali armored forces and mechanized infantry supported by aircraft had thrust deeply into the Ogaden, capturing 90 percent of the disputed territory within several weeks.

The Soviet Union which by early 1977 supported the Marxist-Leninist military regime that was attempting to consolidate its power in Ethiopia, also sought to maintain Somalia as a client state. Moscow was unsuccessful in attempts at mediation and was forced to choose between one side and the other. With Somali forces

deep within Ethiopia's legal borders, the Soviet Union in August 1977 suspended arms shipments to the Mogadishu regime and accelerated military deliveries to Ethiopia. Three months later Siad Barre renounced the treaty of friendship and cooperation, expelled all Soviet advisers and their dependents, and broke diplomatic ties with Cuba, ejecting all of its personnel from his country.

The Soviet Union's decision to lend its support to Ethiopia and to abandon Somalia led to massive shipments of Soviet arms to Ethiopia and the arrival there of an estimated 15,000 Cuban combat troops plus Soviet military advisers. This assistance turned the tide of the war decisively in Ethiopia's favor by early 1978. The Somali armed forces lost 8,000 men—one-third of the regular army—as well as three-quarters of their armored units and half of the air force. In March 1978 Siad Barre announced the withdrawal of Somali regular forces from the Ogaden.

Implications of the Ogaden Defeat

Since the Ogaden war Ethiopia has moved steadily into a position of overwhelming strength in the Horn. Supplied lavishly with Soviet equipment and assisted by an estimated 12,000 to 13,000 Cuban troops in addition to 1,200 to 1,300 Soviet and East European advisers, the Ethiopian regime was able to maintain a measure of internal stability. Most outside observers in 1981 did not think Ethiopia would use its superior military forces to subjugate Somalia, but it had the ability and, given the historical enmities in the Horn, the Siad Barre government was concerned.

Although their movement did not necessarily portend an invasion of Somalia, Ethiopian armed forces in 1980–81 reinforced their government's position in the Ogaden. In mid-1980 the WSLF was able to claim control over 60 percent of the Ogaden; but Somali forces suffered a series of reversals in the latter half of the year, and Ethiopian forces advanced, assuming positions along the border and conducting several border probes into Somali territory.

Beyond the threat of invasion, the presence of the Ethiopian army near Somalia's frontier had undermined Somali security by exacerbating a burdensome refugee problem and by supporting an insurgency aimed at toppling the Siad Barre regime. Since the Ogaden war the combination of drought and Ethiopian military successes in the Ogaden had forced great numbers of refugees into Somalia (see Refugees, ch. 2). In addition the Ethiopian presence along the frontier had augmented Addis Ababa's abilities to support Somali movements opposed to the Siad Barre government. In late 1981 the most conspicuous of these opposition groups—the Majerteyn clan-oriented Somali Salvation Front (SSF)—united with other opponents of the Siad Barre regime to form the Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia (DFSS), which was based in Ethiopia (see Sources of Opposition, this ch.).

Guerrilla soldiers of the Western Somali Liberation Front army
Courtesy Somali Embassy, Washington

The Ethiopian air force had also mounted periodic air attacks against Somali villages and towns. According to Somali sources Ethiopian military aircraft made 152 attacks on fifteen locations between December 1979 and June 1981, killing 196 people and wounding approximately 400 others. These raids were seen by some as a concerted attempt to undermine the Siad Barre government's authority by demonstrating the Somali military's inability to oppose the attacks. The periodic nature of the air strikes, however, and their coincident timing with guerrilla activity in the Ogaden led others in 1981 to explain them as reprisals for WSLF guerrilla attacks against Ethiopian targets.

Somali concerns were heightened in August 1981 when the Ethiopian government joined with those of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen [Yemen (Aden)] and Libya in a pact "to coordinate their anti-imperialist, anti-reactionary, anti-Zionist

and anti-racist stand." Somalia, which immediately severed diplomatic relations with Libya, and some outside observers were concerned that the oil-rich North African country would use financial inducements to encourage Ethiopian military adventurism or a DFSS terrorist campaign against the Siad Barre government. According to this view, action could be motivated by Libyan and Yemeni antipathy toward the United States, which in 1980 concluded an agreement with Mogadishu for access to Somali naval and air bases. Most observers felt, however, that an invasion by Ethiopian forces would be costly in military, economic, and diplomatic terms and, if successful, would yield only a hostile and hungry populace.

Foreign military aid to Somalia was limited after 1977 in part because Somalia's invasion of the Ogaden was seen by most of Africa and the outside world as a simple use of opportunistic expansion. By early 1981, however, outside observers had generally concluded that the last Somali regular units had been withdrawn from the Ogaden three years after the Siad Barre government announced their departure. Thus the most obvious political fact in the Horn became Ethiopia's emerging military hegemony rather than Somalia's nationalist claims. That the government of neighboring Kenya (which in 1979 signed a ten-year friendship and cooperation treaty with Ethiopia and as late as December 1980 joined in a harsh condemnation of Somali policies and goals) recognized the changed situation was indicated in 1981 by an apparent reconciliation with the Siad Barre government (see Greater Somalia, ch. 4). But it was not clear whether changing international opinion would lead to increased arms shipments or whether new military equipment deliveries would enhance Somali national security. The balance of forces in the Horn was so tenuous in 1981 that a massive reequipment program of the Somali military could, according to some observers, simply provoke a response by overwhelmingly strong Ethiopian forces.

The Armed Forces

The Somali military establishment in 1981 was a completely changed organization from the one that fought Ethiopia in the 1977–78 Ogaden war. Its size had increased from a manpower level of 23,000 to nearly 50,000. But as a result of combat losses and maintenance difficulties caused by the departure of Soviet military advisers, Somalia's armored and mechanized forces, the largest in Black Africa before the Ogaden war, had been decimated. The Somali Aeronautical Corps, manned by 1,000 personnel, and a navy of 550 were also severely affected by inoperative equipment. Adjusting to the new realities, the army was reorganized around infantry rather than mechanized forces as its leaders sought increased foreign military assistance to replace its depleted Soviet equipment stocks.

Armed Forces in the National Life

Military virtues have always figured prominently in Somali life, and the armed forces have enjoyed correspondingly high prestige. The popularity of the military has been reflected in the fact that the Somali armed forces always have been maintained without resorting to official conscription. Because of the republic's international claims and others' claims against it, the armed forces have been used extensively in traditional martial roles, especially during the Ogaden war. But since the 1969 coup the military has also participated in the national government and has become a leading force for social change and development. A well-organized body, representing all sections of society, the military has played a central role in contemporary Somalia.

The Warrior Tradition and Development of the Modern Army

The warrior has traditionally occupied an important place in Somali society. Except for a few "men of religion" (*wadaddo*) all Somali males were considered warriors (*waranle*—see Glossary). Aggressiveness and military prowess were rewarded in Somali nomadic life, and force or the potential to use force often decided who prevailed in the harsh environment. As a result, readiness for armed conflict flourished throughout a long history of foreign invasion and colonial occupation.

Warfare had always been important, both in relations with outsiders—the Ethiopian Christians and the Oromos, for example—and in relations among Somali clans and clan segments (see The Segmentary Social Order, ch. 2). Antagonists in intra-Somali conflicts generally belonged to groups bound by their commitment to pay or receive *dia* (blood compensation). Because the entire group was responsible for paying *dia* to compensate for damages inflicted and received *dia* for its own losses, war began only with the unanimous approval of its participants. Peace was usually restored by a meeting of elders of the involved groups. They would determine which group was responsible for starting the war and would decide compensation—usually in the form of livestock—for the damages incurred. The group judged responsible for starting the war was usually the only one fined unless it emerged the clear-cut victor. In a jihad (holy war) against infidels and in most conflicts against non-Somalis, such rules did not apply.

The strength of rival clans and *dia* paying groups (see Glossary) was traditionally defined by the number of warriors belonging to each party, but after the rapid and large-scale introduction of firearms in the Horn in the late nineteenth century, firepower became the primary determinant. Although matchlock guns may have been used by the Somalis as early as the sixteenth century, firearms became numerous in the region only in the 1890s when they were supplied to Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II. Shipped

through the port of Djibouti, some of these rifles fell into Somali hands, and significant numbers came into use against the Ethiopians and the British in the jihad of Mohamed ibn Abdullah Hassan, which lasted from 1899 until his death in 1920. After 1920 possession of firearms was common among the Somalis, and the Italian and British colonial governments pursued a policy of disarming the nomads. For a number of years preceding national independence, however, nomads were frequently more heavily armed than the colonial forces that were responsible for maintaining public order.

The need of the British and Italian regimes to preserve civil peace and maintain political control resulted in the establishment—beginning in 1884—of constabularies that eventually evolved into the modern Somali army and police force. Somalis composed the bulk of personnel in these forces, although they did not serve as officers until after World War II. The organization and duties of the constabularies went through a series of changes over the years, but in general they served as police responsible for internal security rather than as military units oriented to external threats (see State Security Forces, this ch.).

On the eve of independence in 1960 the provisional government in the Italian-administered trust territory requested permission of the United Nations (UN) Trusteeship Council to establish a national army to protect its borders. Permission was granted, and a few months before independence a small army was created in the trust territory, the bulk coming from the Mobile Group (Darawishta Poliska—commonly known as the Darawishta) of the Somali Police Force. At the time that the trust territory was amalgamated with British Somaliland to form the Somali Republic, troops from the Darawishta combined with those of the British Somaliland Scouts—a military unit that had existed since World War II—to form a 5,000-man army. The first commander was Colonel Daud Abdullah Hersi, who had served in the Somalia Gendarmerie, the police force of the British Military Administration. He was succeeded at his death in 1965 by Siad Barre.

From its inception the Somali National Army, which before the 1969 coup was responsible to the civilian government, played a central role in foreign policy. Although the constitution of 1961 renounced war as a means of settling international disputes, it also urged the unification of all Somali territories, and the army was used agressively to support Somali irredentism in Ethiopia.

The army was battle-tested in 1964 when the conflict with Ethiopia over the Somali-inhabited Ogaden, simmering since independence, erupted in open fighting. Somali guerrillas initiated a rebellion in June 1963 after Haile Selassie rejected their demand for self-government in the Ogaden. The government in Mogadi-

shu initially refused to give the guerrillas official support; but in January 1964, after Ethiopia responded to guerrilla successes by reinforcing the Ogaden, Somali forces staged ground and air raids across the Ethiopian border. The Ethiopian air force responded with punitive strikes across its southwestern frontier against Feerfeer and Gaalkacyo. After heavy fighting a truce was established, although it was broken several times within the following month. At a conference of representatives of the two nations held in Sudan, both sides agreed to withdraw behind their frontiers and submit the dispute to discussion by the OAU. The definitive cease-fire began on April 2, 1964.

Both sides probably exaggerated their successes, and both lumped together enemy civilian and military casualties in their public reports. The Somalis apparently destroyed Ethiopian installations and equipment, but their personnel losses seemed to have been far greater than those of the Ethiopians. More telling, by the end of the conflict the heaviest fighting was reported in the area where it had initially broken out. This suggests that, even using their tanks and heavy weapons on ground of their choosing, the Somalis were unable to advance into Ethiopia. They could not defend against Ethiopian air raids, and they were unable to extend their control over the Ogaden Somalis. The army's disappointing performance led to reluctance by the Mogadishu authorities over the next decade to resort to military action against Somalia's neighbors, preferring instead to disrupt them by supporting guerrilla activities. In 1967 the government of Abdirashid Ali Shermarke and Mohamed Ibrahim Egal officially sought to ease tensions with Ethiopia because of the failure of aggressive policy and the ruinous expense such a policy imposed.

Despite détente and cessation of military actions, the military establishment in the late 1960s continued to be highly regarded by the population. The army was seen as less influenced by the class divisions and corruption that characterized civilian institutions, and it gained a reputation for discipline and integrity. It also had succeeded in integrating British- and Italian-trained units more rapidly than had civilian institutions. The armed forces, moreover, maintained contact with the people through limited civic action projects and public relations programs, including the staging of traditional dances and drama, music and poetry competitions, and sports activities. An army-trained, quasi-military youth group called the Young Pioneers, patterned on its Soviet counterpart, was used in agricultural and construction work connected with national development projects. The widespread acceptance of the national army, however, continued to be largely based on the recognition of its major role if the goal to unify all Somalis was to be realized.

The Military and the Government

Before the successful coup d'etat of October 21, 1969, the civilian government had constitutional control over the military. An attempted coup in 1961 by British-trained Somali officers objecting to favoritism allegedly shown those trained by the Italians was an exception in a nine-year period during which the army played no direct role in the internal affairs of the government. Some officers enjoyed good political connections, but there was no evidence to suggest that the army was directly used to support (or undermine) domestic policies of the civilian authorities. Rather, the army served as a barrier to external threats and as a symbol (and potential instrument) in the quest for Somali unification.

The military's apolitical stance changed, however, in 1969. According to Siad Barre in a speech to the people soon after taking power, "Intervention by the armed forces was inevitable. It was no longer possible to ignore...corruption, bribery, theft of public funds, injustice and disrespect to our religion and the laws of the country." (see Coup d'Etat, ch. 1). The Soviet-supported armed forces found backing in their venture, or at least acquiescence, from the police.

When first established in 1969 as the country's governing body, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) was balanced with northern and southern officers and representatives of the major clans. Junior officers down to the rank of captain were included, but headstrong young colonels, who had long agitated for the overthrow of the civilian regime, were not. Siad Barre quickly established himself as a skillful politician and the dominant force within the SRC.

Recognizing that they had limited experience in government, the coup's leaders established under the SRC the largely civilian Council of Secretaries of State (CSS) to administer various ministries. Although ideally the SRC refrained from interfering in day-to-day administration of the ministries, it did closely supervise the implementation of their programs. The Ministry of Interior, which controlled the means of enforcing government decisions, was always headed by a police general. After the coup military officers were placed as the head of district and provincial offices and embassies abroad while civilian administrators and diplomats were recalled to the capital for military training and education in revolutionary principles. Beginning in 1971 senior civil servants were required to take a three-month course at Camp Halane in Mogadishu. Trainees—including administrators, doctors, teachers, and ambassadors—wore military uniforms and underwent military training, including the assembly and use of various types of small arms.

Military dominance of political affairs was modified beginning in 1974 when reorganization brought more civilian participation at all levels of government (see Return to Civilian Political Institu-

tions, ch. 4). Military participation in the government remained strong, however, and continued during the period when the SRC was dissolved and the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) emerged as the basis for political authority. In 1980 the SRC was reconstituted as an element of the national power structure, and military officers were appointed to administer most of Somalia's districts and regions. Among other explanations given for the moves was Siad Barre's respect for the virtues of discipline and order, which made military officers easier to manage than civilian officials. In late 1981 a number of high-ranking military officers occupied important positions within the government structure, including the four highest offices (see table 19, Appendix). The military establishment, however, was viewed not as a source of political power but as an instrument of Siad Barre's increasing personal control over governmental affairs.

The Military and the Economy

In 1981 the defense budget, like most other official matters in Somalia, was strongly influenced by the president. The needs of the armed forces were assessed annually by the army command in conjunction with the Ministry of Defense. Budget recommendations were passed directly to Siad Barre who was responsible for all final budget decisions. It is believed that the SRC did not play a role in the process unless the president, at his own discretion, chose to consult its members.

Since the formation of the national army in 1960, the cost of maintaining the military establishment has been the most expensive item in the national budget. According to figures released by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Somali government, defense costs have consistently exceeded the combined amounts budgeted for health and education. In 1977, according to World Bank (see Glossary) figures, the government spent in equivalent per capita amounts approximately US$7 on the military US$5 on education, and US$2 on health. The following year, in the wake of the reverses in the Ogaden, per capita military spending jumped to a level estimated to be as high as US$17. Military expenditure increased at an average rate of over 9 percent a year in real terms in the first decade after Somali independence when the gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) was estimated to have grown at an annual rate of less than 3 percent. After Siad Barre came to power, defense spending did not increase significantly, contrary to the expectations of outsiders who had observed earlier African military coups. Between 1972 and 1977, funding for the armed forces amounted annually to about 26 percent of total government expenditures. In 1978 military spending increased to 37.1 percent of the national budget, and 39 percent was allocated to defense the following year.

Because of statistical deficiencies, figures on total military costs in relation to government spending and GNP sometimes have

been contradictory, and specific expenditures within the defense budget have been generally unavailable because of government restrictions. In 1981, however, it was known that personnel costs accounted for an overwhelming share of the total defense budget. For several years before 1974, when the government embargoed the information, personnel emoluments of the Ministry of Defense averaged 80 percent of the defense budget.

Personnel costs have dominated because Somali defense budgets have allocated funds only for current expenditures (wages, equipment maintenance, and so forth) and not for capital expenditures (hardware, all of which is imported). During the period of close military relations with the Soviet Union, most payments were thought to have been made indirectly by bartering goods, base rights, fishing rights, and the like. After Moscow stopped its military support in 1977, Somalia continued its policy of including only current costs in the defense budget. Perhaps because since the Ogaden war arms sales could not always be anticipated and budgeted in advance, they may have been funded by extrabudgetary appropriations that amounted to half of total expenditures in 1979 (see Government Finance, ch. 3). It was assumed that a substantial amount of defense spending, including procurement of military equipment since the Ogaden war, had resulted from foreign (mostly Arab) grants or credits and did not appear in the budget.

After the war Somali defense spending increased dramatically from Sh200 million (for value of the Somali shilling—see Glossary) in 1977 to Sh512 million in 1978. Nearly Sh600 million was budgeted for 1979 primarily because of the large increase in military manpower. (These figures did not include spending on police and militia forces, which also increased significantly in size and funding.) In late 1981 there was no indication that military costs would decrease unless a reduction in tensions with Ethiopia allowed a partial demobilization or unless a wealthy foreign state assumed Somalia's military burdens. Neither possibility appeared close at hand.

Before the size of the armed forces doubled in 1977–78, the number of military personnel on active duty never exceeded 1 percent of the total population. In 1981 it was difficult to measure the impact of the armed forces in siphoning off talent from the rest of the economy because information on military manpower was not generally made available by Somali authorities. It was known that the army absorbed many unemployed urban Somalis as well as nomads living on parched land incapable of supporting them and their herds. But a number of Somalia's comparatively few educated and technically trained persons served in the armed forces, presumably to the detriment of the national economy.

The government, especially in the early 1970s, had frequently sought to ameliorate economic problems inherent in the maintenance of a large army by making the defense forces contribute to the national economy. In 1971 military salaries (as well as those for all government employees) were drastically reduced, and the military began to engage more frequently in government- sponsored civic action projects. The army played an important role in evacuating nomads from regions of the country stricken by the 1974–75 drought. Using Soviet transport aircraft and trucks, the military moved 100,000 nomads and distributed food, medicine, and other supplies to refugee camps where the inhabitants awaited resettlement.

The army also participated in government-sponsored "crash programs" to mobilize resources for labor-intensive projects designed to reduce unemployment and to increase national self-sufficiency. Initially it concentrated on self-help projects to improve its own facilities, constructing and repairing roads, barracks, and other facilities in Shabeellaha Hoose Region, Mogadishu, and other locations. The army later became involved in construction in the civilian sector. Some of its projects included cleaning up towns and villages, digging and maintaining wells and irrigation canals, and stabilizing sand dunes. Members of the army also help construct the Somali National University, hospitals, prisons, orphanages, and factories. Even in districts where the army did not formally participate, those who worked in the crash programs were frequently supervised by district commissioners (all of whom were military men before 1974) or by lieutenants and noncommissioned officers. It appears, however, that since the Ogaden war army involvement in civil projects has diminished because of preoccupation with national security requirements.

Performance in the Ogaden Conflict

The Somali army's defeat in the war with Ethiopia has defined the country's current difficult strategic situation. The battles to retake and then defend the area stripped the formerly potent Somali armed forces of many troops, much of their equipment, and their Soviet supplier, forcing the military establishment into a difficult period of rebuilding. Although the armed forces in 1981 were considerably changed and weaker than they had been four years earlier, the war had provided a valuable glimpse of their performance in battle.

Before the Ogaden war, the most striking feature of the 23,000-man army was its large armored force equipped with approximately 250 T–34 and T–54/55 Soviet-built medium tanks and over 300 armored personnel carriers. This gave the Somali Army a tank force more than three times as large as Ethiopia's. The pre-war Somali air force was also larger than Ethiopia's in the mid–

1970s. In 1976 Somalia had fifty-two combat aircraft; twenty-four of these were newly delivered, Soviet-built supersonic MiG–21s. Facing them was an Ethiopian air force of thirty-five to forty aircraft; it was also in the process of taking delivery of several American-built Northrup F–5 fighters from Iran. At the outbreak of fighting, Ethiopia had about sixteen F–5A/Es, which were roughly comparable to the Somali MiG–21s.

As chaos spread throughout Ethiopia in 1975 after the overthrow of Haile Selassie, pro-Somali liberation groups that had been ignored by Somali authorities during the earlier period of détente with Addis Ababa gained increased support from Mogadishu. The WSLF, operating in the Ogaden, was committed to unification of the territory with Somalia. The Somali-Abo Liberation Front (SALF) was linked to the WSLF but was made up of Oromos, who were ethnically and linguistically distinct from Somalis. Beginning in 1977 the SALF operated in the Bale, Sidamo, and Arsi provinces south and west of the Ogaden. A separate Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) also challenged Ethiopian control in these areas. Somalia supported a variety of other Ethiopian groups opposed to the regime in Addis Ababa but had no control over and little, if any, coordination with these organizations.

By late 1975 WSLF guerrillas were mounting successful attacks against Ethiopian outposts in the Ogaden. Hostilities escalated in early 1977 despite vigorous attempts by Moscow and Cuba's Fidel Castro to mediate the dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia. In June 1977 the Ethiopian regime began to accuse Siad Barre of committing Somali regular units to the fighting. At the same time WSLF communiqués began to be broadcast on Radio Mogadishu. In their communiqués the WSLF claimed hundreds of Ethiopians killed, planes shot down, tanks destroyed, and towns captured. Although these reports were exaggerated, it appeared that Somalia was committing substantial resources to the Ogaden conflict at a time when the Soviet Union and Cuba were clearly demonstrating their support of the Ethiopian regime.

Contrary to considerable evidence, Mogadishu consistently denied until February 1978 that units from the regular Somali army were engaged in the fighting. Rather the government conceded only that "volunteers" were given leave from the army to fight with the armed guerrillas of the WSLF. The manned strength of the WSLF, estimated at about 6,000 in June 1977, increased throughout the year as ethnic Somalis living in the "liberated" areas of the Ogaden joined the organization. When regular Somali forces operated with the WSLF they flew the WSLF flag and included in their ranks a high proportion of soldiers from the Ogaden clan, which was also well represented in the WSLF. By late 1977 the combined strength of the WSLF and Somali army

units in the Ogaden probably approached 50,000, of which 15,000 appeared to be irregulars.

After the army was committed to the Ogaden, the conflict ceased to be a guerrilla action and assumed the form of conventional war in which armor, mechanized infantry, and air power played decisive roles. Somali officers under the command of Lieutenant General Mohamed Ali Samantar were given credit by some foreign observers for quickly adapting army organization to battlefield realities. The centralized Somali logistics system was designed to control supplies at battalion level (600 to 1,000 troops) from Mogadishu—an extremely unwieldy arrangement, especially given Somalia's limited transportation and communications network. To facilitate operations the logistics center and headquarters for forces fighting in the northern Ogaden was moved to Hargeysa, the army's northern sector headquarters, because it was much closer to the important Ogaden battlefields than was Mogadishu. Before the war all elements of the Somali ground forces had been organized into battalions, but during the war the standard infantry and mechanized infantry unit became the brigade, comprised of two to four battalions and having a total strength of 1,200 to 2,000.

After Siad Barre committed his regular forces, Somalis in the Ogaden enjoyed marked success in the summer of 1977. In July they captured Gode, which had previously resisted attacks by the WSLF. By late July the WSLF announced that 60 percent of the Ogaden was liberated; by mid-September the Ethiopians conceded that 90 percent of the disputed region was in Somali hands. The Somali army had suffered two setbacks in August when it mounted quick armored thrusts in efforts to capture Dire Dawa and the major Ethiopian forward tank base at Jijiga. At Jijiga, which was heavily defended by two brigades of the Ethiopian Third Division and at least two divisons of militia, the Somalis lost over half of their attacking force of three tank battalions, each of which contained over thirty tanks. A Somali attack by one tank battalion and a mechanized infantry brigade supported by artillery units was repulsed with heavy losses at Dire Dawa, where the airfield had the only remaining concrete surfaced runway available for use in Ethiopian air strikes into northern Somalia and the northern Ogaden. Siad Barre later was criticized for not having committed adequate forces to capture the important airfield. Moreover his generals complained that he had centralized command without the ability to receive communications from the field or to transmit instructions quickly and accurately.

Somalia's greatest victory of the war came in mid-September in the second attempt to take Jijiga, when three tank battalions overwhelmed the defending Ethiopian garrison after several days of seesaw fighting. After inflicting heavy losses on Somali armor, demoralized Ethiopian troops mutinied and withdrew from the

town, leaving its defense to the militia, which was incapable of slowing the Somali advance. The Ethiopians retreated beyond the strategic Marda Pass, the strongest defensive position between Jijiga and the city of Harer, leaving Somali troops in a commanding position within the region.

But as Somali forces reached the limit of their advance, several factors precluded an ultimate victory. Somali tank losses had been heavy in the major battles around Dire Dawa and Jijiga, and the Somali Aeronautical Corps had been dominated by the numerically inferior Ethiopian air force. Having wrested complete air superiority from the Somalis (despite the loss of an important ground control radar at Jijiga), Ethiopian F–5s were able to harass overextended Somali supply lines with impunity. The attacks were hampered only by the rainy season, which also bogged down Somali reinforcements on the dirt roads.

Moscow's action halting the flow of military equipment to Somalia in August 1977 and its support of Ethiopia soon turned the tide of battle in the Ogaden. From October 1977 through January 1978 some 20,000 WSLF guerrillas and Somali regulars pressed attacks on Harer where nearly 50,000 Ethiopians had been regrouped, backed by Soviet-supplied armor and artillery and gradually reinforced (according to official American estimates) by 11,000 Cuban troops and 1,500 Soviet advisers. Although Somali forces reportedly fought their way into Harer in November, they had neither the supplies nor the manpower to take the city and were forced to regroup on the outskirts in anticipation of an Ethiopian counterattack.

As expected, Ethiopian and Cuban forces, directed by Soviet generals Grigory Grigoryevich Varisov and Vasily Ivanovich Petrov, launched a two-stage counterattack toward Jijiga in early February. Unexpectedly, however, a Cuban and Ethiopian column, moving north and east, crossed the highlands between Jijiga and the Somali border, bypassing Somali troops dug in around the Marda Pass. Somali troops were assaulted from two sides, and Jijiga was retaken on March 5 after two days of fierce fighting in which four Somali brigades were cut to pieces and 3,000 troops were killed. Within a week all major towns in the region were once again in Ethiopian hands. The undeclared war was brought to an end on March 9 when Siad Barre announced that his troops had been recalled from Ethiopian territory. Somalia had lost an estimated 8,000 men—one-third of its prewar army. The army also had lost over three-quarters of its tank force and nearly half of its aircraft. Because of the cutoff of Soviet supplied spare parts, only a half dozen MiGs were still reported to be flying in March 1978.

After the withdrawal of Somali regulars, the WSLF reverted to its guerrilla tactics against what spokesmen characterized as "Abyssinian colonialist troops." In May 1980 the guerrilla force

was able to claim control over 60 percent of the Ogaden, and Western journalists confirmed that the WSLF once again controlled the countryside as well as many of the roads. But Ethiopian forces, which since defeating Somali forces had been mainly occupied in attempting to control the secession movement in Ethiopia's Eritrea region, steadily extended their control over the Ogaden. Somali government troops (who had continued to fight in small units after Siad Barre announced their withdrawal) and WSLF guerrillas suffered further defeats, most notably in the battle around Wardair in June and July 1980 when the Ethiopians claimed they defeated a 14,000-man Somali force. By early 1981 Somali regulars had been withdrawn from the Ogaden, and the WSLF changed its top leadership, electing a group tied less closely to Mogadishu than its predecessor had been. In late 1981 reports indicated that the WSLF continued to conduct hit-and-run attacks against Ethiopian targets, although on a reduced scale.

Postwar Composition

In 1981 the Somali armed forces were adjusting to changed circumstances brought about by the Ogaden war: manpower had doubled, but equipment had been sharply reduced. The army's organizational structure had been somewhat altered because of wartime experience and the necessity to adapt to the changed ratio of troops and equipment. The shortages of military hardware, inadequate maintenance, and unavailability of spare parts for what remained of Soviet-supplied equipment considerably limited the effectiveness of all elements. Units of the army, however, had been battle-tested in the Ogaden and were among the world's most recently experienced fighting forces.

In April 1981 the military command structure underwent a shakeup of indeterminate but possibly major proportions when Siad Barre made personnel changes within his government. For a decade Lieutenant General Ali Samantar had been a central figure in the defense establishment, serving simultaneously as minister of defense, commander of the Somali National Army, and first vice-president in the government. When the SRC was reconstituted in October 1980, Ali Samantar had also become chairman of its Defense and Security Committee, although he had previously given up his position as army commander to Brigadier General (later Major General) Omar Haji Mohamed. After Siad Barre's personnel shuffle, Ali Samantar retained his position as first vice-president and appeared to have kept his post on the SRC Defense and Security Committee, but Haji Mohamed, through his appointment as acting minister of defense, became Somalia's leading military figure. Although some reports indicated that the committee was designed to implement SRC decisions, it appeared that under the reconstituted SRC the Ministry of Defense—which possessed

command authority over the armed forces as well as significant administrative responsibility—was the more important of the two sources of authority. The replacement of the loyal but popular veteran Ali Samantar by Haji Mohamed, a member of the president's Marehan clan, indicated conclusively that ultimate authority rested with Siad Barre.

Mission, Organization, and Strength

Since national independence the armed forces' primary mission has been to protect Somalia's territorial integrity from foreign aggression. Assistance to the Somali Police Force in maintaining internal security has been a secondary mission. In 1981 the defense establishment was composed mainly of ground forces. Organizationally it consisted of the Somali National Army and its subordinate air and naval elements. The military command structure extended from Siad Barre, president and commander in chief of the armed forces, through the minister of defense (who served also as commander of the Somali National Army) to army corps commanders who exercised authority over forces stationed in the country's three military sectors.

In 1981 one of three corps headquarters for the ground forces was situated at Hargeysa in Woqooyi Galbeed Region. Others were believed to be at Gaalkacyo in Mudug Region and at Beled Weyne in Hiiraan Region. The ground forces were organized tactically into seven divisions. Allocated among the divisions were three mechanized infantry brigades and twenty-three artillery battalions, ten of them antiaircraft artillery units.

The heavy equipment losses and increased numbers of recruits had dictated major structural reorganization of the army. Whereas the large tank force was grouped in armored battalions that operated as independent units before and during the war, the remaining tanks had been integrated with lighter armored vehicles and truck-mounted mechanized infantry to form the army's first line brigades. Before losing much of its transport to capture, destruction, and poor maintenance, most infantry units were mechanized with trucks and over 300 armored personnel carriers available to transport men into battle. In 1981, however, most of the increased army manpower had been assigned to infantry brigades, and units were equipped for battle with little more than rifles (the bulk of them believed to be Soviet-made Kalashnikovs).

Military equipment was largely a mixture of Soviet-made weapons that had survived the Ogaden war or items that had been delivered subsequently by Egypt and certain Western countries. Serviceability was believed to be extremely low, especially for the Soviet equipment. Even before the war when Soviet assistance was available, observers noted that as little as 20 percent of the armored force was capable of operating at any given time. Soviet-

built T–54, T–55, and T–34 medium tanks, some apparently received from Egypt, continued to serve as the primary armored weapon. Reports in 1980 indicated that eighty to 100 remained in the inventory, less than half of which could be put into operating condition. The vast majority of the service vehicles used by the armed forces were of Western (mainly Italian) origin and had been delivered after the war. Of the Soviet transport equipment, according to a 1980 article in the Paris newspaper *Le Monde*, "Virtually nothing remains."

Some of the army's armored personnel carriers were of Italian origin, and some Soviet models had been delivered by Egypt to replace those sent earlier by Moscow. Although much had been abandoned to the Ethiopians in the Ogaden and much of what remained was unserviceable, Soviet weapons continued to serve as basic equipment in the artillery units. Included were 76mm, 85mm, 122mm, and 130mm field gun and 122mm howitzers. The army was also equipped with a variety of Soviet-supplied antiaircraft missiles and guns, but it was assumed that the missiles—SAM–2s and SAM–3s allocated among three battalions—were largely inoperative and that many of the approximately 250 antiaircraft guns reportedly in inventory were not operational (see table 20, Appendix).

The Somali Aeronautical Corps operated most of its aircraft from bases near Mogadishu and Hargeysa. Its primary mission was to support the ground forces, a task thwarted during the Ogaden war by Ethiopian pilots. Since the war the air corps' performance has been limited—like that of other service elements—by a shortage of equipment, spare parts, and maintenance. Several sources stated in 1980 that of approximately twenty-one combat aircraft in the air corps, less than a half dozen—MiG–17s and MiG–21s—were kept operational by Pakistani mechanics. Six Italian single-engine SIAI Marchetti SF–260W trainer tactical support aircraft delivered in late 1979 were reportedly grounded in 1980 because of a lack of 110-octane gasoline in Somalia for the piston-engine aircraft. The shortage of combat aircraft was being redressed in 1981 when Somalia began to take delivery of thirty F–6 Shenyang fighter-bombers from China. (The F–6 is a Chinese version of the MiG–19 and is considered inferior to the MiG–21.) addition of the aircraft and associated training was expected to enhance the capabilities of the air corps.

The air element also had a transport squadron composed of a variety of aircraft delivered over the years. These included several Soviet-built Antonov An–2s, An–24s, and An–26s, believed to be grounded for lack of spare parts. (Egypt, which may have been willing to supply necessary parts, only had the larger An–12 model in its inventory.) In 1981 Somalia was in the process of taking delivery from Italy of four G–222 twin-turboprop medium transports. These new aircraft, in addition to several lighter planes—





Somali's declining military arsenal includes Soviet weapons of low serviceability such as MiG–21 aircraft (top), T–55 tanks; and (facing page)



...BTR–60 armored personnel carriers (top) and AK–47 Kalashnikov automatic rifles.

and four Boeing 707s and 720Bs that could be borrowed from the national airline—were to compose the backbone of the Somali transport force (see table 21, Appendix).

The navy was established in 1965 with the aid of the Soviet Union and was organized to support army forces in maintaining coastal security. Having bases located near Berbera, Mogadishu, and Kismaayo, the navy in 1981 was equipped with two Soviet Osa II missile-armed fast attack craft, eight torpedo-armed fast attack craft, and several patrol boats. Apparently the navy also had an amphibious support capability as it had a Soviet Polnochniy-class landing ship capable of carrying six tanks and four ninety-three-ton landing craft. All naval vessels had been delivered by the Soviet Union and were believed to have deteriorated significantly. One source indicated that as few as three of the twenty ships were operational in 1980 (see table 22, Appendix).

Army strength was supplemented by paramilitary forces. These included a 1,500-man elite force of border guards (Darawishta), which had increased from a prewar level of 500, the People's Militia (increased from 2,500 to less than 10,000 as a result of the war), and the 8,000 members of the Somali Police Force (see State Security Forces, this ch.).

In the event of a concerted attack by Ethiopia's Soviet-equipped 225,000-man army, it appeared unlikely in 1981 that Somalia's armed forces could halt the advance. Rather, according to at least one source, the attacks would be opposed by popular resistance, described as the "people's deterrent." The Ministry of Defense was rumored to have under its authority a High Command for Mobilization to coordinate popular opposition. There were reports that mobilization plans called for the distribution of arms to groups throughout the country under the military leadership at the regional and district levels.

Whether complex national mobilization procedures would operate in such a crisis was a matter for conjecture. It appeared highly likely, however, that given historical enmity between Ethiopians and Somalis, invasion would lead to widespread Somali resistance. Somalis—particularly the nomads—were well organized in clan-families, (see Glossary) clans, and smaller lineage groups accustomed to defending themselves against a harsh environment, outsiders, and each other. The availability of firearms in the Horn—unknown but, as a result of long conflict, assumed to be widespread—would aid the defenders in waging long-term guerrilla warfare, although they would be hindered by limited water supplies.

Manpower, Training, and Conditions of Service

Despite the assumption that in the event of an invasion virtually every Somali would contribute to the country's defense, the country suffered from a manpower shortage. In February 1978 the

government announced that 30,000 recruits had enlisted for fourteen to sixty days of training and that military and paramilitary forces were able to triple their size in 1977–78 without officially resorting to conscription. But with a population of only 4.3 million, military manpower potential was limited. By one estimate Somalia had roughly 464,000 males between fifteen and forty-nine years of age who were fit for military service compared to its major antagonist (Ethiopia), which had about 4 million. (The loyalty of many Ethiopians in an empire gained through conquest and maintained through subjugation may be questioned, however.)

Conscription has not been practiced officially, but since the advent of the military government in 1969—and especially since the army expansion related to the Ogaden war and its aftermath—there have been frequent reports that some Somalis have been impressed into military service. Whereas poverty-stricken town dwellers without compensating family or clan ties were recruited to work on farms and on construction projects in the early 1970s, by 1981 these people were reportedly being recruited for military service along with many male residents of the refugee camps. By presidential decree originally promulgated by the civilian government in 1966 and apparently extended by the SRC, all students over the age of eighteen were required to have certificates from the army as evidence that they had completed short-term military training or alternate national service. In 1980 it was reported that young Somalis unable to produce such a document when questioned by the authorities would be inducted by the army.

Somalia first felt compelled to organize a reserve force during the 1964 border clashes with Ethiopia. At that time the National Assembly passed legislation authorizing mobilization of large numbers of volunteers to be trained by the army at special camps in the regional capitals. A force of about 2,000 regulars was hastily recruited, but these troops were not needed in the border war and were subsequently released from duty. These men received cards identifying them as reservists, but they received neither pay nor training and had no official status.

The Home Guard was established in 1967 when 3,000 men were called up for six months of training. Having completed their tours of duty, they were discharged but were carried in a reserve pool, and an additional 3,000 men were called up for the next six months. It was not known whether the Home Guard reserve system continued to function. In 1981 the People's Militia and the Somali Police Force constituted the country's most important reserve forces.

Despite reverses in the war with Ethiopia and the apparently diminished popularity of the military government, many Somalis continued to be attracted to service with the armed forces. Nomads with their strong martial traditions have been drawn to the

army, where they have also found more comfortable accommodations and more regular meals than have been possible in civilian life. From the beginning of the colonial period, soldiers (as well as the bulk of government employees in general) have been recruited from the nomadic areas rather than from the cultivated (and wealthier) riverine areas. According to I.M. Lewis, a noted authority on Somalia, this reflected the harsh environment and the pressure of limited resources in regions of the country populated by nomads.

Apart from the fact that nomadic Somalis were traditionally more heavily represented than those from the sedentary Digil and Rahanweyn clans, little was known about the clan representation in the armed forces in 1981. Balanced clan representation had long been a sensitive issue, and recruitment notices had specified the proportional number of men to be recruited from each district in an attempt to establish a clan balance in the officer corps and enlisted ranks. In the 1960s traditional group animosities had created disciplinary problems where serious clan imbalance occurred, but it was not known whether these problems persisted in 1981 in a national army tested in combat against an outside force. After it assumed power, the military government had followed a practice of mixing recruits from throughout the country to cultivate a national spirit among the soldiers.

Since the military coup in 1969 little information has been available on the makeup of the officer corps and its training. Before the coup the army relied on two sources for its officer personnel: volunteers for officer candidate training and outstanding noncommissioned officers from the army or the police force. To fill unit vacancies for officers of lower rank the Ministry of Defense usually advertised through the information media. Announcements were in the form of specified numbers of vacancies in the Somali Army Officers' Academy. To be eligible, applicants had to be citizens between seventeen and twenty-eight years of age and willing to serve for four years.

Completion of the third level of middle school (seven years of education) constituted the minimum acceptable academic experience for officer training, although it was desirable for cadets to have a diploma from upper middle school or its equivalent. Officer candidates were given written tests covering mathematics, language, and general information. High moral standards were also required; convictions for acts against the state, offenses against other persons, or violations of marriage laws disqualified an applicant. He could also be barred for previous expulsion from a military organization or educational instituion for disciplinary reasons. Officer candidates had to be in good health, and a physical examination was necessary.

Although there were no indications that the official requirements for a commission had changed substantially since the

Ogaden war, it was possible that in view of wartime losses and the buildup of army manpower the military had lowered its standards for officer candidates. At least one source suggests that the officer corps has tended to be staffed largely by members of lower middle class urban families or families of traders from the interior. On the other hand enlisted men tended to come from remote villages or nomadic life where opportunities for formal education were most limited.

Before the coup basic enlistment was for four years, but in 1981 there were indications that this term had been increased to six or more years. Prerequisites for joining any branch of the armed forces were that a man had to be between the ages of seventeen and twenty-five, physically fit, of high moral caliber, and have "youthful vigor." (In 1981, however, many enlisted men were reportedly in their thirties.) Before 1969 enlisted men were recruited for three categories of service: general duty with a line unit, administration, or assignments requiring technical skills. Recruits for administrative positions had to have an elementary education, and those for technical positions needed a government certificate attesting to their special qualifications. There were no special requirements for general duty.

In 1961 the Women's Auxiliary Corps was established. Enlistments were for two years, and recruits were selected and trained to fill positions in administration, personnel, and military welfare. Qualified enlistees received a five-month period of basic training and instruction in typing, recordkeeping, and related administrative subjects. The corps was small, and most duty assignments were with National Army headquarters in Mogadishu or with subordinate headquarters in the field.

From the early 1960s until 1977 the Soviet Union played a major part in officer training. Many of the higher ranking Somali officers had served in the British and Italian colonial forces, and some had been trained at Italian military and police academies. By the mid–1970s it was estimated that as many as 60 percent of all officers on active duty had been exposed to the Soviet Union and its training systems. The army adopted Soviet methods of organization and tactical concepts, and its officers were schooled in Marxist-Leninist ideology and politics. All military training during the 1970s emphasized the army's role as a revolutionary force within the society as well as strategy and tactics. But it seemed in 1981 that defeat in the Ogaden war had modified these priorities.

In the early 1980s at least two major military academies provided training for officers; both were situated in Mogadishu. One offered general instruction, and the other was a staff school for senior officers. Foreign training was still available, although it appeared to emphasize technical instruction in the care and main-

tenance of specialized equipment purchased abroad, particularly in Italy. During the 1960s Egypt also had provided training for the army and its naval component, and there were indications that this was again being offered on a moderate scale.

During peacetime, enlisted recruits have received a six-month training course conducted by the appropriate service element. Elimination of illiteracy from the ranks has been a primary goal, and garrisons and detachments have provided educational improvement courses for new recruits. Attendance by illiterate recruits is mandatory. Noncommissioned officers have received leadership training at a special school in Mogadishu. Other specialized instruction has included commando, artillery, and driver training.

In addition to the quality of its manpower, equipment, and training, the ability of any military establishment to perform its assigned missions depends to a marked degree on whether it has a sense of institutional solidarity and esprit de corps. Somali military and paramilitary organizations recognize and accept this principle and have sought to foster allegiance through their own distinctive uniforms and systems of ranks and insignia. In 1981 the regular army wore summer uniforms of khaki and winter (rainy season) uniforms of olive drab. Members of the Darawishta, the elite paramilitary mobile unit, wore the traditional headcloth of national hero Mohamed Abdullah's warriors. Uniforms of the Women's Auxiliary Corps were buff-color, and those of the militia were bright green. In the Somali National Army, chevrons indicated enlisted ranks, and combinations of stars and shields indicated commissioned officer grades (see fig. 12).

In 1981 the Somali soldier was regarded by observers as disciplined and competent especially when operating in small units. Technical competence was generally lacking, however, and it was felt by some that wartime losses and political-clan maneuvering in the government were leading to morale problems (see Internal Security, this ch.).

Foreign Military Assistance

Lacking an indigenous arms industry, Somalia has had to rely on foreign sources for equipping its military and internal security forces. Because of domestic economic insufficiencies, however, the government has been unable to pay for significant military purchases and has had to depend on donor countries whose aid has been linked to perceived national interests. Foreign military aid has been difficult to obtain because of Somali irredentist claims against neighbors in the Horn and the widespread perception that Somalis would use their weapons offensively if given the opportunity. Except for the period when the Soviet Union was a close arms partner, Somalia has had to seek sources of military aid aggres-



Source: Based on information from Irving Kaplan, et. al., *Area Handbook for Somalia*, Washington, 1977, p. 324.

Figure 12. Army Ranks and Insignia

sively. As a small country in need of weaponry, "The problem for us is not choosing between independence and alignment," according to one Somali, "but rather figuring out which sauce we would prefer to be eaten with...perhaps we are better off selling ourselves than being sold by others."

The close fifteen-year relationship between Somalia and the Soviet Union developed from the Somali appraisal immediately after independence that its interests demanded a 20,000-man army. Government leaders first sought financial support for the army from the United States, but Washington—already a large supplier of arms to Ethiopia—initially refused to supply any aid. United States policymakers, in concert with Italy and West Germany, later agreed to provide US$10 million in aid for a 5,000-man force that would be oriented to internal security functions. Somalia looked elsewhere and in 1962 found the Soviet Union ready to grant loans worth US$32 million to expand and modernize the republic's army. The loan later was increased to the equivalent of US$55 million, and Moscow began to equip and train an army scheduled to reach a total of 14,000. The loan was made unconditionally, and Moscow allowed a leisurely repayment schedule over as much as twenty years.

During the rest of the 1960s the Soviet Union furnished small arms and artillery pieces as well as a substantial number of T–34 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and MiG–15 and MiG–17 aircraft. About 300 Soviet advisers in Somalia began training the army, while more than 500 Somali pilots, officers, and technicians received training in the Soviet Union in the 1960s. Until the 1969 coup Soviet aid to the army was counterbalanced to some extent by two factors: the Mogadishu government's Western political inclinations, and aid to the police force from the United States and West Germany. But by 1969 the army had become dominant over the police. After the coup the Soviet Union became Somalia's only major supplier of military matériel.

Close ideological ties and mutual interests reinforced the Somali-Soviet military relationship over the next several years. From Soviet Defense Minister Andrey Grechko's visit to Mogadishu in 1972 came the agreement to improve and modernize the port of Berbera in return for use of the facility for communication, docking, and repairs. The Soviet Union thus built Berbera into an important base that contained a missile storage facility for its navy, an airfield with runways nearly 5,000 meters long capable of handling large bombers, and extensive radar and communications facilities. The Somali government denied that the installation was a Soviet military base and offered guided inspection tours to prove its point. But some of the visitors, notably a mission headed by United States Senator Dewey F. Bartlett in 1975, reported that the Soviet Union had complete control over the facility; it was de-

scribed by some observers as Soviet-operated, including the buildings' maintenance staff.

The base agreement was a marriage of mutual advantage. Somalia wanted military equipment, and the Soviet Union wanted a base in the strategic Indian Ocean Persian Gulf region from which to show the flag and to counter the United States' deployment of Polaris A–3 submarine-launched missiles, which Moscow viewed as having made the Arabian Sea a potential launching site for a strike against the Soviet Union. The Berbera facilities acquired additional importance when Soviet advisers were expelled from Egypt in July 1972, the Suez Canal was reopened in 1975, and oil shipments from the Persian Gulf through the canal increased.

After the signing of the 1974 treaty of friendship and cooperation with Moscow, the Somalis began taking delivery of improved military hardware: MiG–21 supersonic jet fighters, T–54 tanks, a SAM–2 missile defense system for Mogadishu, and modern torpedo and missile-armed fast attack and landing craft for the navy. Soviet military advisers were increased to about 1,500, supplemented by about fifty Cubans. One unconfirmed report stated that, in a secret clause in the treaty, Moscow agreed to write off Somalia's arms debt. During the fifteen-year association approximately 2,400 military personnel underwent training in the Soviet Union and 150 more in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union also provided the training and organizational model for the Somali army's intelligence apparatus and for the National Security Service (NSS).

Somalia's ideological ties with the Islamic world were reinforced by interests shared with several Arab states, notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and have provided the basis for military assistance. Saudi attempts over several years to induce Mogadishu to break ties with Moscow met with little success before the Ogaden war; but in August 1977 a Saudi offer of a loan equivalent to US$400 million may have influenced Siad Barre's actions in the following months. Egypt was also active in its support of Somalia during the war, supplying the equivalent of approximately US$30 million in military aid, according to a report prepared for the United States Congress in 1978. Iran sent small arms to assist Somalia in the war, and there was considerable speculation that the Iranian shah had violated a United States restriction on the shipment of American-supplied military equipment to third parties—in this case, vehicles.

After the war Siad Barre and his representatives made a number of trips to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf to secure military assistance or financing. Egypt became Somalia's largest military donor after 1977, although relations between the two countries were strained by Somalia's refusal to pay for the equipment. Cairo

reportedly supplied large quantities of ammunition, spare parts from Egyptian stocks for some of the Soviet-made equipment, and military equipment that included T–54 and T–55 tanks and armored personnel carriers. Egypt, however, did not have the resources to do much more than slow the erosion of Somalia's military capability. It was not known in late 1981 what effect the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al Sadat would have on Egyptian-Somali military ties.

Although other Arab states were a major source of Somali finances, Siad Barre was reportedly disappointed in the aid he had received from them, including the conservative Persian Gulf states and Saudi Arabia. Arab attitudes toward Somalia were reportedly influenced by Siad Barre's unwillingness to break ties with Egypt after that country's 1978 peace treaty with Israel. Iraq has also objected to the Somalis offering the use of Berbera's military bases to the United States in return for American military equipment and economic aid. In 1980 Iraq was reported to be willing to give Somalia "important military aid" including Soviet-made tanks and spare parts if Mogadishu refused Washington's request for use of the Berbera facilities. The exact amount of aid given by Arab states, repayment arrangements (if any), and eventual use in civilian or military projects were unknown. Arab funds supported the purchase of foreign military equipment, most notably the acquisition of F–6 fighter-bomber aircraft from China in 1981.

Although China had maintained a close economic aid relationship with Somalia since 1963, it did not emerge as a major arms supplier until the F–6 deliveries. Previously the Chinese had only provided limited military aid—mostly small arms. President Siad Barre attached great importance to Somalia's relationship with Beijing, but China's own economic and military weaknesses would appear to preclude its supplying of military equipment to Somalia on the scale of the Soviet Union.

Before strained relations between the Soviet Union and Somalia became apparent in early 1977, the United States and West European countries had been unwilling to support the Mogadishu government militarily. Soviet influence and Somali agitation against the French colonial presence in neighboring Djibouti militated against even economic aid from the United States and Italy (which had been strong in the 1960s) or French support. In early 1977, responding to Somali disillusion with the Soviet Union and United States problems with Ethiopia, President Jimmy Carter instructed his government to "do everything possible to get the Somalis to be our friends."

In late July 1977, when the Somalis' Ogaden offensive was well under way, the United States announced that it was not opposed in principle to supplying defensive weapons to Somalia. This statement was preceded by extensive United States consultation with

its Middle East and European allies and was followed by announcements by Britain and France that they too would be willing to sell defensive weapons to Somalia. The three countries changed their policies within a month, however, because of the clear involvement of Somali regulars in the stepped-up hostilities in the Ogaden and the opposition of other African states, particularly Kenya.

The United States and most European countries took the position that no military items would be transferred to Somalia either directly or through third parties until Mogadishu withdrew its forces from the Ogaden. Siad Barre's March 1978 announcement of Somali troop withdrawal was followed by numerous written assurances in the hope of concluding an arms deal with Western nations. Western military assistance, however, may have in fact begun at the height of the Ogaden war when the West German government, in appreciation for Somali cooperation in the rescue by German commandos of passengers hijacked to Mogadishu aboard a German airliner, extended to Somalia credit equivalent to US$12 million. This February 1978 loan was not tied to any specific economic projects and could have been used, the Germans admitted, to purchase military equipment.

Since 1978 Italy has provided more military assistance to Somalia than has any other Western country. This aid included several large shipments of Fiat trucks, which were the backbone of Somalia's military transportation in 1981. In addition Italian companies, aided by generous export credits subsidized by the Italian government, supplied aircraft and training for Somali flight and ground crews beginning in 1979. Aircraft included six SIAI-Marchetti SF–260W single-engine trainer/tactical support aircraft and four G–222 twin-engine transports. Fiat, encouraged by government-subsidized export credits, sought to expand its commerce in Somalia by selling light tanks and armored cars. Total Italian exports to Somalia amounted to the equivalent of US$124 million in 1980, but following year, reports indicated that the Italian government was dissatisfied with Somali financing arrangements and had delayed delivery of the G–222s. A visit in 1981 by Italian Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo to Mogadishu and Addis Ababa, which resulted in an aid package for Somalia equivalent to US$40 million, apparently resolved these difficulties.

Relations with France improved significantly after Djibouti achieved independence in 1977. The two countries also shared concern over Soviet activities in the Horn. Although a small number of French armored cars were delivered to Somalia in 1977 (possibly from a third country) and although the French firm Renault had sold a number of trucks to Somalia, friendship had not

been translated into significant arms sales by 1981 because of financing difficulties. In 1980 extensive negotiations were held between the two countries on the sale of C–160 Transall twin-engine transports, light tanks, and helicopters, but agreement could not be reached. According to a Somali general familar with the negotiations, "France is prepared to sell us arms, and we want to buy from France. However, we must find funds because France's attitude is purely commercial, which we feel is fair...."

The United States and Somalia were motivated more by strategic than commercial considerations in the arms agreement initialed in August 1980. "Our main objective," according to Siad Barre, "...is to have the Americans contribute to our national security." Washington was searching for military facilities to bolster the American presence in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean region after the shah of Iran's fall from power in 1979. In December 1979 a United States Department of State mission concluded an agreement in principle allowing American access to Somali naval and air facilities in return for military equipment. The following month United States negotiators returned to Somalia and to Oman and Kenya, where they also sought facilities. Although final agreements were quickly completed with Kenya and Oman, Washington's negotiations with Mogadishu lasted eight months.

Differences between the two governments revolved around the amount of equipment to be sold by the United States. Somalia originally requested a list of items estimated by the Americans to cost US$2 billion, while the United States was interested in selling only defensive weaponry worth approximately US$40 million. Eventually agreement was reached that would provide three TPS–43 long-range air defense radars, twelve M–167 (towed) Vulcan 20mm air defense guns and associated communications equipment, support gear, spare parts, and training. The equipment and training, valued at US$42 million, were to be supplied on concessionary terms and delivered in 1982, although the Somalis were considering the purchase of weapons other than the relatively ineffective Vulcan guns. The agreement did not become official until February 1981 because of insistence by the United States Congress on the verified withdrawal of Somali troops from the Ogaden. By late 1981 numerous American military survey teams had been granted unprecedented access to Somali military installations, and it appeared that Somalia would be sent an additional US$20 million in military aid under fiscal year 1982 appropriations.

Internal Security

The Siad Barre government—aware of its birth by coup d'etat—has always been extremely conscious of protecting itself against possible domestic threats. After coming to power the military

regime sought to remove rival sources of political power and to replace the country's clan-based political and socioeconomic system with centralized national control. Since the mid–1970s, however, in the wake of disruptions caused by drought and the war, the government's internal security apparatus and the president's political skills appear to have been directed almost exclusively toward maintaining its grip on power rather than achieving societal reforms.

Governmental Security Policy

Immediately after the 1969 coup the military government moved to concentrate in its own hands control of all legislative, administrative, and judicial functions. Roughly sixty leaders of the previous government, businessmen, important lawyers, and senior military personnel who did not support the coup were arrested and tried by the National Security Court (NSC), which was created in April 1970 (see The Legal System, ch. 4). The following September the SRC proclaimed that any person who harmed the unity, peace, or sovereignty of the nation could be sentenced to death. Severe punishment could also be meted out to anyone who spread false propaganda against the government.

The Siad Barre government has generally shunned capital punishment (with some notable exceptions) in favor of the widespread use of imprisonment and reeducation of actual, suspected, or potential opponents. The earlier parliamentary government had been able to hold people without trial for up to ninety days during a state of emergency, but the military regime removed most legal restrictions on preventive detention. After the coup a local revolutionary council or the NSS could detain people regarded as dangerous to peace, order, good government, or the aims and spirit of the revolution. Regional governors could also order the search and arrest of persons suspected of a crime or of activities that threatened public order and security and could also requisition property or services without compensation.

The number of political prisoners held by the Somali government in 1980 was estimated by Amnesty International to number at least 100 and possibly many more. Most notable among these were former Prime Minister Egal and the respected former Chief of Police Mohammad Abshir Musa, both of whom had been in detention for more than a decade. Many who had served in Somalia's parliamentary government or had fallen from the regime's favor were known to have been "rehabilitated" and given official posts after attending reorientation courses or serving prison sentences. According to a former Somali official in 1981, many if not most influential citizens had been jailed at least once, indicating that imprisonment was used as a means of keeping

potential opponents off balance. The Siad Barre government, beginning three months after it assumed power, has occasionally declared special amnesties for prisoners, often on the anniversary of the SRC's ascension to power. These occurred most recently in April 1980 when 2,658 were released and in October 1981 when 5,009 were freed, including some political prisoners.

In 1974 all government employees were required to sign statements of intent to abide by security regulations. Contacts with foreigners had to be referred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; this measure was apparently sometimes ignored, but Somalis who had contacts with non-Soviet foreigners reportedly did so cautiously. By one account security officers conducted monthly interviews with government workers in which questions were asked about the loyalty of the workers' families and acquaintances. By the late 1970s it appeared that these restrictions were no longer in force or that they were frequently ignored by Somalis who were reportedly associating more freely with foreigners.

The Somali government apparently became most repressive immediately after the attempted coup in 1971—a period when Soviet advisers were most influential (see Challenges to the Regime, ch. 1). The government's explanation was that the coup attempt by some members of the SRC was aimed at protecting interests of the trading bourgeoisie and the tribal structure. Many expected that the government would announce clemency for the conspirators. Instead they were executed, with thousands observing. Many Somalis considered this an act of revenge inconsistent with Islamic principles and with past standards of justice in the country. It has been suggested that Siad Barre was counseled by his Soviet advisers to make an example of the plotters.

During its first years in power the SRC sought to undermine traditional Somali allegiance to Islamic religious leaders and descent groups. Although the military regime tried to avoid alienating religious leaders, it did not want them interfering in politics. During the early 1970s some Islamic leaders affirmed that Islam could never coexist with scientific socialism while Siad Barre stressed that they were entirely compatible.

The government also attempted during the mid–1970s to substitute allegiance to the nation for traditional allegiance to family and clan, thus eliminating a potential rallying point for opposition. Although the government itself was based ostensibly on an alliance between the Marehan, Ogaden, and Dolbahante clans, it was seen by many Somalis—except the Majerteyn, who had been systematically excluded because of their dominance in the old regime—to be as non-tribal as could be expected in Somalia. The authorities consistently stressed individual responsibility for all offenses, undermining the concept of collective responsibility that existed in traditional society and was the basis for the existence of

dia-paying groups. Traditional clan leadership responsibilities and titles such as sultan and sheikh were abolished, and by 1975 imprisonment on charges of "tribalism and nepotism" were reported to be accepted features of life under the regime. The persistence of clan-related loyalties was described at this time as the problem causing the most concern to the government.

Sources of Opposition

Despite its repressive features—or perhaps because its authoritarianism allowed it to act with a decisiveness not displayed by the previous civilian governments—the Siad Barre regime appeared relatively popular with most Somalis in the mid–1970s. The leading personnel of the military regime showed a remarkable stability after the coup attempt of 1971, but in the wake of decisive defeat in the Ogaden war and the expulsion of Soviet advisers new tensions emerged.

Even before the war the president was criticized for not moving to support guerrillas in annexing the Ogaden immediately after the Ethiopian emperor's death in 1975. Open criticism of his caution was not easily stifled because the Somali claim to the Ogaden had overwhelming national support and the approval of many government officials (see War in the Ogaden, ch. 1). The regime's commitment of regular troops to the Ogaden proved highly popular, as was Siad Barre's expulsion of the Soviet advisers, who had generally been resented by Somalis. But defeat in the field focused Somali criticism on the government.

After the retreat toward Hargeysa, Siad Barre met with his generals to discuss the battlefield situation, and reportedly six of them were summarily executed for activities against the security of the state. Opposition to the government was demonstrated on April 9, 1978, when a group of military officers (mostly Majerteyn) attempted a coup described as ill-timed, ill-planned, and ill-supported. The attempt was crushed within hours by forces loyal to Siad Barre, and seventy-four suspected plotters were arrested, although several escaped. After a month-long series of trials, thirty-six of those implicated were imprisoned and seventeen were shot the following October.

The coup plotters reportedly disapproved of the way the president had conducted the war. Although only a small group was implicated, discouragement over Somalia's predicament apparently was widespread throughout the armed forces and Somali society in general. There seems to have been a strong element in the officer corps that believed expulsion of the Soviets was precipitate. These views may have been reinforced by Somalia's continuing inability to obtain new military armament from other sources. Much of the criticism centered on Siad Barre's overreliance for advice and administration on members of his Marehan clan, few of whom were assigned to front line units during the war.

After the war it became increasingly obvious that the ruling alliance between the Marehan, Ogaden, and Dolbahante clans had been broken. The Ogaden—the clan of Siad Barre's mother, which had the most direct stakes in the war and reportedly suffered tremendously—broke openly with the regime over the president's wartime leadership. Since the war Siad Barre has protected his position by relying more on members of his own clan, placing them in important positions in the government, the armed forces, the security services, and other state agencies.

Increased disaffection with government policies and personalities was evidenced by numerous defections by government officials and the establishment of movements calling for the overthrow of Siad Barre. Because of prohibitions against unauthorized political activity, these organizations were based abroad. The best known was the Somali Salvation Front (SSF) operating from headquarters in Ethiopia. It appeared to have absorbed its predecessor, the Somali Democratic Action Front (SODAF), which had been formed in Rome in 1976 and was thought to be comprised principally of Majerteyn under the leadership of former Minister of Justice Osman Nur Ali. The SSF was led by Lieutenant Colonel Abullahi Yusuf Ahmad (a survivor of the failed coup of 1978) and included former Minister of Education Hassan Ali Mireh and former Ambassador Muse Islan Farah. The SSF, which was supported by Ethiopia and Libya, claimed to sponsor a well-armed and well-trained guerrilla force of several thousand. Ethiopia had put a radio transmitter at the disposal of the SSF from which Radio Kulmis (Unity) beamed invective against Siad Barre to listeners in Somalia. Several bombings and sabotage attempts in 1981 were attributed to the SSF, but its guerrilla operations and propaganda broadcasts were not regarded as especially effective.

The SSF appeared to offer only limited potential as a rallying point for the opposition to the government. Although it claimed no ideological or political premise other than bitter hostility to the governing regime, its nationalist appeal was severely undercut by Ethiopia's support. The SSF claimed to encompass a broad range of opposition forces, but its leading figures, with important exceptions, were of the Majerteyn clan. Some of them, according to reports, have even urged independence for northern Somalia.

Leftist opposition to the Somali government was strengthened in October 1981 with the formation of the Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia (DFSS), created when the SSF merged with the radical-left Somali Workers Party (SWP) and the newly formed Democratic Front for the Liberation of Somalia (DFLS). The latter groups, both based in Yemen (Aden), included some former members of the SRSP Central Committee who faulted Siad Barre for compromising Somalia's revolutionary goals. The DFSS was to be led by an eleven-man committee including Yusuf Ah-

mad as chairman, former SWP leader Idris Jama Hussein as vice chairman and, as secretary for information, Abdar Rahman Aidid Ahmad, former chairman of the SRSP ideology bureau, who with the reported backing of the Soviet Union had earlier united several smaller groups to form the DFLS. The leaders of the DFSS pledged to intensify "the armed and political struggle" against the Siad Barre regime, which had "destroyed the unity and solidarity of the Somali people" and "surrender[ed] to American imperialism and international reaction." The new organization had no identifiable clan orientation, but its close links with the Ethiopian government would appear to jeopardize its support among Somalis.

In April 1981 the Somali National Movement (SNM) was launched in London at a press conference reportedly attended by 500 Somali exiles living in Europe. It advocated for the republic a mixed economy and a neutralist foreign policy, rejecting alignment with either the Soviet Union or the United States and calling for the dismantling of all foreign military bases in the region. The numerical strength and full identity of the group were not revealed, although among its leaders were Hassan Adan Wadadi, former ambassador to Saudi Arabia, and Ahmed Ismail Abdi, former minister of planning. The SNM sought to attract more broad-based support than other opposition groups, but at the time of its organization most of its leaders were reported to be of the Isaaq clan.

There were indications after the Ogaden war that the army continued to suffer from internal tensions that characterized other sectors of Somali society. As many as several dozen Somali military personnel—all from the Majerteyn clan—were executed secretly in the spring of 1980 for allegedly having supported the SSF. In 1981 further divisions were brought to the surface after Lieutenant General Ali Samantar, who was widely respected in the SRSP and the military as a nationalist not tied to narrow regional interests, was dismissed as minister of defense and replaced by Siad Barre's clansman, Haji Mohamed. Ali Samantar's removal reportedly resulted in incidents at a number of military camps, including a unit mutiny near the Ethiopian border and a work stoppage by some officers serving in the Ministry of Defense. According to some reports Siad Barre felt it necessary to call a special meeting at Defense Headquarters with senior military officers—including Haji Mohamed and Ali Samantar—to assert that the lieutenant general's removal had not been a demotion.

The flight of political and military officers into exile has mounted as Siad Barre has resorted increasingly to placing trusted relatives and clansmen in key positions to consolidate his personal authority. In late 1981 it seemed doubtful that the opposition groups formed abroad and linked to specific clans or dependent on regimes hostile to Somalia represented an imminent threat to

Siad Barre's leadership. Whether the existing government faced a more serious threat from domestic military and civilian dissidents could not be estimated. While dissatisfaction seemed to be growing and the base of Siad Barre's support had narrowed, any challenge by a rival clique would have to contend with a leader who had amply demonstrated his skill in retaining and reinforcing his power and in placating or neutralizing potential opponents. Given the prominent role of the military and the security apparatus, any serious attempt to overturn his rule probably would arise from within these institutions.

State Security Forces

In 1981 several police and intelligence organizations operated under centralized control to maintain public order, control crime, and protect the government against domestic threats. These units included the Somali Police Force, the NSS, the People's Militia, and a number of other intelligence-gathering operations; most of them were headed by trusted members of the president's family. Since 1976 control of the security apparatus has been increasingly concentrated in the presidency under the authority of Presidential Adviser on Security Affairs Ahmed Suleiman Abdulle, Siad Barre's son-in-law.

The Somali Police Force

The Somali Police Force, which numbered approximately 8,000 in 1981, was originally established as the government's primary organ for maintaining public order and internal security. Its influence and usefulness to the central government, however, had declined since the 1969 coup, and its law enforcement role was largely duplicated in the 1970s by the People's Militia.

The police force, considered a part of the armed forces since 1960, ultimately was responsible to the head of state, who was also commander in chief of the armed forces. It was not a branch of the Somali National Army, however, and did not operate under the army's command structure. Until 1976 the force's national commandant and his central command were under the control of the minister of interior.

Each of the country's administrative regions had a police commandant, and other commissioned officers were responsible for maintaining law and order in the districts. After 1972 the police outside Mogadishu comprised northern and southern group commands, divisional commands (corresponding to the regions), subdivisional commands (corresponding to the districts), station commands, and police posts. The responsibilities of officials commanding police stations varied, but regional and district police elements were under the authority of regional governors and district commissioners. It appeared that in 1981 the police commandant—Major General Adan Abdi Dualeh—followed in-

structions received directly from the president and from Suleiman Abdulle. The local authorities, however, were thought to retain significant control over regional and district police commands in order to facilitate local police work.

The national force grew out of police forces employed by the British and Italians to maintain the peace during the colonial period. Both European powers used Somalis as armed constables in rural areas, and Somalis eventually staffed the lower ranks of police forces, which had as officers only Europeans. The colonial forces were the source of the senior officers and commanders—including Siad Barre—who led the Somali Police Force and the army after national independence.

In 1960 the British Somaliland Scouts were integrated with the Police Force of Somalia from the trust territory, resulting in a force of about 3,700 men. Roughly 1,000 of them were organized as the Darawishta Poliska, a mobile group used to keep peace between warring clans in the interior. The new government could also call on it for assistance in military actions near Somalia's disputed borders.

Major General Abshir Musa commanded the Somali Police Force from 1959 until he resigned in early 1969. Under his leadership the force expanded to 6,000 men, acquired a reputation for professionalism and excellence, and remained committed to the rule of law and basic civil liberties. To a remarkable extent the police were able to remain above the nation's internal political struggles. Abshir Musa frequently complained of political interference with the judiciary, and during the national election in 1969 the police did much to preserve order. Abshir Musa resigned as a result of his conflict with the precoup civilian government over the use of the police for political purposes. His resignation greatly demoralized the force.

Under the parliamentary regime, police received training and material aid from West Germany, Italy, and the United States. Although the government was able to use the police to counterbalance the Soviet-supported army, no police commander actually opposed the army's coup in 1969. It was reported that much of their docility was a result of Siad Barre's negotiating skill.

The popular Abshir Musa was arrested shortly after the coup although he no longer held the post of police commandant. The commandant at the time was General Jama Ali Korshel, who became the government's first vice-president. Several months after the SRC's establishment Korshel was accused of leading a countercoup attempt and was arrested. The police have been represented in Somali governments since that time but with apparently diminishing influence, particularly since the post of minister of interior (held by police generals since 1969) was abolished in 1976.

By the late 1970s the Somali Police Force was organized to carry out a broad range of internal security responsibilities. The elite mobile police groups consisted of the Darawishta and the Birmadka Poliska (Riot Unit). The Darawishta, which was a mobile unit operating in remote areas and along the frontier, may have been absorbed into the army during the Ogaden war. The Birmadka was regarded as a crack unit for emergency action and also provided honor guards for ceremonial functions.

A police air wing, equipped with Cessna light aircraft and one Douglas DC–3, was established in 1961. The unit was able to operate from improvised landing fields near most of the remote police posts. The wing provided assistance to the field police units and to the Darawishta through airlift of supplies, reconnaissance, and the transport of personnel. It was not known what equipment the air wing was using in 1981.

Technical and specialized units included the Tributary Division, the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), the Traffic Division, a communications unit, and a training unit. The CID, the best known of these units, handled investigations, fingerprinting, criminal records, immigration matters, and passports and operated in both rural and urban areas. Although headquartered in the capital, the CID in the late 1960s had a communications network that allowed it to communicate with outlying stations. It had maintained close liaison with medical authorities involved in forensic science. The operational effectiveness of the CID in 1981 was not known but, according to one of Siad Barre's political critics, it was headed by an uneducated relative of the president.

A small unit of policewomen was formed in 1961. They were generally assigned to investigation, inspection, and interrogation of female offenders and victims. Policewomen were also assigned to cases involving female juvenile delinquents, ill or abandoned girls, prostitutes, and child beggars.

Service units included the Gadidka Poliska (Transport Department) and the health service. The Police Custodial Corps served as prison guards—the most difficult police job, according to Siad Barre in a 1972 speech. In 1971 a national fire brigade was established and staffed with fifty persons under the control of the Somali Police Force. It operated exclusively in Mogadishu, but the Three Year Plan 1979–1981 called for the expansion of the brigade into several other growing towns, including Kismaayo, Hargeysa, Berbera, Marka, Jowhar, and Beled Weyne.

In the early 1970s police recruits had to be seventeen to twenty-five years of age, of high moral caliber, and physically fit. After joining they received six months' training at the National Police Academy in Mogadishu. Once this training was completed, recruits sat for an examination and, if they passed, served two years on the force. When this service was completed, the policemen

could request renewal of their contracts. Pay and allowances were thought to be the same as for members of the armed forces except that there were extra allowances for certain specified kinds of duty.

At least until 1972 no Somali with a university education had ever applied to join the police, although some policemen had earned degrees while serving. The force still had a policy of recruiting secondary school graduates as cadet officers, but by 1972 the trend was toward making officers of men who had earned their secondary school education while serving as police. Recruiting from the ranks undoubtedly improved morale and meant that more officers had previous police experience.

Officers at this time underwent a stiff training course of nine months' duration. The force emphasized supervision of policemen's field performances and provided for their periodic retraining. Darawishta members received special training in a six-month tactical training course, and Birmadka personnel were trained in public order and riot control. Training at the local level was increased after the United States and West Germany ceased training support for Somali policemen in 1970 and when Italy curtailed its instruction. During the 1970s the Somali Police Force was assisted by security advisers from the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). After relations with Western nations improved in the late 1970s, West German and Italian advisers were again actively training units of the force, European-made vehicles were supplied to police units, and Somali policemen underwent instruction in West Germany and Italy. In mid–1980 a delegation headed by the general commandant of the Italian Carabinieri Corps held talks with Somali officials on increasing cooperation between the two forces.

People's Militia

In 1981 the People's Militia, known as the Gulwadayal or Victory Pioneers, was a large paramilitary force that had strong political connections and was described by one former Somali official as politically more influential than the army. Organized by the SRC in August 1972 as a wing of the army, it nevertheless worked under the separate supervision of the political bureau of the presidency. It was not known what connection, if any, existed between the militia and the Young Pioneers, an organization established by the army during the era of civilian government. Since the formation of SRSP in 1976 the militia had been, in effect, part of the party apparatus. Largely because of the increased need for military reserves, militia membership increased from 2,500 in 1977 to less than 10,000 members of both sexes in 1979. They were reportedly commanded in 1980 by Abdirihan Hussein, a son-in-law of the president.

The militia operated throughout the country, staffing govern-

ment and party orientation centers that were located in all settlements. Officially its duties were to aid in self-help schemes; to spread principles that would encourage revolutionary progress; to fight laziness, misuse of public property, and reactionary ideas and actions; and to promote and defend Somali culture and traditional heritage. The most visible duties of the organization, however, involved law enforcement—responsibilities that paralleled the duties of regular policemen. The militia had authority, used extensively in the mid–1970s, to perform such duties as checking contacts between Somalis and foreigners. It had powers of arrest independent of the police. Members of the organization were more highly visible than the regular police, reportedly keeping both government officials and ordinary members of the population under their scrutiny. In rural areas they formed vigilance corps, performing police and guard duties over grazing areas and in towns. Before the Ogaden war they played an important role in initiating self-help schemes and "crash programs," but these activities had apparently decreased since the war.

According to government statements, the militia comprised youths, workers, peasants, and intellectuals. Most members, however, were from the ranks of the unemployed and were frequently described by Somalis as "misfits" or "thugs." Students were reportedly tapped for positions of leadership in the organization; but according to one foreign observer in 1980, they were usually ostracized by their peers who felt they could no longer be trusted.

Intelligence and Protective Services

The NSS and a number of other intelligence organizations have operated, like the militia, outside the bureaucratic structure to protect the governing regime. Established after 1969 with assistance from the Soviet Committee of State Security (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti—KGB), the NSS developed into a pervasive and effective instrument of domestic surveillance having broad powers of arrest and investigation. Members of the civil service and the military were reportedly under constant watch, and NSS reports played an important role in the promotion and demotion of government officials. The service was headed for a decade before April 1981 by the president's son-in-law, Suleiman Abdulle. The identity of his replacement has not been revealed but the NSS and Suleiman Abdulle, in his post as presidential adviser on security affairs, have remained influential in day-to-day decisions on domestic security matters and have been reported to be influential in foreign policymaking.

The NSS in 1981 was an elite organization staffed by men from the army and the police force who had been chosen for their loyalty to Siad Barre. Although it was organized along KGB lines and reportedly employed Soviet advisers until the break between the two countries, lasting Soviet influence appeared to be of a

technical—not ideological—nature. After 1977 the NSS was perceived by outside observers as being less pro-Soviet than other branches of the security apparatus, including the army.

Among the organizations engaged in protecting key government officials was the 5,000-man army unit that provided presidential security. Many of its members were from the Marehan clan and they were stationed at the Mogadishu army headquarters, where the president lived much of the time. The commander of the unit was reported in 1980 to have been Colonel Mohamed Siad Morgan, another son-in-law of the president.

A number of other organizations—staffed largely by members of the Marehan clan, operated by trusted relatives, and ultimately controlled by the president—engaged in gathering intelligence. According to a report published by opponents of the government, in 1980 military intelligence, formerly headed by Suleiman Abdulle, was under the supervision of Colonel Mohamed Samantar, a cousin of Siad Barre. The same report stated that the president's elder wife, Khadiija Maalim, headed the section of the NSS concerned with counterespionage. Trusted Marehans were placed throughout the government in the late 1970s; this "old boy" network filtered information directly to Siad Barre.

The Prison System

The government's extensive use of imprisonment to punish criminals and politically threatening persons has strained the physical resources of a penal system that had been inadequate even earlier. The few prisons that existed before 1960 had been established during the British and Italian colonial administrations. By the time of independence these facilities had deteriorated and were inadequately staffed.

Aware of the deficiencies of its prisons, the government at independence included in the constitution an article asserting the premise that criminal punishment must not be an obstacle to moral reeducation of those convicted. This article implied a complex form of prison organization and a strong emphasis on prisoner rehabilitation.

In 1962 the Somali Penal Code laid down the underlying principles for reorganizing the prison system. The code required that prisoners of all ages work during prison confinement. In return for labor on prison farms, construction projects, and roadbuilding, prisoners were paid a modest sum, which they could spend in prison canteens or retain until their release. The Siad Barre government retained compulsory labor as part of most prison sentences because of its concern with the rehabilitation of prisoners. It apparently held the same view as the earlier parliamentary government: that labor contributes to rehabilitation by guarding against idleness and promoting socially constructive activity for inmates.

According to the 1962 penal code, juvenile offenders were not to be imprisoned with adult offenders. In practice during the 1960s they were usually segregated in special juvenile sections of the Mogadishu and Mandheera central prisons.

By the time of the 1969 coup the system included forty-nine facilities, the best equipped of which was Mogadishu's central prison. Four large, modern, well-equipped prisons were known to have been constructed with East German assistance during the 1970s. Since 1969 the prison system has been characterized by severe overcrowding; as a result schools, military and police headquarters, and even part of the presidential palace have been used as makeshift jails. The size of the country's prison population was unknown in 1981 but was estimated to number several thousand. Overcrowding was apparently relieved only by periodic amnesties granted by the government.

Amnesty International and the United States Department of State have reported that there was no evidence to indicate that prisoners were physically ill-treated by prison guards, who were from the Somali Police Force Custodial Corps. An unknown number of prisoners have been kept in solitary confinement, however, often in small, continuously lit cells without access to reading materials or fresh air.

* * *

There are no definitive studies describing the full scope of national security affairs in contemporary Somalia, but several works provide significant elements of the overall theme. A useful introduction to the military's role in the society can be found in the concluding chapters of I.M. Lewis' *A Modern History of Somalia* and in several of his articles published after the advent of military government. David Laitin also has written informative articles about the Siad Barre government that touch upon national security policy, the military, and the security services. The dispute with Ethiopia is well covered in *Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa* by Bereket H. Selassie and in Tom J. Farer's *War Clouds on the Horn of Africa.* Both books provide brief overviews on the Somali armed forces and the internal security system. Useful information on the historical development of Somali security forces can be found in the 1970 and 1977 editions of the *Area Handbook for Somalia.*

Readers who wish to do further research on Somali national security matters using publicly available sources will find useful the International Institute for Strategic Studies' annual, *The Military Balance*; *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents*, edited by noted British Africanist Colin Legum; the periodical *Horn of Africa*; and the monthly *Africa Research Bulletin.* Translations of relevant foreign publications and radiobroad-

casts regarding Somali national security can be found in the *Sub-Saharan Africa Report* series published by the Joint Publications Research Service, and Foreign Broadcast Information Service's *Daily Report, Middle East and Africa.* (For further information see Bibliography.)

Appendix

Table 1. Conversion Coefficients and Factors

When you know	Multiply by	To find
Millimeters	0.04	inches
Centimeters	0.39	inches
Meters	3.3	feet
Kilometers	0.62	miles
Hectares (10,000 m^2)	2.47	acres
Square kilometers	0.39	square miles
Cubic meters	35.3	cubic feet
Liters	0.26	gallons
Kilograms	2.2	pounds
Metric tons	0.98	long tons
.....	1.1	short tons
.....	2,204	pounds
Degrees Celsius (Centigrade)	9, divide by 5, and add 32	degrees Fahrenheit

Table 2. Population by Category and Region, 1975
(in thousands)

Region	Total		Nomadic		Settled Farming		Nonagricultural	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage[1]	Number	Percentage[1]	Number	Percentage[1]
Woqooyi Galbeed	440	11.8	271	7.3 (62)	118	3.2 (27)	51	1.4 (12)
Togdheer	258	6.9	198	5.3 (77)	42	1.1 (16)	18	0.5 (7)
Sanaag	145	3.9	113	3.0 (78)	22	0.6 (15)	10	0.3 (7)
Bari	154	4.2	116	3.1 (75)	27	0.7 (18)	11	0.3 (7)
Nugaal	87	2.3	66	1.8 (76)	15	0.4 (17)	6	0.1 (7)
Mudug	215	5.8	170	4.6 (79)	32	0.8 (15)	13	0.3 (6)
Galguduud	182	4.9	119	3.2 (65)	44	1.2 (24)	19	0.5 (10)
Hirraan	147	3.9	116	3.1 (79)	22	0.6 (15)	9	0.2 (6)
Shabeellaha Dhexe	263	7.1	166	4.5 (63)	68	1.8 (26)	29	0.8 (11)
Shabeellaha Hoose	398	10.7	193	5.2 (48)	143	3.9 (36)	62	1.7 (16)
Banaadir	380	10.2	—	—	—	—	380	10.2 (100)
Gedo	212	5.7	181	4.8 (85)	22	0.6 (10)	9	0.3 (4)
Jubbada Dhexe	216	5.8	141	3.8 (65)	52	1.4 (24)	23	0.6 (11)
Jubbada Hoose	223	6.0	155	4.2 (70)	48	1.3 (22)	20	0.5 (9)
Bakool	100	2.7	79	2.1 (79)	15	0.4 (15)	6	0.2 (6)
Bay	302	8.1	100	2.7 (33)	141	3.8 (47)	61	1.6 (20)
Total[2]	3,722	100.0	2,184	58.7	811	21.8	727	19.5

[1] Percentage in parenthesis is proportion of each category in each region.

[2] If nomads were undercounted by 700,000, then total is 4,422,000; nomads are 2,884,000; and nomadic population is 65.2 percent; settled farming, 18.3 percent; and nonagricultural, 16.4 percent.

Source: Based on information from Somalia, State Planning Commission, *Three Year Plan, 1979–1981*, Mogadishu, 1979, Table 19–1.

Table 3. Primary and Secondary Education, 1968–69 to 1978–79

Year[1]	Classes	Enrollment		Teachers	
		Total	Female	Total	Female
Primary					
1968–69	1,052	35,306	7,937	1,186	119
1969–70	1,427	48,609	9,576	1,542	82
1970–71	1,510	50,384	12,091	1,654	204
1971–72	1,767	59,846	14,547	1,946	253
1972–73	2,085	78,133	20,075	2,454	263
1973–74	2,544	96,903	27,399	2,842	287
1975–76	5,148	219,517	75,526	4,281	627
1976–77	5,640	229,030	81,119	6,540	1,263
1977–78	5,994	230,189	83,876	8,496	2,149
1978–79	6,856	263,751	95,200	8,141	2,070
Secondary					
1968–69	97	3,133	358	201	34
1969–70	196	6,412	737	334	5
1970–71	203	7,088	1,131	349	38
1971–72	231	8,153	1,267	453	69
1972–73	262	9,457	1,452	579	68
1973–74	316	10,500	1,773	640	76
1975–76	227	7,046	1,062	572	68
1976–77	356	13,666	3,128	988	109
1977–78	363	14,178	3,523	916	92
1978–79	474	18,416	4,373	1,201	87
Total					
1968–69	1,149	38,439	8,295	1,387	153
1969–70	1,623	55,021	10,313	1,876	87
1970–71	1,713	57,472	13,222	2,003	242
1971–72	1,998	67,999	15,814	2,399	322
1972–73	2,347	87,590	21,527	3,033	331
1973–74	2,860	107,403	29,172	3,482	363
1975–76	5,375	226,563	76,588	4,853	695
1976–77	5,996	242,696	84,247	7,528	1,372
1977–78	6,357	244,367	87,399	9,412	2,241
1978–79	7,330	282,167	99,573	9,342	2,157

[1] Statistics for 1974–75 are not available in official sources.

Table 4. Medical Personnel and Facilities, 1977

Region	Doctors	Medical Assistants	Dispensaries	Hospitals	Hospital Beds
Bakool	4	2	8	3	173
Banaadir	111	297	13	4	2,560
Bari	2	19	8	6	99
Bay	7	31	17	3	175
Galguduud	1	18	11	4	61
Gedo	2	21	13	5	81
Hiiraan	10	35	14	5	282
Jubbada Dhexe	3	51	7	2	280
Jubbada Hoose	15	20	24	5	290
Mudug	10	7	11	4	90
Nugaal	1	14	7	4	122
Sanaag	1	22	8	3	115
Shabeellaha Dhexe	2	54	16	4	131
Shabeellaha Hoose	10	18	25	5	170
Togdheer	3	27	10	2	275
Woqooyi Galbeed	16	117	17	7	1,052
Total	198	753	209	66	5,956

Source: Based on information from Somalia, State Planning Commission, *Three Year Plan 1979–1981*, Mogadishu, 1979, Table 19–10.

Table 5. Number of People Served by Medical Personnel and Facilities, 1977
(in thousands)

Region	Per Doctor	Per Medical Assistant	Per Dispensary	Per Hospital	Per Hospital Bed
Bakool	25	50	12	33	0.6
Banaadir	3	1	28	92	0.1
Bari	77	8	19	26	0.8
Bay	43	10	18	101	1.7
Galguduud	182	10	17	26	3.6
Gedo	106	10	16	43	2.6
Hiiraan	15	4	10	29	0.6
Jubbada Dhexe	72	4	32	108	0.8
Jubbada Hoose	15	11	9	45	0.8
Mudug	22	31	20	54	2.4
Nugaal	87	5	12	22	2.0
Sanaag	145	7	18	48	1.3
Shabeellaha Dhexe	132	5	16	45	2.0
Shabeellaha Hoose	40	22	16	79	2.3
Togdheer	86	10	26	129	0.9
Woqooyi Galbeed	28	4	26	63	0.4
COUNTRYWIDE	18	5	17	53	0.6

Source: Based on information from Somalia, State Planning Commission, *Three Year Plan 1979–1981*, Mogadishu, 1979, Table 19–11.

*Table 6. Somalia's External Public Debt, Including Undisbursed, by Credit Source, as of December 31, 1979**
(in thousands of United States dollars)

Credit Source	Disbursed	Undisbursed	Total
Bilateral Loans			
Arab Countries			
Abu Dhabi	67,048	39,999	107,047
Algeria	1,000	—	1,000
Iraq	14,535	1,964	16,499
Kuwait	27,139	17,531	44,670
Libya	3,000	—	3,000
Qatar	10,000	—	10,000
Saudi Arabia	81,867	45,912	127,779
Subtotal	204,589	105,406	309,995
Eastern Europe			
Bulgaria	4,876	—	4,876
East Germany	1,095	—	1,095
Soviet Union	109,974	—	109,974
Subtotal	115,945	—	115,945
China	87,177	74,389	161,566
United States	12,691	17,700	30,391
Total	420,402	197,495	617,897
Multilateral Loans			
African Development Bank	2,938	—	2,938
African Development Fund	7,061	28,700	35,761
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development	34,688	25,338	60,026
International Development Association	62,502	67,531	130,033
Islamic Development Bank	7,658	30,968	38,626
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries Special Account	7,300	2,660	9,960
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Special Fund	2,050	7,700	9,750
Total	124,197	162,897	287,094
Nationalization Compensation			
Italy	1,106	—	1,106
Total	1,106	—	1,106
TOTAL	545,705	306,392	906,097

— means none.

* Debts of more than one year (original or extended) maturity, repayable in foreign currency and/or merchandise.

Table 7. Estimated Gross Domestic Product by Industrial Origin at Current Prices, Selected Years, 1970–78
(in millions of Somali shillings)*

	1970	1972	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry, and Fishing	1,190.2	1,589.2	1,125.9	2,509.6	2,777.0	3,294.2	3,917.2
Agriculture	269.1	359.3	322.6	405.0	429.2	520.3	561.4
Foods crops	(205.6)	(287.4)	(253.6)	(309.4)	(382.8)	(418.6)	(463.1)
Industrial crops	(63.5)	(71.9)	(69.0)	(95.6)	(96.9)	(101.7)	(98.3)
Livestock	758.0	1,052.7	600.5	1,881.6	2,081.3	2,480.2	3,052.0
Forestry	158.0	171.0	190.0	205.0	225.0	253.0	287.0
Fishing	5.1	6.2	12.8	18.0	41.5	40.7	16.8
Mining and Quarrying	23.0	26.0	30.0	35.0	36.0	40.0	28.0
Manufacturing	186.2	214.0	199.7	226.2	334.6	439.0	433.2
Of which small establishments	(80.1)	(87.0)	(83.0)	(88.0)	(125.0)	(158.0)	(165.0)
Electricity and Water	4.9	10.1	16.9	20.0	31.7	32.9	39.0
Construction	105.0	128.0	257.0	204.0	219.0	302.0	206.0
Transport and Communications	95.2	138.6	168.6	210.1	258.2	316.5	365.3
Trade, Hotels, and Restaurants	110.6	137.7	175.9	240.0	285.0	340.0	378.6
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate	90.5	102.3	160.3	228.2	260.0	311.5	450.2
Government Services	147.5	172.0	248.6	268.0	308.0	368.8	608.0
Other Services	51.6	63.0	85.6	107.5	129.0	148.6	169.6
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT FACTOR COST	2,004.7	2,580.9	2,468.5	4,048.6	4,646.6	5,593.5	6,494.5
Indirect taxes, net of subsidies	253.5	329.4	474.9	522.8	536.2	678.6	1,010.1
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT MARKET PRICES	2,258.2	2,910.3	2,943.4	4,511.4	5,182.8	6,272.1	7,504.6

* For value of the Somali shilling—see Glossary.

Source: Based on information from Somalia, Ministry of National Planning, *Somalia: Country Programme for the 1980s for Presentation to the United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries*, Mogadishu, January 1981, p. 16.

Table 8. Estimated Gross Domestic Product by Industrial Origin in Constant 1970 Prices, Selected Years, 1970–78[1]

(in millions of Somali shillings[2])

	1970	1972	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry, and Fishing	1,190.2	1,243.3	768.3	1,330.4	1,338.0	1,411.2	1,431.9
Agriculture	269.1	294.3	191.2	233.8	241.1	241.3	246.9
Foods crops	(205.6)	(236.1)	(146.6)	(176.0)	(189.3)	(189.6)	(197.9)
Industrial crops	(63.5)	(58.2)	(44.6)	(57.8)	(51.8)	(51.7)	(49.9)
Livestock	758.0	776.3	387.7	897.4	879.1	947.4	970.0
Forestry	158.0	167.0	180.0	188.0	197.0	205.0	215.0
Fishing	5.1	5.7	9.4	11.2	20.8	17.5	6.2
Mining and Manufacturing	209.2	225.8	167.1	179.9	165.2	183.9	155.6
Electricity and Water	4.9	9.5	12.3	13.8	21.6	22.2	26.6
Construction	105.0	105.7	104.9	88.4	80.6	114.1	70.0
Transport and Communications	95.2	133.3	72.8	105.2	111.6	109.8	143.9
Trade, Hotels, and Restaurants	110.6	142.8	144.8	165.5	172.3	185.0	185.0
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate	90.5	106.1	132.0	157.3	162.0	170.3	219.9
Government Services	147.5	178.3	204.7	184.8	186.2	201.7	297.0
Other Services	51.6	65.3	70.5	74.1	78.0	81.3	92.9
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT FACTOR COST	2,004.7	2,210.1	1,677.4	2,299.4	2,315.5	2,479.5	2,629.0
Indirect taxes, net of subsidies	253.5	341.6	391.0	360.5	324.1	371.1	493.5
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT MARKET PRICES	2,258.2	2,551.7	2,068.4	2,659.9	2,639.6	2,850.6	3,122.5

[1] For agriculture, livestock, forestry, and fishing, value added has been calculated on the basis of the value of gross output in constant 1970 prices. For other industry sectors the following deflators were used: mining and manufacturing—the import price index of industrial inputs; electricity—the price index of electricity; construction—the import price index of building materials; transport—the import price index of petroleum products, excluding kerosine; finance, insurance, real estate, government services, and other services—the consumer price index for Mogadishu.

[2] For value of the Somali shilling—see Glossary.

Source: Based on information from Somalia, Ministry of National Planning, *Somalia: Country Programme for the 1980s for Presentation to the United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries*, Mogadishu, January 1981, p. 17.

Table 9. Production of Principal Crops, Selected Years, 1970–78
(in thousands of tons)

	1970	1972	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Staple Foods							
Sorghum	158.1	149.1	125.7	134.7	139.9	145.1	141.1
Maize	122.1	114.9	96.8	103.6	107.6	111.3	107.7
Rice	2.9	3.5	4.1	4.9	5.4	8.4	12.1
Beans	10.9	10.3	8.8	9.4	9.8	10.2	10.1
Industrial Crops							
Sesame	43.4	41.0	34.7	37.3	38.8	40.6	40.0
Groundnuts	3.0	2.9	2.4	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.8
Cotton	3.6	3.3	2.8	3.0	3.1	3.3	3.2
Sugarcane	450.4	401.0	382.6	370.0	333.3	320.0	311.5
Export Crops							
Bananas	145.5	188.5	157.5	106.0	96.6	65.2	69.7
Other							
Vegetables	28.8	27.2	23.0	24.7	25.7	26.9	26.5

Table 10. Production of Principal Manufacturing Industries, 1975–79

Product	Unit of Measure	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Sugar	thousand tons	30.60	33.20	30.00	24.00	21.12
Canned meat	million tins	14.43	10.90	6.63	—	1.50
Canned fish	thousand tons	2.22	1.84	2.33	---	---
Milk	million liters	2.16	3.67	3.84	3.31	2.71
Pasta and wheat flour	thousand tons	—	7.85	8.42	8.11	5.78
Pasta	-do-	—	(4.62)	(7.23)	(7.74)	(5.73)
Wheat flour	-do-	—	(3.23)	(1.19)	(0.37)	(0.05)
Canned fruits and vegetables	-do-	0.94	1.45	1.17	0.87	0.97
Textiles	million yards	5.50	7.30	12.92	13.80	9.93
Packaging materials	thousand tons	5.20	6.77	5.04	4.75	5.20
Cardboard boxes	-do-	(4.80)	(6.40)	(4.76)	(4.50)	(4.90)
Plastic bags	-do-	(0.40)	(0.37)	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.30)
Cigarettes	-do-	0.25	0.29	0.29	0.24	0.26
Matches	-do-	0.10	0.07	0.07	0.03	0.09
Petroleum products	-do-	—	—	—	—	223.26

— means none.
--- negligible.

Source: Based on information from Central Bank of Somalia, *Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1979: 19th Financial Year, 1 January–31 December 1979*, Mogadishu, pp. 12, 19.

Table 11. Live Animal Exports, 1970–78
(number in thousands; unit value in Somali shillings; value in millions of Somali shillings)*

Year	Sheep			Goats			Cattle		
	Number	Unit Value	Value	Number	Unit Value	Value	Number	Unit Value	Value
1970	546	78.8	43.0	605	69.3	41.9	45	344.4	15.5
1971	608	77.0	46.8	576	71.9	41.4	56	330.4	18.5
1972	789	79.8	62.9	828	73.1	60.5	77	289.6	22.3
1973	684	106.3	72.7	639	102.7	65.6	70	501.4	35.1
1974	655	141.2	92.5	556	140.5	78.1	27	800.0	21.6
1975	773	199.5	154.2	754	194.7	146.8	39	859.0	33.5
1976	374	216.3	80.9	374	211.2	79.0	76	946.1	71.9
1977	461	207.2	95.5	442	212.9	94.1	54	772.2	41.7
1978	738	264.1	192.3	723	352.7	255.0	74	1,363.5	100.9

Year	Camels			Total Number	Total Value
	Number	Unit Value	Value		
1970	26	730.8	19.0	1,222	119.3
1971	24	691.7	16.6	1,264	123.4
1972	21	700.0	14.7	1,715	160.5
1973	28	832.1	23.3	1,421	196.7
1974	24	1,258.3	30.2	1,262	222.4
1975	33	1,436.4	47.4	1,599	382.0
1976	37	1,335.1	49.4	861	281.2
1977	35	1,377.1	48.2	992	279.5
1978	21	1,928.6	40.5	1,546	588.7

* For value of the Somali shilling—see Glossary.

Table 12. Principal Exports, 1975–79[1]

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
In Millions of Somali Shillings[2]					
Bananas	80.9	88.2	53.1	59.0	73.2
Live animals	364.4	301.9	299.5	570.4	474.1
Meat and meat products	59.3	37.1	32.1	0.7	7.3
Hides and skins	20.7	44.4	23.6	29.7	56.4
Fish and fish products	17.4	23.3	21.2	4.3	2.7
Myrrh	14.4	11.3	11.7	14.8	21.0
Other	6.3	4.1	7.8	10.2	32.7
TOTAL	563.4	510.3	449.0	689.1	667.4
Percentage of Total					
Bananas	14.4	17.3	11.8	8.6	11.0
Live animals	64.7	59.2	66.7	82.8	71.0
Meat and meat products	10.5	7.3	7.1	0.1	1.1
Hides and skins	3.7	8.7	5.3	4.3	8.5
Fish and fish products	3.1	4.6	4.7	0.6	0.4
Myrrh	2.6	2.2	2.7	2.1	3.1
Other	1.1	0.8	1.7	1.5	4.9
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

[1] Values according to export receipts.

[2] For value of the Somali shilling—see Glossary.

Table 13. Principal Destinations of Exports, 1973–78

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
In Millions of Somali Shillings[1]						
Arab States						
Saudi Arabia	194.1	221.5	360.4	282.1	263.8	575.1
Yemen (Aden)[2]	26.1	12.1	12.4	2.9	2.4	1.9
Kuwait	11.0	18.2	21.2	4.6	1.1	1.3
Other	8.1	12.9	27.1	25.0	20.1	25.2
Subtotal	239.3	264.7	421.1	314.6	287.4	603.5
Other Countries						
Italy	56.2	39.9	41.0	105.9	57.8	53.5
Iran	5.9	25.4	26.0	6.1	1.1	—
Soviet Union	9.3	21.2	30.7	41.6	13.9	0.1
China	11.0	15.1	15.8	15.0	2.3	6.0
Other	18.7	24.3	39.5	21.8	34.0	7.9
Subtotal	101.1	125.9	153.0	190.4	109.1	67.5
TOTAL	340.4	390.6	574.1	505.0	396.5	671.0
Percentage of Total						
Arab States						
Saudi Arabia	57.0	56.7	62.8	55.9	66.5	85.7
Yemen (Aden)[2]	7.7	3.1	2.2	0.6	0.6	0.3
Kuwait	3.2	4.7	3.7	0.9	0.3	0.2
Other	2.4	3.3	4.7	4.9	5.1	3.7
Subtotal	70.3	67.8	73.4	62.3	72.5	89.9
Other Countries						
Italy	16.5	10.2	7.1	21.0	14.6	8.0
Iran	1.8	6.5	4.5	1.2	0.3	—
Soviet Union	2.7	5.4	5.3	8.2	3.5	—
China	3.2	3.9	2.8	3.0	0.6	0.9
Other	5.5	6.2	6.9	4.3	8.5	1.2
Subtotal	29.7	32.2	26.6	37.7	27.5	10.1
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

— means none.

[1] For value of the Somali shilling—see Glossary.

[2] People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

Table 14. Imports by Major Use Categories, 1973–78[1]
(in millions of Somali shillings)[2]

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Consumer Goods						
Food	134.0	175.7	235.0	221.2	305.6	250.5
Cereals and cereal products	(57.5)	(71.5)	(161.0)	(134.1)	(191.4)	(31.1)
Fruits and vegetables	(12.3)	(13.2)	(18.8)	(5.0)	(6.3)	(7.9)
Sugar and sugar products	(42.3)	(61.5)	(4.4)	(1.4)	(1.6)	(78.4)
Dairy products	(1.2)	(1.5)	(7.4)	(12.5)	(23.9)	(66.3)
Coffee, tea, and cocoa	(11.0)	(13.9)	(12.3)	(22.4)	(20.7)	(32.4)
Oilseeds	(0.1)	—	(0.1)	(1.5)	(5.2)	—
Animal and vegetable oils	(7.9)	(12.8)	(29.5)	(41.4)	(51.4)	(32.0)
Other food	(1.7)	(1.3)	(1.5)	(2.9)	(5.1)	(2.4)
Beverages and tobacco	19.8	7.3	18.4	22.9	19.9	64.2
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products	37.2	24.2	25.3	27.9	47.5	20.0
Personal and household toiletries	9.1	6.5	1.2	1.0	2.0	4.4
Textile articles, fabrics, and yarns	56.5	95.2	29.4	33.9	52.0	68.2
Clothing and footwear	21.5	20.2	7.8	11.4	24.7	54.3
Other manufactured goods	22.6	23.8	31.9	43.1	35.4	127.1
Subtotal	300.7	352.9	349.0	361.4	487.1	588.7
Mineral Fuels						
Petroleum and petroleum products	28.6	60.1	59.4	66.5	61.4	100.5
Other	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.5	1.1	0.3
Subtotal	28.8	60.3	60.0	67.0	62.5	100.8

Table 14. Continued)
(in millions of Somali shillings)[2]

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Intermediate Goods						
Fertilizers (manufactured)	5.4	3.1	5.9	0.1	3.9	—
Other chemicals	25.6	33.7	27.6	38.0	9.1	49.6
Rubber products	8.6	16.0	15.9	22.5	43.4	21.4
Paper and paper products	36.4	49.2	45.5	27.1	51.7	16.2
Wood, lumber, cork, and products	10.8	24.5	13.5	17.3	20.5	9.9
Cement and building materials	10.3	29.9	46.1	34.9	55.5	42.1
Iron and steel	18.3	68.2	22.9	29.1	53.3	26.3
Metal and mineral manufactures	30.1	36.9	37.0	42.8	43.1	121.1
Other	20.1	27.4	39.2	57.5	78.5	61.1
Subtotal	165.6	288.9	253.6	269.3	359.0	347.7
Capital Goods						
Nonelectrical machinery	69.6	88.1	152.1	93.9	196.7	112.7
Electrical machinery	26.3	37.8	36.2	31.9	118.5	59.8
Transportation equipment	84.5	67.9	120.4	150.2	195.0	298.3
Subtotal	180.4	193.8	308.7	276.0	510.2	470.8
Other	1.9	2.5	2.4	4.3	14.0	10.9
TOTAL	677.4	898.4	973.7	978.0	1,432.8	1,518.9

— means negligible

[1] On cost, insurance, and freight basis. Imports through the *franco valuta* market not included.

[2] For value of the Somali shilling—see Glossary.

Table 15. Merchandise Imports by Area and Principal Countries of Origin, 1973–78[1]
(in millions of Somali shillings)[2]

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Western Europe						
Italy	212.0	249.1	311.5	251.7	406.1	459.2
West Germany	35.4	29.9	60.0	67.7	74.1	159.7
Britain	32.5	31.7	52.8	55.7	132.2	146.7
France	28.1	33.2	15.7	13.9	18.2	10.2
Other	25.7	39.6	58.7	86.7	57.3	111.3
Subtotal	333.7	383.5	498.7	475.7	687.9	887.1
Eastern Europe						
Soviet Union	63.5	112.7	74.8	119.6	174.7	9.2
Other	9.8	14.7	8.2	20.3	39.5	5.4
Subtotal	73.3	127.4	83.0	139.9	214.2	14.6
Africa						
Kenya	26.7	43.2	56.0	71.7	41.8	70.3
Ethiopia	12.8	11.9	13.1	24.5	36.1	30.2
Other	9.5	47.7	30.8	16.1	20.7	86.5
Subtotal	49.0	102.8	99.9	112.3	98.6	187.0
Asia						
China	126.3	56.6	60.4	71.6	93.5	51.0
Thailand	—	33.2	71.5	40.4	66.7	—
Japan	24.8	32.8	5.8	11.2	13.0	39.1
Hong Kong	3.3	5.2	5.5	2.5	34.5	14.3
Other	21.2	82.2	52.6	47.3	92.2	101.9
Subtotal	175.6	210.0	195.8	173.0	299.9	206.3
Middle East						
Saudi Arabia	5.8	13.6	8.5	13.3	14.3	58.3
Yemen (Aden)[3]	13.2	15.8	8.3	6.0	9.4	8.6
Other	7.8	23.3	45.8	12.0	71.2	74.6
Subtotal	26.8	52.7	62.6	31.3	94.9	141.5
Western Hemisphere						
United States	16.5	19.9	23.5	42.8	11.6	38.7
Other	1.9	0.6	9.4	1.6	19.7	42.6
Subtotal	18.4	20.5	32.9	44.4	31.3	81.3
Other	0.6	1.5	0.8	1.4	6.0	1.1
TOTAL	677.4	898.4	973.7	978.0	1,432.8	1,518.9

— means none or negligible.

[1] On cost, insurance, and freight basis. Imports through the *franco valuta* market not included.

[2] For value of the Somali shilling—see Glossary.

[3] People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

Table 16. Balance of Payments, 1974–79
(in millions of Somali shillings)[1]

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979[2]
Goods and Services (net)	–650	–643	–693	–885	–1,072	–1,887
Trade balance	–564	–463	–598	–847	–1,043	–1,814
Exports, f.o.b.[3]	(403)	(558)	(510)	(449)	(689)	(667)
Imports, c.i.f.[4]	(–967)	(–1,021)	(–1,108)	(–1,296)	(–1,732)	(–2,481)
Services (net)	–86	–180	–95	–39	–30	–73
Transportation and insurance	(–12)	(–18)	(–20)	(–7)	(–4)	(12)
Travel	(–14)	(–32)	(–40)	(–15)	(20)	(–86)
Investment income	(12)	(2)	(8)	(13)	(22)	(15)
Government, n.i.e[5]	(–54)	(–11)	(52)	(3)	(5)	(29)
Other services	(–18)	(–121)	(–95)	(–33)	(–73)	(–43)
Unrequited transfers (net)	326	643	257	680	666	592
Private	23	12	7	14	491[6]	226[6]
Official	303	631	250	666	175	366
Current Account Balance	–324	—	–436	–205	–406	–1295
Capital Account (net)	203	194	539	342	413	640
Private	9	59	22	97	2	24
Central Government	255	269	424	355	494	527
Commercial Bank	–61	–134	93	–110	–83	89
Errors and omissions	–5	–6	—	41	45	123
Basic Balance	–126	188	103	178	52	–532
Monetary movements (net)[7]	126	–188	–103	–178	–52	532
IMF[8]	–1	–4	2	31	–1	–44
Bilateral Payment Agreement	47	–10	–19	46	–8	26
Assets	(22)	(3)	(–10)	(31)	—	(4)
Liabilities	(25)	(–13)	(–9)	(15)	(–8)	(22)
Other assets and liabilities (net)	80	–173	–89	–253	–43	550

Note: Export and import totals and official capital inflows believed underreported.
Table totals may not add because of rounding.

— means none.
[1] For value of Somali shilling—see Glossary.
[2] Provisional.
[3] Free on board.
[4] Cost, insurance, and freight.
[5] Not included elsewhere.
[6] Includes value of *franco valuta* imports.
[7] Net monetary movement totals: increase –, decrease +.
[8] International Monetary Fund.

Source: Based on information from Central Bank of Somalia, *Annual Report and Statement of Accounts 1979: 19th Financial Year, 1 January–31 December 1979*, Mogadishu, p. 66.

Table 17. Central Government Revenue, 1975–79
(in millions of Somali shillings)[1]

	1975	1976	1977	1978[2]	1979[3]
Tax Revenue	491.3	529.1	647.2	1154.6	1380.0
Taxes on net income and profits	45.2	54.0	59.1	74.4	65.0
Taxes on earned income	(40.8)	(47.4)	(55.8)	(68.0)	(60.0)
Ordinary tax on income	(17.8)	(21.3)	(25.3)	(32.1)	(30.0)
Extraordinary tax (development levy)	(23.0)	(26.1)	(3.05)	(35.9)	(30.0)
Other income taxes	(4.4)	(6.6)	(3.3)	(6.4)	(5.0)
Taxes on property	10.5	12.3	16.0	45.0	40.0
Registration tax	(10.5)	(12.3)	(16.0)	(45.0)	(40.0)
Taxes on goods and services	148.1	164.8	179.6	227.2	390.0
Excise tax on sugar and spirits	(93.2)	(100.0)	(78.2)	(98.5)	(210.0)
Fiscal monopolies (tobacco and matches)	(49.6)	(60.0)	(96.3)	(118.6)	(170.0)
Motor vehicle taxes	(1.3)	(1.3)	(1.3)	(2.8)	(4.0)
Other	(4.0)	(3.5)	(3.8)	(7.3)	(6.0)
Taxes on international trade and transactions	246.7	354.2	341.5	704.5	765.0
Import duties	(230.7)	(241.0)	(329.4)	(687.1)	(750.0)
Customs duties	(177.9)	(189.7)	(255.0)	(572.8)	(550.0)
Administrative and statistical tax	(52.8)	(51.3)	(74.4)	(114.3)	(200.0)
Export duties	(16.0)	(13.2)	(12.1)	(17.4)	(15.0)
Stamp taxes	40.8	43.8	51.0	103.3	120.0
Nontax Revenue	137.1	141.6	190.2	239.6	316.3
Operating surplus of departmental enterprises[4]	—	14.8	—	0.3	—
Property income	106.0	102.1	153.0	182.3	308.0
From public enterprises	(101.3)	(99.8)	(141.8)	(179.6)	(302.1)
Turnover tax[5]	(53.4)	(47.3.)	(61.4)	(108.0)	(132.8)
Share of profits	(43.3)	(51.3)	(72.7)	(66.3)	(141.0)
Share of depreciation[6]	(4.6)	(1.2)	(7.7)	(5.4)	(28.3)
Other	(4.7)	(2.3)	(11.2)	(2.7)	(5.9)
Administrative fees and charges	23.2	16.2	25.4	24.5	5.3
Fines and forfeits	1.7	3.0	2.9	3.6	1.0
Other	6.2	5.5	14.9	28.9	2.0
TOTAL REVENUE	628.4	670.7	843.4	1394.2	1696.3

— means none.
[1] For value of the Somali shilling—see Glossary.
[2] Preliminary.
[3] Budget.
[4] Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.
[5] Levies on certain profitmaking state-owned corporations.

Table 18. Central Government Ordinary Expenditures, 1975–79
(in millions of Somali shillings)[1]

	1975	1976	1977	1978[2]	1979[3]
General Public Services					
Presidency[4]	19.9	20.1	21.6	43.0	44.8
Justice and religious affairs	25.0	26.7	30.6	44.5	49.1
Interior and police[4]	57.9	60.7	69.3	128.5	130.8
Foreign affairs	23.3	27.6	40.3	45.6	50.0
Finance[5]	66.3	70.8	87.8	209.6	199.7
Planning[6]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3.8	3.2
Subtotal	192.4	205.9	249.6	475.0	477.6
Defense	145.2	165.4	199.7	502.1	592.3
Social Services					
Education	56.7	77.7	97.0	115.1	135.4
Higher education	13.6	19.1	23.8	31.9	36.7
Health	41.3	45.6	57.8	63.9	70.3
Information	12.8	14.3	16.1	9.1	21.5
Labor[7]	2.8	3.6	2.6	6.5	4.2
Sports[7]	n.a.	n.a.	1.3	—	4.3
Subtotal	127.2	160.3	198.6	226.5	272.4
Economic Services					
Agriculture	24.6	29.4	27.3	26.2	30.9
Livestock	15.2	17.0	19.8	20.0	22.0
Fisheries	2.2	4.0	0.5	3.0	4.7
Mineral and water resources	0.6	9.2	6.6	7.0	17.4
Industry	2.2	3.9	0.8	1.3	1.2
Commerce	2.7	3.1	3.3	3.3	5.6
Public works	17.6	21.0	24.2	23.1	21.5
Transportation	28.3	30.1	34.4	40.0	46.9
Posts and telecommunications[8]	—	—	1.4	21.4	3.3
Tourism	1.1	—	—	—	1.7
Marine transport[9]	n.a.	n.a.	3.4	4.1	2.9
Subtotal	101.4	117.7	121.7	149.4	158.0
TOTAL	566.2	649.3	769.6	1,353.0	1,500.3

— means none.
n.a.—not applicable.
[1] For value of the Somali shilling—see Glossary.
[2] Preliminary.
[3] Budget.
[4] In 1977 became Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development; at the time the police were placed under the president's office.
[5] Mainly subsidies and contingencies.
[6] Through 1977 under the Presidency.
[7] Until 1977 combined in the Ministry of Labor and Sports.
[8] Expenditure covering operating deficit.
[9] Until 1977 part of Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Transport.

Table 19. National Executive and Council of Ministers, September 1981

Office	Incumbent
President	Mohamed Siad Barre, Major General
1st Vice-President	Mohamed Ali Samantar, Lieutenant General
2d Vice-President	Hussein Kulmie Afrah, Major General
3d Vice-President	Ismail Ali Abokar, Brigadier General
Presidential Adviser on Security Affairs	Ahmed Suleiman Abdulle, Brigadier General
Minister of	
Agriculture (Acting)	Mohamed Abdi Nur
Commerce	Ahmed Mohamed Mohamud
Culture and Higher Education	Ahmed Ashkir Botan
Defense (Acting)	Omar Haji Mohamed, Major General
Education	Adan Mohamed Ali
Finance	Abdullahi Ahmed Addu
Fisheries	Osman Jama Ali
Foreign Affairs	Abdurahman Jama Barre
Health (Acting)	Mohamed Farah Issa
Industry	Ali Khalif Gulaid
Information and National Guidance	Mohamed Aden Sheikh
Justice and Religious Affairs	Ahmed Shire Mohamud
Labor and Social Affairs	Mohamed Burale Ismail
Livestock, Forestry, and Range	Mohamed Ali Nur
Local Government and Rural Development	Jama Mohamed Ghalib, Major General
Mineral and Water Development	Hussein Abdulkadir Kassim
National Planning	Ahmed Habib Ahmed
Ports and Sea Transport (Acting)	Jama Gass Ma'awiye
Posts and Telecommunications	Mohamed Hawadle Madar
Public Works	Mohamud Nur Galal, Brigadier General
Sports and Youth	Mire Aware Jama, Colonel
Tourism and National Parks (Acting)	Abdirahman Mohamed Araleh
Transport (Land and Air)	(VACANT)
Minister in President's Office Responsible for Political Affairs	Mohamed Said Samantar
Minister in President's Office Responsible for Social Affairs (Acting)	Abdillahi Jama Mohamed

Table 20. Major Army Weapons, 1981[1]

Type	Description	Country of Manufacture	Estimated in Inventory
Tanks			
T-54/-55	Main battle tank; 100mm quick firing gun; most transferred 1974-76	Soviet Union	40
T-34	Medium tank; 85mm gun	-do-	60
Centurion	Main battle tank; 105mm gun	Britain	40
Armed personnel carriers (APC)			
BTR-40	9-passenger wheeled APC	Soviet Union	)
BTR-50	12-passenger tracked APC	-do-	) 50
BTR-60	10-12-passenger wheeled APC	-do-	)
Fiat 6614	10-passenger wheeled APC	Italy	) 200
Fiat 6616	Armored car; 20mm gun	-do-	)
BTR-152	12-passenger wheeled APC	Soviet Union	150
Artillery			
130mm	Field gun, towed	-do-	)
122mm	Field gun, towed	-do-	) 80
122mm	Howitzer, towed	-do-	)
100mm	Antitank gun/field gun, towed	-do-	)
85mm	Antitank gun, towed	-do-	) 150
76mm	Divisional gun, towed	-do-	)
120mm	Heavy mortar	-do-	n.a.
82mm	Medium mortar	-do-	n.a.
106mm	B-11-type recoilless rifle	China	n.a.
Antiaircraft guns			
100mm	Towed	Soviet Union	)
57mm	Towed	-do-	) 250
37mm	Towed	-do-	)
23mm	ZU 23-2-type, towed	-do-	)
Missiles			
SAM-2 Guideline	Land-mobile surface-to-air missile (SAM)	-do-	)) 30[2]
SAM-3 Goa	Land-mobile SAM; short-range defense vs. low flying aircraft	-do-	))
Milan	Surface-to-surface, man-portable, antitank guided weapon	France/ West Germany	100[2]

n.a.—not applicable.

[1] Serviceability low.

[2] Estimated number of launchers.

Table 21. Major Air Force Weapons, 1981[1]

Type	Description	Country of Manufacture	Estimated in Inventory
Combat aircraft			
MiG–17 Fresco	Mach 0.9 fighter-bomber	Soviet Union	9
MiG–21 Fishbed	Mach 2.1 fighter-bomber with AA–2 Atoll antiaircraft missiles	-do-	3
Shenyang F–6	Mach 1.3 fighter-bomber	China	30
Il–28 Beagle	Subsonic jet light bomber	Soviet Union	3
SF–260W	Single-engine light attack craft	Italy	6
Transport aircraft			
An–2	Single-engine light transport	Soviet Union	3
An–24/–26	Twin-turboprop transport	-do-	3
C–47	Twin-engine transport	United States	3
C–45	Twin-engine light transport	-do-	1
G–222	Twin-turboprop transport	Italy	4
Helicopters			
Mi–4	Twelve-seat transport	Soviet Union	4
Mi–8	Twin-engine medium transport	-do-	8
AB–204	General utility helicopter	United States/ Italy	1
AB–212	General utility helicopter	-do-	4
Trainers			
P–148	Single-engine, two-seat primary trainer	Italy	6
Yak–11	Single-engine, two-seat advanced trainer	Soviet Union	20
MiG–15 UTI	Two-seat advanced jet trainer	-do-	4
SM–1019	Single-engine training, observation, and light attack aircraft	Italy	6[2]

[1] Serviceability extremely low.
[2] On order or being delivered, 1981

*Table 22. Major Naval Weapons, 1981**

Type	Description	Country of Manufacture	Estimated in Inventory
Fast attack craft (FAC)			
Osa II-class	FAC (missile) with four SS-N-2 Styx antiship missiles; transferred 1975	Soviet Union	2
Mol-class	FAC (torpedo) with four 21-inch tubes; transferred 1976	-do-	4
P6-class	FAC (torpedo) with two 21-inch tubes; transferred 1968	-do-	4
Patrol craft			
Poluchat I-class	Large patrol craft; transferred 1965–66	-do-	5
Amphibious forces			
Polnochniy-class	Landing craft (tank); transferred 1976	-do-	1
T-4-class	Landing craft (medium); transferred 1968–69	-do-	4

* Few of these ships believed to be fully operational in 1981, four years after the withdrawal of Soviet advisers.

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Glossary

abbaan—Patron, in a relationship between a member of a dominant group and a member of a servile group; also used to refer to a host who bears some responsibility for a guest in his camp, village, or territory and to a man who acts as the protector of a merchant traveling through an area.

baraka—Blessing. To have baraka is to be in a state of special blessedness and therefore to have special power.

chaalle—See jaalle.

clan—A large group of people believed to be descendants through males of a common ancestor whose name is also the name of the clan. Several clans constitute a clan-family (*q.v.*), and each clan is divided into a number of lineages (*q.v.*).

clan-family—A group of clans (*q.v.*) believed to be linked ultimately by descent from a common ancestor. The six clan-families are Darod, Hawiye, Isaaq, Dir, Digil, and Rahanweyn.

contract (*heer*)—An agreement, often written, among members of an existing group (lineage, *q.v.*) or of more than one such group explicitly setting out their rights and duties in specified circumstances. A contract is the basis of a *dia*-paying group (*q.v.*).

dia-paying group—A group bound by contract either to pay blood compensation (*dia*) or to collect it if one of its members is the perpetrator or victim of homicide or other damage. Members of the group may also be bound by other rules agreed to by contract.

fiscal year (FY)—An annual period established for accounting purposes. The Somali fiscal year is coterminous with the calendar year.

GDP—Gross domestic product. The total value of goods and services produced within a country's borders during a fixed period, usually one year. Obtained by adding the value contributed by each sector of the economy in the form of compensation of employees, profits, and depreciation (consumption of capital). Subsistence production is included and consists of the imputed value of production by the farm family for its own use and the imputed rental value of owner-occupied dwellings.

GNP—Gross national product. GDP (*q.v.*) plus the income received from abroad by residents, less payments remitted abroad to nonresidents.

Haud—Wet season grazing area, lying partly in southern part of northern Somalia and partly in Ethiopia.

heer—Contract (*q.v.*), compact, or treaty.

jaalle—Sometimes *chaalle.* Somali term translated as comrade and widely used in public and official contexts. Precedes

other titles, e.g., comrade general.

jamaha—An agricultural community established by an Islamic brotherhood.

jiffo-paying group—A narrow group of kin responsible for paying or receiving that portion of the blood compensation (*dia*) that goes to the close kin of the victim of a homicide. *See dia*-paying group.

lineage—A group of persons tracing descent from a common ancestor; in Somalia the ancestor is male, and descent is traced through males. The group carries his name. A lineage may be part of a larger one and may consist of several smaller ones.

Northern Region—Sometimes used in official documents before the coup of October 1969 to refer to that part of Somalia formerly under British rule (British Somaliland).

qadi—A magistrate applying the sharia (*q.v.*) usually in subordinate courts.

reer—Meaning descendants of; applied to the members of a lineage (*q.v.*) of any size and genealogical depth; *reer* is followed by the name of the ancestor; the term is sometimes applied to a group even if its members are not necessarily descended from a common ancestor; *reer* is then followed by the name of the group.

Sab—Applied to the sedentary, agricultural Somalis living between the Juba and Shabeelle rivers and comprising the members of the Digil and Rahanweyn clan-families. Contrasted to Samaal (*q.v.*).

sab—Low. Term used by Somalis to refer to groups having low occupational and social status. To be distinguished from Sab (*q.v.*).

Samaal—Those Somalis of pastoral nomadic tradition, principally of four clan-families (Darod, Dir, Isaaq, and Hawiye), in contrast to the Sab (*q.v.*).

sharia—Islamic law. In Somalia the Shafii school of Islamic law.

sheikh—A term sometimes used for a *wadad* (*q.v.*) and granted as a title to the more learned religious figures.

shir—Council of elders (all adult males) of a clan (*q.v.*) or lineage (*q.v.*).

Somali shilling (Sh)—Currency of Somalia since national independence in 1960; divided into 100 Somali cents. Sh1 equaled US$0.14 (US$1 equaled Sh7.143) from July 1960 to August 1971. The rate varied slightly thereafter until December 1971 when Sh1 equaled US$0.144 (US$1 equaled Sh6.925). Sh1 equaled US$0.160 (US$1 equaled Sh6.233) in February 1973. From December 1973 until June 1981 Sh1 equaled US$0.159 (US$1 equaled Sh6.295). Effective July 1981 a two-tier rate system related to categories of imports was introduced; Sh1 equaled US$0.08 (US$1 equaled Sh12.46) in one case, in the other Sh1 equaled US$0.158 (US$1 equaled Sh6.35).

Southern Region—Sometimes used in official documents before October 1969 to refer to that part of Somalia formerly under Italian rule (Italian Somaliland or Trust Territory of Somalia under Italian Administration).

sultan—A term used for the head of a clan (*q.v.*) or lineage (*q.v.*) where such an office existed; a sultan did not have substantial secular authority.

tariqa (pl., *taruq*)—In Islam an order of religious devotees: a religious brotherhood.

tribe—A term sometimes applied to a clan-family (*q.v.*).

wadad (pl., *wadaddo*)—A religious figure or functionary; member of a *tariq* (*q.v.*) or of a hereditary lineage of religious figures; the Arabic term sheikh is sometimes used for *wadad*.

waranle—Spear carrier (warrior). Applied to adult males, particularly those of the pastoral tradition; excluded from this category are religious figures. See *wadad*.

World Bank—Group of three institutions consisting of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the International Development Association (IDA); established in 1945, the World Bank in 1981 was owned by the governments of approximately 140 countries, which subscribe the institutions' capital. The IFC works with the private sector in developing countries. The IDA operates in the same sectors and using the same policies as the IBRD but provides credits only to the poorer developing countries and on easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans.

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